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In a series of cases beginning in the 1960s and extending through the present
time, the Supreme Court has struggled with determining the extent to which the
First Amendment's protection for freedom of expression applies to the gathering
of information for the purpose of engaging in speech. The resulting First
Amendment "information-gathering" jurisprudence is anomalous in the general
scheme offree speech law in that it generally disfavors 'flows of information" of
an inherently political nature, and the protection that is extended to information-
gathering activities tends to be applied to one select type of information-
"news." Professor McDonald argues that such a jurisprudence is inadequate to
facilitate a 'free flow of information and ideas" that is the hallmark of a society
which places a premium on information and knowledge. Increasingly, the First
Amendment is being invoked not only to protect the gathering of news by the
institutional press, but also to protect academic and scientific research,
information gathering by private research and policy organizations, and the
collection and dissemination of information over the Internet. A logical extension
of the "structural" theory of the First Amendment-which the Court has
endorsed and which provides protection to the "essential processes" of
communication necessary to facilitate an informed public discussion of
important societal matters-would justify the recognition of a more uniform, but
limitea First Amendment right to gather many different types of information of
public concern. This right could be invoked only by those individuals and
groups whom our society recognizes as performing an important and valued
information-gathering and dissemination function as evidenced by certain
objective criteria suggested in this Article.
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Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
U.S. Constitution, Amendment I
I. INTRODUCTION
In their most literal form, the Speech and Press Clauses of the First
Amendment protect the freedom to speak and the freedom to publish using a
printing press.' Obviously, such a literal construction of these clauses would have
been inadequate to fully effectuate their purpose even in the days of their
adoption, for they would not have even covered correspondence by hand-written
letters (an essential mode of communication at that time). Hence, it is not
surprising that the U.S. Supreme Court has eschewed such a literal reading, and,
for the most part, has interpreted these clauses as redundant guarantees of the
freedom of expression. 2
But defining the precise scope of "freedom of expression" has been a more
challenging task for the Court. Certainly such freedoms include the right to
engage in expressive or communicative acts, such as speaking, writing, or
publishing, and have also been construed to include less obvious forms of
symbolic actions engaged in to convey a message (e.g., flag burning).3 Even these
freedoms, however, could be substantially undermined if the government were
permitted to interfere with the receipt of these various communications. Thus, it is
also not surprising that since 1943 the Court has maintained that freedom of
expression encompasses a right to receive information and ideas.4 And having
established a right to communicate, and a correlative right to receive
communications, later assertions by the Court that one of the chief purposes of the
First Amendment is to protect the "free flow" of information and ideas to the
1 Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue, the
weight of scholarly commentary supports the view that in using the term "freedom of the
press," the Framers were referring to the use of the printing press for publishing activities
rather than the institution of the organized "press." See, e.g., David A. Anderson,
Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 446 (2002); see also First Nat'l Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) ("[Tihe history of
the [Press] Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a 'special' or
'institutional' privilege.").
2 See infra note 29 and accompanying text.
3 See infra notes 30-34 and accompanying text.
4 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (declaring that the freedoms
of speech and press "necessarily protect[] the right to receive [expression]"); see also
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (observing that "[it is now well established
that the [First Amendment] protects the right to receive information and ideas").
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public seemed to be a natural extension of these principles.5 On this conception of
freedom of expression, however, the Court's focus was not so much on protecting
individual interests in expressing oneself or receiving another's expression, but
rather on the societal interest in maintaining a sufficient flow of information to the
public about matters of social concern in order to foster our system of informed
self-governance. 6
One problem with this system of maintaining a flow of important information
to the public, however, was its vulnerability at the "head" of the flow: even if the
government was prohibited from unduly interfering with the flow itself or its
destinations, what would prevent the government from constricting its sources? In
other words, did the First Amendment encompass a right to be free from undue
governmental interference with the acquisition or gathering of information
destined to enter that flow?7
In a series of cases brought primarily by the institutional press to test this
proposition as one of society's most prominent information gatherers, the Court
responded in a remarkably erratic and fragmented way. The Court initially held
that there is no general First Amendment right to gather information in order to
speak or publish it.8 But then the Court retreated from this position in the area of
newsgathering, asserting that the First Amendment does provide some protection
for such activities.9 Somewhat paradoxically, however, the Court later decided
5 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) ("At the heart of the
First Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern."); Associated Press v.
United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (asserting the First Amendment commands that "the
government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas").
6 See, e.g., Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (declaring that heightened
First Amendment protection for speech about government representatives "protects the
paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people concerning public
officials, their servants"); see also id. at 74-75 (The Court observed that "speech
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-
government. The First and Fourteenth Amendments embody our 'profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust
and wide-open....') (quoting New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
But cf Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 762-67 (1976) (explaining that protecting a "free flow of commercial information"
to the public promotes both individual and societal interests).
7 Cf In re Mack, 126 A.2d 679, 689 (Pa. 1956) (Musmanno, J., dissenting)
("Freedom of the press means freedom to gather news, write it, publish it, and circulate it.
When any one of these integral operations is interdicted, freedom of the press becomes a
river without water."); Note, The Rights of the Public and the Press to Gather
Information, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1505, 1505 (1974) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
8 See Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965), discussed infra at notes 69-78 and
accompanying text.
9 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972), discussed infra at notes 79-99
and accompanying text.
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that if information (whether "news" or otherwise) is being sought from
governmental bodies about their actions or decisions, no First Amendment rights
are implicated when access to that information is denied1° unless the information
concerns the conduct of criminal trials (in which case the strictest form of First
Amendment scrutiny does apply to any governmental interference).'1 And most
recently, the Court has suggested that a general newsgathering right does not
apply in cases where it may conflict with laws of general application (such as tort,
property, or contract laws).12
To illustrate how the lower courts are grappling with this inscrutable scheme,
consider the following examples. When an educational tour group claimed a First
Amendment right to travel to Cuba to acquire information to engage in the public
debate about the Cuban embargo, the court held that no such rights were
implicated because government restrictions on that travel merely interfered with
the group's desire to gather information. 13 But when a law prohibited the news
media from gathering exit-polling data,14 or police officers prevented freelance
journalists from videotaping a protest march 15 or photographing a traffic
accident, 16 the law and police actions were held to infringe the media's First
Amendment right of newsgathering. At the same time, alleged violations by the
10 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co.,
417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974); Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978); see also Los
Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40-41 (1999).
These cases are discussed infra at notes 100-35 and 193-209 and accompanying text.
11 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980) and
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982), discussed infra at
notes 144-76 and accompanying text.
12 See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991), discussed infra at
notes 177-92 and accompanying text.
13 See Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th Cir.
1996) (asserting that "where a person seeks only to gather information, no First
Amendment rights are implicated").
14 See CBS, Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794, 802 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a
state law prohibiting solicitation of voters within 150 feet of polling places violated the
media's newsgathering and free speech rights in part because "[t]he gathering of news of
political consequence is a necessary corollary to the freedom to report about politics and
government") (citing Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)).
15 See Fordyce v. City of Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 438-40 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
summary judgment in an action against police for interference with plaintiff's "First
Amendment right to gather news" was improper).
16 See Connell v. Town of Hudson, 733 F. Supp. 465, 469-71 (D.N.H. 1990)
(holding that police violated the First Amendment right of the news media " 'to be in
public places and on public property to gather information photographically or
otherwise' " by barring photographs of fatal car accident on public streets (quoting
Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972))).
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news media of general tort laws in connection with its coverage of a hostage
standoff presented no First Amendment concerns. 17
Similarly, when the news media and others sought records from the
government about a defunct agency that had been devoted to maintaining racial
segregation, no First Amendment rights were implicated.18 Nonetheless, where
access was sought to INS deportation proceedings conducted in the wake of the
September 11 terrorist events, one court believed those proceedings were
sufficiently like criminal trials to find a First Amendment right of access, while
another court disagreed. 19 Given this scheme, it is little wonder that judges have
complained about the "unsettled" and "fuliginous" nature of the legal principles in
this area.20 And legal scholars are not in general agreement about their
application.2
1
17 See Risenhoover v. England, 936 F. Supp. 392, 404 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (rejecting
First Amendment defense of news media against claims of negligence related to the
injury and death of federal agents during the Branch Davidian standoff at Waco,
explaining that "the press must abide by laws of general applicability even though such
laws may impose an incidental burden upon the ability to gather or report the news").
18 See ACLU of Mississippi v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1990),
affid 84 F.3d 784, 787 (5th Cir. 1996) (observing that "there is no constitutional right to
have access to particular government information, or to require openness from the
bureaucracy") (quotation omitted).
19 Compare Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 709 (6th Cir. 2002)
(finding First Amendment right to attend deportation proceedings), with North Jersey
Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 201, 204-21 (3d Cir. 2002) (disagreeing
with Detroit Free Press and rejecting right of access). Although these decisions created a
direct conflict in the U.S. Courts of Appeal, the Supreme Court recently declined to
resolve it. See North Jersey Media Group v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 2215 (2003) (denial of
certiorari). Although it is impossible to determine the basis for the Court's inaction, one
possible reason may be the difficulties inherent in delineating the scope of a First
Amendment right of access to government-controlled information as the Court currently
defines it. See infra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
20 See Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 29 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (In dissent, Justice Stevens argued in the Court's last major case dealing with
First Amendment right of access to government information, that "[ilt is
unfortunate ... the Court neglects this opportunity to fit the result in this case into the
body of precedent dealing with access rights generally. I fear that today's decision will
simply further unsettle the law in this area."); El Dia, Inc. v. Hernandez Colon, 963 F.2d
488, 494 (1st Cir. 1992) (describing, in a right of access case, the First Amendment issues
as "fuliginous").
21 Compare A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1461,
1508 (2000) (asserting that "both the Supreme Court and appellate courts have
interpreted the First Amendment to encompass a right to gather information"), with
Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 237, 246 (1995) (stating that whenever a "First
Amendment right to gather information.., was squarely presented [to] the Court, the
proponents of the putative right-to-gather were emphatically denied"). Compare also C.
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In essence, the Court has created a legal scheme governing a First
Amendment right to gather information that is not only fragmented and
inconsistent, but appears to be in substantial tension with two cardinal tenets of
free speech law. First, the gathering of information from government sources
(except for criminal courts) that directly concerns their activities and decisions is
generally afforded less constitutional protection than the gathering of information
from non-governmental sources. This appears to turn the First Amendment's
"core" protection for speech of a political or governmental nature on its head.
Second, the Court appears to be making the very existence of a First Amendment
"right" depend on the type or content of the information being gathered: at a
general level whether the information gathering concerns internal government
affairs versus other types of information, and within these two general categories
whether it concerns the affairs of one branch of government versus another, or
"news" versus other types of information. 22 This seems to be in substantial
tension with established First Amendment principles that generally require
government regulation of conduct associated with speech to be neutral with
respect to the content of the speech at issue.23
Although commentators have certainly scrutinized various aspects of the
constitutional scheme governing a First Amendment right to gather information-
focusing on the question of the public's "right to know" government-controlled
information 24 or First Amendment protection for general newsgathering
Thomas Dienes, Trial Participants in the Newsgathering Process, 34 U. RICH. L. REv.
1107, 1125 (2001) (asserting that "[t]here is little question today that the First
Amendment protects newsgathering"), with Anderson, supra note 1, at 485 (observing
that the "press's ability to gather news is protected almost entirely by nonconstitutional
means"), and Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect The Press: A First Amendment Standard for
Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REV. 1143, 1157 (2000) (noting
that "the Supreme Court and the lower courts consistently have rejected First Amendment
protection for newsgathering").
22 For purposes of this Article the term "news," as commonly understood in the
context of newsgathering and reporting, shall refer to information about recent or current
events of general or public interest. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Dell Publ'g Co., 251 F.2d 447,
451 (3d Cir. 1958).
23 See infra notes 223-25 and accompanying text. Of course, even under general
First Amendment principles the Court has sanctioned various content-based categories of
lesser-protected or disfavored speech-such as commercial speech, libel, incitement, and
obscenity-where the government is given greater leeway to regulate the content of the
speech (and a fortiori conduct associated with that speech). But it is clear that the
"information gathering" categories created by the Court are not tied to such "low value"
speech distinctions, but instead discriminate based on the type of otherwise fully-
protected speech that is at issue.
24 See, e.g., Lillian R. BeVier, Like Mackerel in the Moonlight: Some Reflections on
Richmond Newspapers, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 311, 314 (1982) [hereinafter Mackerel in
Moonlight]; Lillian R. BeVier, Justice Powell and The First Amendment's 'Societal
Function': A Preliminary Analysis, 68 VA. L. REv. 177, 177-178 (1982) [hereinafter
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activities 25-none appears to have examined whether this body of law makes
sense as a whole.26 This Article seeks to fill that gap. In Part I, I will explore in
Justice Powell]; Lillian R. BeVier, An Informed Public, an Informing Press: The Search
for a Constitutional Principle, 68 CAL. L. REV. 482, 484 (1980) [hereinafter Informed
Public]; Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85
COLUM. L. REV. 449, 489-95 (1985); Cerruti, supra note 21, at 245-46; Mary M. Cheh,
Judicial Supervision of Executive Secrecy: Rethinking Freedom of Expression for
Government Employees and the Public Right of Access to Government Information, 69
CORNELL L. REV. 690, 698 (1984); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and
the First Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927, 929 (1992); Steven Helle, The News-
Gathering/Publication Dichotomy and Government Expression, 1982 DUKE L.J. 1, 3
(1982); Anthony Lewis, A Public Right to Know About Public Institutions: The First
Amendment as Sword, 1980 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 8-9; see generally David M. O'Brien, The
First Amendment and the Public's "Right to Know," 7 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 579
(1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Government Control of Information, 74 CAL. L. REV. 889
(1986).
25 See generally Randall P. Bezanson, Means and Ends and Food Lion: The Tension
Between Exemption and Independence in Newsgathering by the Press, 47 EMORY L.J.
895 (1998); Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 3 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 521, 591-611 (1977) [hereinafter The Checking Value]; Chemerinsky,
supra note 21; Tom A. Collins, The Press Clause Construed in Context: The Journalists'
Right of Access to Places, 52 Mo. L. REV. 751 (1987); Dienes, supra note 21; Eric B.
Easton, Two Wrongs Mock A Right: Overcoming the Cohen Maledicta That Bar First
Amendment Protection for Newsgathering, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1135 (1997); Rodney A.
Smolla, Qualified Intimacy, Celebrity, and the Case for a Newsgathering Privilege, 33 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1233 (2000); Roy S. Gutterman, Note, Chilled Bananas: Why
Newsgathering Demands More First Amendment Protection, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 197
(2000).
26 The closest anyone has come to analyzing all aspects of a right to gather
information as a unitary body of law is the late prominent First Amendment scholar
Thomas I. Emerson. In his article Legal Foundations of the Right to Know, 1976 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1 (1977), Professor Emerson purports to "outline issues" associated with a First
Amendment "right to know" that consists of both a right to gather information and a right
to receive information and ideas. See generally id. Together with the right to
communicate, all of these rights constitute a complete "system of freedom of expression"
similar to the "information flows" discussed in this Article. As part of his analysis,
Professor Emerson explores issues associated with obtaining information from both
governmental and private sources. See generally id. Where pertinent, these views will be
explored in the relevant sections of this Article. One apparent gap in Professor Emerson's
analysis concerns issues presented by governmental interference with a person's right to
gather information from the public domain, such as when the police interfere with a
journalist's efforts to photograph a disaster scene or other public event. See supra notes
15-16 and accompanying text. Collectively, these three sources of information-
governmental or public entities, private parties, and the public domain-would appear to
constitute the universe of sources of information from which a person could conceivably
draw (apart of course, from his or her own thoughts and experiences). Prior to the
decisions in many of the key Supreme Court cases relevant to this issue, another
commentator purported to write about a general First Amendment right to gather
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more detail the nature of a right to gather information and how it fits (or does not
fit) within the general scheme of First Amendment protection for freedom of
expression. As I will discuss, the cautious ambivalence the Supreme Court and
lower courts generally demonstrate with regard to such a right is understandable.
On the one hand, information gathering frequently consists of non-expressive
conduct that bears a more attenuated link to acts of expression than other forms of
non-expressive conduct accorded First Amendment protection. On the other hand,
the government could abridge flows of important information to the public by
simply restricting or burdening antecedent conduct that generates those flows.
In Part I1, I will describe the evolution of the Supreme Court decisions
involving a First Amendment right to gather information. I will demonstrate that
many of the inconsistencies in its information-gathering jurisprudence have
resulted from the Court's myopic fear of granting perceived privileges to the news
media as a private institution, which caused it to lose sight of the functional role
played by the press as a vital information-gathering agent of the public. Lower
court treatment of a right to gather information will also be discussed. In Part K, I
will analyze the problems presented by the Court's jurisprudence in this area.
Ironically, one problem is that the First Amendment protection lower courts have
conferred on information-gathering activities tends to be limited to the gathering
of "news." In today's information society, where academic and scientific
researchers, non-governmental organizations such as "think tanks" and related
public policy groups, and other information-oriented enterprises are playing
increasingly important roles in conveying information to the public, such a
limited scope of protection is anachronistic and inadequate to meet current
societal needs.27
Finally, in Part IV of this Article, I will outline some preliminary proposals
for creating a cohesive and workable right to gather information under the First
Amendment that would apply regardless of the context in which such a claim was
made. I will propose that instead of an "all-or-nothing" approach to such a right,
both of which the Court has espoused in different situations, an intermediate
position supported by the express provisions of the First Amendment-and in
information but limited his or her analysis to "the scope of the public and press right to
gather news .... " Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1510 (emphasis supplied).
27 See infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text. Recent advances in science and
technology can be expected to result in a proliferation of new types of First Amendment
information-gathering claims. For instance, recent laws restricting access to digital
information transmitted on the Internet or in other electronic media, and proposed laws
barring certain forms of scientific research in the area of biomedical science, are already
generating such claims. See id. Another problem with limiting an information-gathering
right to the "press" is that it is becoming increasingly difficult in the age of "media and
content convergence" to determine who or what the "press" is. See Anderson, supra note
1, at 435-46.
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particular the Press Clause-is the best way to meet society's need to preserve
meaningful flows of information.
Preliminarily, I will contend that recognizing a general right to gather
information in order to engage in "speech" would be unduly broad and
unmanageable, encouraging an undesirable increase in social conflict involving
First Amendment values and other interests valued by society. However, I will
argue that a reinvigorated and expanded interpretation of the Press Clause, one
that accords a limited right to gather information to all individuals and groups that
society recognizes as performing legitimate and valuable information-gathering
and dissemination functions today (whether news media or not), is the best way to
preserve and facilitate modem flows of quality information. 28 Moreover, I will
propose some basic criteria for identifying such individuals or groups. Such an
approach would align this area of the law with traditional freedom of expression
principles-making the existence of the right depend solely on First Amendment
values (to then be weighed against competing societal interests in particular
cases), rather than having it depend on whatever competing interests happen to be
28 1 am not the first to propose an independent and special role for the Press Clause
in protecting the "system" of freedom of expression. Prominent scholars, jurists, and
others have previously argued both for and against special First Amendment protections
for the institutional news media-for its newsgathering, editorial, and/or publication
functions-based on the text and history of that Amendment, or the structure and policies
underlying the Constitution. However, this Article takes a much different approach. First,
it proposes a return to the traditional conception of the Press Clause as protecting all in
today's society-and not just the news media-who perform a recognized and valued
function in gathering and disseminating important information to society. Second, it
proposes an independent role for that Clause that is limited to the information-gathering
stage of the publication process, and not the editing/analysis or dissemination phases.
These latter two phases appear to be adequately protected by traditional First Amendment
principles, and there seems to be little reason to distinguish between "publishers" and
other speakers in this regard. But in the information-gathering stage of the process-
where First Amendment protection is being sought for non-expressive types of conduct-
this Article will argue that there is good reason to withhold such protection for "ordinary
speakers" while granting it on a limited basis to those who provide a quid pro quo to
society in the form of facilitating valuable flows of information. See infra Part 1V. For
some of the more notable articles exploring the merits of unique Press Clause protection
for the news media (both pro and con), see generally Anderson, supra note 1; David A.
Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455 (1983); C. Edwin
Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 MIAMI L. REV.
819 (1980) [hereinafter Press Rights]; Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press
Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977); David Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses, 23
UCLA L. REV. 77 (1975); Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy:
What Does It Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1975) [hereinafter
Freedom of the Press]; Melville B. Nimmer, Speech and Press: A Brief Reply, 23 UCLA
L. REV. 120 (1975); Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631 (1975);
William W. Van Alstyne, Comment, The Hazards to the Press of Claiming a "Preferred
Position," 28 HASTINGs L.J. 761 (1977).
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present in a given context (as the Court seems to have done). With such a
revitalized interpretation of the Press Clause, the First Amendment could truly
serve as a protective aqueduct for facilitating important flows of information
within society-from source to destination.
I. RELATIONSHIP OF A RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION TO THE FRST
AMENDMENT GENERALLY
To properly evaluate a First Amendment right to gather information, it is
important to assess it against the general backdrop of the Court's freedom of
expression jurisprudence. As stated earlier, the Court has interpreted the First
Amendment much more broadly than its explicit protection for speech and
publishing activities might suggest. Although the Court has mainly treated the
Press Clause as a superfluous subset of the Speech Clause,29 it has construed the
latter clause to cover most forms of human conduct engaged in for the purpose of
expressing or communicating information or ideas.30 This includes not only acts
29 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 430 ("Most of the freedoms the press
receives from the First Amendment are no different from the freedoms everyone enjoys
under the Speech Clause."); id. at 448-50 (observing that while at times during the mid-
20th century "the Court invoked the Press Clause ... and appeared to rely on it... to
protect freedom of the press," over the last 30 years "the Court seemed to lose its
enthusiasm for the Press Clause . . [and has] treated media cases as free-speech cases
rather than free-press cases"); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 22-b21 (3d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2001) (asserting that "on the whole, the
Supreme Court has been reluctant to carve out unique meaning for the Press Clause, as
distinguished from the Speech Clause").
30 See SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 11-2 ('The Supreme Court has long recognized
that First Amendment protection for speech extends to more than the use of language,
encompassing communication through the use of nonlanguage symbols") (footnote
omitted); id. at 11-5 (nonverbal conduct is protected where an actor "undertake[s] the
action to communicate"). Traditionally, the First Amendment's protection for "[f]ree
speech has been thought to serve three principal values: advancing knowledge and 'truth'
in the 'marketplace of ideas,' facilitating representative democracy and self-government,
and promoting individual autonomy, self-expression and self-fulfillment." KATHLEEN M.
SULLIVAN & GERALD G. GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 4 (David L. Shapiro et al.
eds., 1999); cf generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REV. 593 (1982) (acknowledging the legitimacy of these values, but arguing that they are
all encompassed by one overarching value of "individual self-realization"). A First
Amendment right to gather information for the purpose of engaging in expression would
appear to promote values similar to those traditionally associated with free speech. See
Emerson, supra note 26, at 2 (stating that the rights to receive and obtain information
serve "much the same function in our society as the right to communicate"). However,
one could make a strong case that the discovery of truth and knowledge is especially
furthered by an information-gathering right. Clearly, the more speech is based on "good"
information or facts, the more likely that speech will be to accurately depict reality. See
infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
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of speaking or communicating in other verbal or aural forms (e.g., singing or
orchestral performances), but also the acts of representing things visually in
writings, pictures or other works of art, or audio-visually in multiple formats such
as text, sound, graphics, pictures, or videos that are transmitted via electronic
means of communication (i.e., "multimedia"). 31 Such protection includes not only
the "speech" itself (i.e., the making or use of the symbols or representations), but
also conduct that is necessary for, or integrally tied to, acts of expression. Thus,
the Court has typically analyzed governmental restraints on such conduct (e.g.,
the distribution of handbills, acts of door-to-door solicitation, or operation of
sound amplification equipment) as restraints on the speech itself.32 So even
conduct that is not inherently expressive in itself (and can even be characterized
as "non-expressive" when viewed in isolation), is typically accorded First
Amendment protection provided it is intimately bound up with an expressive
act.33
The Court has also extended protection to conduct less commonly associated
with acts of communication or expression, provided the conduct is engaged in
with the intent to express or communicate a message. For instance, the Court has
held that the act of burning a draft card or U.S. flag as a vehicle for political
protest is entitled to some measure of First Amendment protection. 34 In such
31 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989) ("Music, as a
form of expression and communication, is protected under the First Amendment.");
Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1973) ("[P]ictures, films, paintings,
drawings, and engravings... have First Amendment protection.").
32 See Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Viii. of Stratton, 536
U.S. 150, 168-69 (2002) (door to door solicitation); Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (regulation of
use of bandshell sound equipment); Lovell v. City of Griffm, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)
(handbill distribution). Of course, when the government regulates conduct bound up with
expression on a content-neutral basis as a time, place, or manner restriction on the
affected speech, the government is generally accorded more leeway in regulating such
speech than when the government regulates speech on the basis of its content. See, e.g.,
Ward, 419 U.S. at 791-803 (upholding sound equipment regulations under an
"intermediate" level of scrutiny). But cf Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y, 536 U.S. at
164-69 (declining to analyze a licensing requirement for door to door solicitation
activities as a time, place, or manner restriction given the amount of speech restricted in
comparison to competing governmental interests).
33 Of course, according speech or conduct First Amendment "protection" does not
mean that a person will always have a right to engage in it. It simply means that a person
may seek to have a court scrutinize the propriety of government restraints on such acts
under established First Amendment principles. The government interests at stake in a
given case may be found to "trump" the First Amendment rights being asserted.
34 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 418-19 (1989) (flag burning); United States
v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968) (draft card burning). As with content-neutral
time, place, or manner restrictions on speech, content-neutral regulation of the "conduct"
aspect of expressive or symbolic conduct is also subject to a less rigorous level of
constitutional scrutiny than would be any content-based regulation of the expressive
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instances, conduct not automatically associated with expression becomes
"expressive" by virtue of the speaker's intent to engage in such conduct in a
symbolic manner.
Thus, the Court has construed the First Amendment broadly to cover conduct
that is either expressive itself-by its nature or because engaged in for an
expressive purpose-or intimately related to acts of expression. However, this
does not exhaust the scope of the Amendment's free speech guarantees; the Court
has also pulled certain forms of conduct within its ambit not because they are
expressive in nature, but rather because they are deemed necessary to accord full
meaning and substance to those guarantees. Thus, as mentioned earlier, the Court
has held that the First Amendment protects the "right to receive information or
ideas," not only to vindicate a speaker's right to speak but also an independent
right of listeners to receive the communication. 35 Similarly, the Court has
recognized a "right not to speak," in recognition of the fact that freedom of
expression would not be complete if it were limited to the right to say what one
desired; full freedom also encompasses the right not to engage in expression
against one's will.3 6 Also, the Court has recognized the right of putative speakers
to gain access to certain types of government property for the purpose of
engaging in expressive activities, even though gaining physical access to a place
is typically not an expressive act.37 Finally, the Court has recognized a right to
associate with other members of society, not because such activities are
component. See generally O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-82 (upholding draft card regulations
under an "intermediate" level of scrutiny).
35 In other words, what is protected by the First Amendment is "speech" itself (its
generation, transmission, and receipt), and not just acts of "speaking." See, e.g., Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756 (1976)
("Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a speaker exists... the
protection afforded is to the communication, to its source and to its recipients both."); id.
at 757 n.15 (rejecting certain limitations on "the independent right of the listener to
receive the information sought to be communicated"); see also Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion) (asserting that the right to receive information
"is an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech and press.., in two senses. First, the
right to receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to
send them .... More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the
recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political
freedom") (emphases in original). See infra notes 59-67 and accompanying text for a
discussion of how the right to receive information and ideas differs from a claimed right
to gather information.
36 See SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 4-19 ("The First Amendment generally prohibits
government from forcing a speaker to profess statements or beliefs against the speaker's
will. 'At the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should
decide for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration and
adherence."') (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).
37 See, e.g., Arkansas Ed. Television Comm. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 676-78
(1998) (describing the Court's public fora doctrine).
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necessarily expressive in and of themselves (although they can be in some
situations), but rather because they facilitate the expressive activities of people
that associate together.38 In sum, the Court has recognized that there must be
corollary rights to engage in certain forms of "non-expressive" conduct for the
First Amendment's free speech guarantees to be fully realized.
Returning to the "free flow of information" metaphor, a "flow" of anything-
be it a river of water or information-is generally characterized by a source or
origin of the flow, the flow itself, and its destination. Since First Amendment
protection plainly extends to the latter two aspects of information flows, why is
there so much uncertainty and ambivalence about extending its protection to the
"wellspring" of the information? After all, without protection of their sources,
won't information flows dry up and freedom of expression lose meaning? And
don't the demands of symmetry and logic dictate that if non-expressive conduct at
one end of the flow is entitled to protection (the receipt of information), then non-
expressive conduct at the other end (the acquisition of information) should be
protected as well? 39
The answer to these questions must begin with an examination of the nature
of information gathering. What exactly does this mean? Certainly not all
communications or expression require information gathering at the front end of
the process in order to give them content or substance. For instance, if one
experiences pangs of hunger and relates that feeling to someone else, it is difficult
to say the speaker has gathered any information to engage in that communication
except perhaps in a very narrow, "internal" sense-it is possible to say that the
speaker's brain has "gathered" signals from its stomach that it is low on food,
which then formed the basis for the subsequent communication. Similarly, if a
person has a dream or comes up with a very original idea that she describes to
another, again it is difficult to say that any affirmative information gathering has
occurred. But in this situation, unlike a wholly internally-generated sensation, it is
probably safe to say that most original ideas, and even dreams to some extent,
have some basis in information that has been acquired from one's external
environment (e.g., experiences, observations, conversations, etc.). Thus it appears
that the notion of information gathering, at least in the First Amendment context,
38 See, e.g., SULLIVAN & GUNTHER, supra note 30, at 369-70 ("The right to
associate reflects the notion that individual rights of expression can be made more
effectual by collective action.... The Court has tended to view the right of association as
dependent on underlying individual rights of expression; there is no right of association
in the abstract.") (citations omitted).
39 As will be discussed more fully below, although information-gathering activities
may consist of some expressive activities such as acquiring information through a
conversation with someone, any such expression is often incidental to the generally non-
expressive nature of the information-gathering process. See infra notes 53-56 and
accompanying text.
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is to some extent linked to one's ability to acquire information from his or her
external environment where that information is then communicated to another.
But such "passive" information-gathering activities, which people engage in
as a mostly unconscious and natural everyday activity, are not likely to be the
subject of a claim of First Amendment entitlement. This is true for the simple
reason that most people are unlikely to ever encounter any governmental
interference with such normal and expected human activities. 40 Such interference
is most likely to be encountered when information gathering shifts from a passive
mode into a more active one, and not even then until people are engaged in
seeking out information in. a manner that conflicts with other socially-valued
interests that have a claim to legal recognition. It is at this point, when a person's
information-seeking activities are at greatest risk of "invad[ing] the rights and
liberties of others,"41 where one's alleged First Amendment interests may clash
with other legally recognized interests such as rights in property, privacy,
confidentiality, or security.
Thus it is apparent that claims of a First Amendment right to gather
information are most likely to arise in situations where someone's information-
seeking activities are being met with objections of others-often the government
itself-asserting conflicting, legally cognizable interests. To date, news and
information-gathering claims made by the news media and public have taken on a
"sword" and "shield" aspect: as a sword to gain access to government
proceedings and facilities, as well as to obtain other information or documents
within the government's control; as a shield mainly when asserted as a defense by
members of the news media who have been accused of violating civil or criminal
laws in the course of gathering the news, or who have been subjected to civil or
criminal process by government officials or private parties attempting to obtain
information gathered in the course of a news investigation.42
But as scientific and technological advances facilitate the ability to both
gather and disseminate information, increasing the demand for and uses of
information, it is not difficult to envision a proliferation of information-gathering
40 It may be true for another reason as well: generally the Court has extended First
Amendment protection to conduct only when it is engaged in for a "speech" purpose. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text. Thus to the extent a person was not gathering
information with a conscious purpose of using it in a subsequent communication, any
claim of First Amendment protection for that conduct might be viewed as being too
attenuated to assert. Indeed, I will argue later that First Amendment protection for
information-gathering activities should be predicated, among other things, upon an intent
to publicly disseminate the sought-after information. See infra notes 330-33 and
accompanying text.
41 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 683 (1972) (observing that the press "has no
special privilege to invade the rights' and liberties of others" in performing its functions)
(citing Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 132-33 (1937)).
42 See infra notes 213-22 and accompanying text.
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claims both inside and outside these traditional spheres of contest. The
development of increasingly smaller and easy-to-use videotaping, photographing,
and recording equipment has produced a plethora of claims in recent years of a
First Amendment right to record government proceedings, police conduct, public
events, and scenes of accidents and disasters.43 Owners of information products
distributed in digital form, either on-line or in other electronic media like CD-
ROMs, were recently successful in convincing Congress to supplement traditional
copyright protections for such products with additional laws essentially banning
the sale, distribution, and use of software that can be used to override access
control and anti-copying mechanisms embedded in such information products."
Already claims are being made that these laws conflict with the First Amendment
rights of others to gain access to and copy digital works when it would be
arguably lawful to do so in the absence of such control mechanisms. 45
As biomedical science exerts increasing control over biological processes,
more calls are being made to regulate or prohibit certain areas of scientific
43 See, e.g., Smith v. City of Cumming, 212 F.3d 1332, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000)
(holding that citizens have a First Amendment right to videotape the conduct of police
officers in public places); Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland, 193
F.3d 177, 183-84 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that a ban on videotaping township planning
committee meetings was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction on First
Amendment right of access to such proceedings); see also cases discussed at supra notes
15-16 and accompanying text.
44 See, e.g., United States v. Elcom, Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1123-25 (N.D. Cal.
2002) (describing anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act ("DMCA"), 17 U.S.C.A. § 1201(b) (West Supp. 2003)).
45 See id. at 1132-35 (rejecting the First Amendment overbreadth claim of a maker
of software permitting the copying of electronic books that DMCA "impairs the First
Amendment right to access non-copyrighted works [and] ... precludes third parties from
exercising their rights of fair use," all in derogation of society's interest in "the free flow
of such information"); see also Edelman v. N2H2, Inc., 263 F. Supp. 2d 137, 138-39 (D.
Mass. 2003) (dismissing as premature a declaratory judgment action by a computer
researcher alleging, inter alia, that DMCA violated his First Amendment right to gain
access to and copy a list of websites blocked by Internet filtering software for purposes of
testing and publishing a study on the software's accuracy). It should be noted that when a
First Amendment defense is made to charges of illegally accessing and copying digital
works, as opposed to illegally disseminating them, what is really being asserted is a First
Amendment right to access or gather the pertinent materials (versus the traditional right
of expression which would be implicated by charges of the latter sort). This distinction
would be particularly evident in cases where a protected work was accessed and copied
illegally with an intent to disseminate it, but for whatever reason was never subsequently
disseminated. Of course, if there was never an intent or purpose to disseminate or "speak"
a copied work, it is difficult to see how a First Amendment defense would be implicated
at all. For a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of claims that a First
Amendment right to gather information is being impaired by the application of generally
applicable laws (such as the DMCA or copyright laws), see infra notes 284-302 and
accompanying text.
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research. Indeed, in 2003 the House of Representatives voted to ban a type of
scientific procedure that would effectively preclude further experimentation in a
new field of medical research, thus precluding the acquisition of new information
and data that would allow that research to advance.46 And with the recent
46 An uncontroversial part of the House's bill makes it a criminal act to attempt to
clone a human being, but more controversial provisions also criminalize a procedure
called "therapeutic cloning," which scientists use to create human embryos for purposes
of stem cell research. See Aaron Zitner, House Votes to Outlaw Human Cloning; Ban
Includes Research, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2003, at A32 (discussing the Human Cloning
Prohibition Act of 2003, H.R. 538, 108th Cong. (2003)). The House had passed a similar
bill in the previous session of Congress, but it died in the U.S. Senate "after a bitter
stalemate in which scientists and patient advocacy groups argued that a [total] ban [on
cloning] would stall promising medical advances." Rick Weiss, An Uncertain Year for
Cloning Laws; Ban on Embryo Research Seen as Unlikely, WASH. POST, Dec. 26, 2002,
at Al. Despite the House's passage of the bill for a second time, many believe that a
political compromise will be reached resulting in a mandatory moratorium on therapeutic
cloning research for a set period of time (which essentially would be a ban on research
for that period). See id. Any consideration of the profound ethical and moral issues
associated with cloning human embryos for research purposes is beyond the scope of this
Article. The point here is that scientific research, as a form of information gathering, is
going to be subject to increasing public scrutiny and calls for regulation as it pushes
forward the frontiers of knowledge and human capabilities in various fields. See, e.g.,
Justin Gillis, Scientists Planning to Make New Form of Life, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 2002,
at Al (reporting that "[sicientists ... plan to create a new form of life in a laboratory
dish, a project that raises ethical and safety issues but also promises to illuminate the
fundamental mechanics of living organisms"). Undoubtedly, such calls will be answered
by claims of scientists that they have a First Amendment right to engage in such research.
See California Attempts Stem Cell Research, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 11, 2002 (quoting
state legislator supportive of stem cell research as stating, with respect to potential federal
laws restricting it, that " '[there are a whole spectrum of legal issues that should be
considered'. .. including scientists' First Amendment rights to freedom of expression in
the research"). Indeed, similar calls to restrict scientific research were made in the 1970's
after Stanford University scientists learned to recombine the DNA of different
microorganisms, spurring fears of an inadvertent release of potentially dangerous life
forms into the environment. In response to these calls, several legal scholars argued both
for and against a First Amendment right to engage in scientific research. Compare Gary
L. Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136
U. PA. L. REv. 417, 422-26 (1987) (rejecting First Amendment right to engage in
scientific experimentation), with John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research: A
Constitutional Analysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1215-40 (1977) (advocating such a
right).
One might argue that scientific research is a qualitatively different information-
gathering activity for First Amendment purposes than, say, typical newsgathering or
investigative journalism. For instance, scientific research often involves "academic
freedom" considerations that are normally not thought to be present in journalism and
which may raise special First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 262-63 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). On the other hand,
with science being increasingly funded by profit-oriented private businesses that often
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proliferation of non-governmental organizations such as non-profit research
institutes (otherwise known as "think tanks") and other public interest or issue
advocacy groups that are seeking to hold government and industry more
accountable, more and more studies and investigations are being undertaken that
can be expected to raise additional claims of entitlement to information. 47
keep their discoveries confidential for competitive reasons, one might question to what
extent academic freedom principles are still applicable to such scientific enterprises (not
to mention the fact that if scientific discoveries are kept confidential rather than being
published in conformity with traditional norms, one might question the extent to which
the First Amendment's protection for "free speech," or more accurately "information
gathering for speech purposes," is even implicated). In addition to these problems, one
could argue that scientific research often involves the "generation" of new information,
whereas typical journalism only involves the "collection" of existing information. See,
e.g., Roy G. Spece, Jr. & Jennifer Weinzierl, First Amendment Protection of
Experimentation: A Critical Review and Tentative Synthesis/Reconstruction of the
Literature, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 185, 188 (1998). Needless to say, any extended
consideration of the differences between scientific research and other types of
information-gathering activities is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it to say for
present purposes, however, that to the extent the scientific community premises a
constitutional right to engage in scientific research on the First Amendment's protection
for free "speech" or "press," it would seem that the more such research is linked to
expressive activities or purposes, the stronger the First Amendment claim would be. In
this sense, then, the scope of the First Amendment's protection for speech-related
information-gathering activities would seem to be highly relevant to the question of a
right to engage in scientific research under the First Amendment. If a requirement of
speech or publication were divorced from such claims, scientists would then essentially
be claiming a "right to know" under the First Amendment. I argue elsewhere in this
Article that implying a freestanding "right to know" under the First Amendment (i.e., one
divorced from an identifiable speech or publication purpose for engaging in the conduct
for which constitutional protection is claimed), would be inappropriate from both a legal
and policy perspective. See infra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
47 See, e.g., National Institute for Research Advancement, World Directory of Think
Tanks viii (4th ed., 2002) (observing that "[t]hink tanks... have been proliferating all
over the globe"); see also, e.g., Douglas Farah, Report Decries Saudi Laxity: U.S. Must
Act to Dry Up Al Qaeda Funds, Policy Group Says, WASH. POST, Oct. 17, 2002, at A18
(describing a study by the Council on Foreign Relations critical of Bush Administration
for failing to "crack down" on Saudi Arabia's alleged financing of terrorist groups); Milt
Freudenheim, Report Rates Hospitals in State on Care in Life-Threatening Illnesses,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2002, at B5 (describing a report by the Alliance for Quality Health
Care identifying hospitals in New York "where relatively high numbers of patients die
during treatment for life-threatening conditions"); Neely Tucker, White House Told to
Turn Over More Data on Energy Panel, WASH. POST, Aug. 3, 2002, at A6 (describing a
lawsuit by certain public policy groups-the Sierra Club and Judicial Watch-to obtain a
list of participants and contacts involved in an energy policy task force chaired by Vice
President Cheney); Editorial, The Curse of Factory Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2002, at
Al 8 (editorial based on Sierra Club report describing pattern of environmental violations
by farms run by large agricultural corporations). Indeed, in a 1975 speech Justice Stewart
asserted that freedom of the press was specifically protected by the First Amendment in
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All of these situations are rife with potential conflicts between claims of a
right to gather information and countervailing legally-recognized interests. But
given that similar conflicts also arise with respect to engaging in speech or
receiving communications (which, like many legal rights, are normally not even
asserted unless such a conflict has arisen), what is it about a right to gather
information that makes courts hesitate to accord it a similar level of First
Amendment protection? The answer to this question begins in the language of the
First Amendment itself. As noted earlier, the literal protections of the Amendment
are limited to the freedom to speak and publish. Although expanded through
subsequent Court interpretations to meet evolving social conditions, these
freedoms remain at the core of First Amendment protection. And there was, and
remains today, good reason to keep First Amendment rights at least centered on
these particular activities.
Whenever one is granted a "right" or "freedom" to engage in certain conduct,
other members of society incur a corresponding obligation to tolerate that
conduct. In other words, to borrow from an adage, one person's freedoms are
another person's chains. And in a society that is committed to managing the
inevitable tensions between the ideals of "liberty" and "justice," it is incumbent
upon the law to order human conduct in a way that achieves an optimal balance
between the enjoyment of guaranteed freedoms by those exercising them, and the
infringement on the same or other freedoms enjoyed by others. In other words,
individual freedoms or rights are by necessity never absolute: they are limited to
the extent necessary to achieve the maximum enjoyment of all individual rights,
as well as the collective interests of society as a whole.
And so it is with freedom of expression. To the extent that freedom entitles
one to communicate information and ideas either orally or through published
writings, the danger of infringement on the rights and liberties of others is
relatively constrained. Certainly the expression of one's views or beliefs may be
extremely offensive or annoying to others, but that is a price we are willing to pay
to reap the benefits of a free flow of information and ideas. Therefore, society has
generally not recognized a right or liberty to be free from receiving speech that
otherwise enjoys First Amendment protection.48 But as freedom of expression
order to protect the press' role as an independent, expert check on government. See
Stewart, supra note 28, at 634. Today it might be persuasively argued that private
research and policy organizations perform this role to an even greater extent than the
institutional press, with respect to both public and private centers of power. Compare
Martin H. Redish, What's Good for General Motors: Corporate Speech and the Theory
of Free Expression, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 235, 261-64 (1998) (arguing that private
corporations also provide an additional and valuable check on the government, and, at
times, even the institutional press).
48 See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-11 (1975) (The
Court asserted that "the Constitution does not permit government to decide which types
of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for the
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moves away from such "pure speech" activities, and expression is delivered or
facilitated through forms of conduct beyond the basic acts of speaking or
publishing, the potential for interference with other socially-valued rights and
liberties increases. No longer is that interference limited to reluctant reception or
listening, but now a wider panoply of potential conflict is opened for a very
natural reason: when a person acts on her physical environment in a more
intrusive manner, she increases the potential for more "equal and opposite
reactions" to occur within that environment (to borrow a concept from Sir Isaac
Newton). In other words, by acting in a more physical manner, chances increase
that such actions will impinge upon important freedoms of others.49
For instance, if a person desires to express a political message that is
offensive to others solely through the vehicle of speech or writings, another
person may be forced to hear or see some things that she would otherwise have
chosen to avoid. But if that same person bums a draft card or flag to deliver his
message, now he has acted upon his environment in a more intrusive manner. Not
only may another person be forced to see something that she would have avoided
otherwise, but the speaker has also destroyed a document the government created
to administer the draft system (in the case of draft cards), or has perhaps created a
threat to the safety of surrounding people and property by starting a fire. To take
account of such increased impingements on the rights of others presented by the
use of "expressive conduct" as a vehicle of communication, the Court developed
the "speech-action" dichotomy in First Amendment law. Under that doctrine, the
government is given greater leeway to regulate expressive or symbolic conduct
provided such regulation aims to achieve legitimate control over the effects of the
non-expressive components of the conduct, and is unrelated to the suppression of
the expression itself.50
Similar considerations apply when the government is attempting to regulate
non-expressive conduct that facilitates acts of expression, rather than when the
conduct is being engaged in for its inherently symbolic effect. Thus the Court has
said that when government is regulating conduct bound up with speech as a
"time, place or manner" restriction on how that speech is communicated, the
unwilling listener or viewer. Rather.... the burden normally falls upon the viewer to
avoid further bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.") (internal
citations and quotations omitted). The Court has, however, recognized that there are
certain "captive audience" type situations, such as the home, where it is more difficult for
a listener to avoid undesired speech, thus endowing the listener with greater interests in
not being subjected to it. See SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 5-5.
4 9 See, e.g., THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 9
(1970) (asserting that "expression is normally conceived as doing less injury to other
social goals than action" and that "[it generally has less immediate consequences, is less
irremediable in its impact"). Of course, certain types of speech can be inherently
harmful-such as obscenity, libel or incitement-which is one reason these particular
categories of speech receive little or no First Amendment protection.
50 See supra note 34.
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government is generally given greater latitude to regulate that conduct with
similar provisos that the regulation is not being used as a pretext to restrict the
expression itself.51 But when non-expressive conduct is not bound up with the act
of expression itself, as in the case of gathering news or information that one
expects will form the basis for a subsequent communication, the link between
expressive and non-expressive conduct becomes even more attenuated. Hence it
is not surprising that the First Amendment might be even less protective of such
activities, 52 especially when one examines the nature of information-gathering
activities in greater detail.
Information gathering frequently consists of predominantly non-expressive
conduct that is unable to lay claim to the core First Amendment protection
accorded to expression itself. As mentioned earlier, many news and information-
51 See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790-803 (1989).
Sometimes, however, non-expressive conduct is so intimately bound up with the delivery
of speech that the Court declines to treat the regulation of that conduct as a mere "time,
place and manner" restriction subject to an "intermediate" standard of review. See
Watchtower Bible and Tract Soc'y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150,
164-69 (2002) (appearing to strike down a licensing requirement on door-to-door
solicitations under a more stringent standard of review than the intermediate scrutiny test
normally applied to "time, place or manner" restrictions).
52 Justice Brennan recognized this distinction between expressive activity and non-
expressive conduct engaged in for the purpose of facilitating expression. In a public
address he argued that the First Amendment protects two models of the press: the
"speech" model which is accorded absolute protection, and the "structural" model which
protects the communicative functions of the press such as newsgathering where "the
press' interests may conflict with other societal interests and adjustment of the conflict on
occasion favors the competing claim." William J. Brennan, Jr., Rutgers Address, 32
RUTGERS L. REv. 173, 176-77 (1979). Thus in Justice Brennan's view, while
newsgathering is entitled to First Amendment protection, it is at a lower level than
expression itself and requires more of a general balancing of the First Amendment and
competing societal interests. See id. Other commentators have also recognized the
distinction between expressive activities and non-expressive conduct that facilitates
subsequent speech, and the lower level of First Amendment protection that is generally
appropriate for the latter type of conduct absent a governmental purpose to indirectly
regulate the speech itself. See, e.g., Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the
First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 615, 724 (1991) (describing a "continuum" of
speech-facilitative acts running from those that are part of the speech activity itself, to
"separate activities ... specifically designed to facilitate speech, to general
activities ... that may facilitate many behaviors-including speech"); see also id.
(asserting that "at some point the connection to speech becomes so attenuated that [First
Amendment] protection must disappear" such as for general facilitative behaviors
burdened by "general regulatory schemes"). Speech-related information gathering
activities would plainly qualify as "separate activities specifically designed to facilitate
speech" under Professor Williams' scheme, presumably warranting some First
Amendment protection but perhaps not as much as the facilitative aspects of
communicative activities themselves.
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gathering claims concern a right of access to government proceedings or facilities
in order to observe and listen to what is happening inside, or to government
documents in order to read their contents. As to gaining physical access to such
locations or documents, there is nothing inherently expressive about the act of
being in or traveling to one place versus another, or in the act of obtaining
documents or other materials. The same is generally true for the acts of observing,
listening, reading, and learning that would accompany such access.53 Now if a
journalist, for example, were to ask questions or interview people in connection
with such access, or take notes of her findings or other observations, it is likely
that one would consider her to be engaged in expressive activity. However, such
expressions or communications would normally be wholly incidental to the
information-gathering process itself, and it is difficult to see how a desire to
engage in such expression could justify a right of access to the information in the
first place.54 In other words, any protection for such incidental expression would
normally be a wholly inadequate basis for protecting the entire information-
gathering process itself (and thus for obtaining the desired information).
These observations about the gathering process vis-a-vis government-
controlled information apply generally to most other information-gathering
activities engaged in for a speech-related purpose. Whether a journalist is
investigating a story, or a scholar or scientist is conducting research for a study,
she will initially need to gain access to information in order to gather it. And once
access is achieved, such gathering will consist of much non-expressive behavior
53 See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 576 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (describing right of access to criminal trials as a "right to attend [such]
trials to hear, see, and communicate observations concerning them"). Of course, the
"communication" part of this process would follow access and implicate a basic right of
free speech.
54 See, e.g., Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966, 974-76 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(holding that neither a paralegal nor prisoners had a First Amendment right to have the
paralegal enter a prison in order to conduct legal interviews with prisoners); id. at 975
(observing that "[a]n act does not necessarily take on characteristics invoking the First
Amendment simply because if taken it may usher in another episode plainly possessing
First Amendment elements"). I will argue, however, that in certain circumstances a
speech-related information-gathering purpose for seeking access to government
information can justify an access right even where an intent to engage in expression
incidental to that purpose cannot. This is justified by the societal purpose of the speech to
be engaged in as a result of such information gathering, which serves much stronger First
Amendment interests than incidental expressive activities that might be engaged in as
part of such information-gathering activities. See infra Part IV. Of course, as mentioned
earlier, the Court has recognized a First Amendment right of access to public places for
the purpose of engaging in speech. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. But since
claims of access to government information will ordinarily be limited to non-public
places or information (if places or information are accessible by the public there typically
would be no need to assert a right of access), this speech-related right of access would be
of little use to one engaged in information gathering.
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such as listening, observing, reading, or other ways people naturally obtain
information from their surroundings. But it will also be done increasingly through
the assistance of electronic devices such as cameras, video recorders, or
computers, the use of which would also be difficult to describe as "expressive
activity" when they are being used to simply record, store, and process
information for dissemination at a later point.55 And as I just discussed, while
some incidental expression will often attend the information-gathering process,
rarely would it be a sufficient component to justify First Amendment protection
for the entire process itself.56
But the fact that information gathering generally consists of non-expressive
activity cannot be totally dispositive of the First Amendment question for, as
explained earlier, many forms of non-expressive conduct receive such protection
given a sufficient link to expressive activity. For instance, the right to receive
information and ideas is a fully recognized First Amendment right57 even though,
55 However, as frequently occurs in a copyright context, an operator of a camera,
video-recorder, or television camera might argue that he or she has engaged in creative
expression by making "artistic" decisions in connection with the use of such devices. See,
e.g., Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668-
69 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that telecast of a baseball game contained sufficient creative
expression to be copyrightable because of "[tihe many decisions that must be made
during the broadcast of a baseball game concerning camera angles, types of shots, the use
of instant replays and split screens, and shot selection"). But even if such information-
gathering techniques could be said to be expressive in nature for this reason, it would be
unlikely that such incidental expression would provide sufficient First Amendment
grounds for protecting the entire information-gathering process itself (including
overcoming any governmental interference with initial access to the information). See
supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text; see also infra note 56. On the other hand,
whether one is engaged in "non-incidental expression" that might provide sufficient First
Amendment interests to justify a right of access to information when operating equipment
such as a television camera that simultaneously records and broadcasts the information
being gathered to the public, is a more interesting question. Cf. American Broadcasting
Cos. v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a television network
had a First Amendment right to enter private property and broadcast post-election
activities when other networks had been granted access). At least with respect to
govemment-controlled information, however, the Supreme Court has held that the First
Amendment does not provide a right to gather information in a "more effective" manner
(i.e., via electronic media or devices) if basic physical access to information has been
provided. See infra note 80. In this sense, then, any governmental restrictions on the use
of electronic devices to gather information could be viewed as permissible "time, place or
manner" restrictions on a basic right to gather information for First Amendment
purposes. It is such a basic right to gather information that is the primary concern of this
Article. See id.
56 See, e.g., Easton, supra note 25, at 1141 ("Notwithstanding its importance to First
Amendment values... newsgathering is still merely conduct, not speech.").
57 See supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d
629, 643 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) ("It is well established that the right to
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like the information-gathering process, it is difficult to characterize acts of
listening, observing, or reading as being expressive in and of themselves.
Moreover, like a right to gather information, a right to receive information and
ideas is typically asserted simply to gain access to sources of information.58
So what is it about the right to receive information that makes the law more
willing to accord it First Amendment protection? Probably the main difference is
that the right to receive information and ideas generally "presupposes a willing
speaker."'59 That is, the right to receive information is directly linked to the speech
of another,60 as well as the speaker's intent to communicate to an audience
comprising the listener (be it the whole world, as with a book author, or a more
select group of listeners). 6 1 By contrast, information gathering merely precedes
and anticipates speech that may or may not arise from such activities. Moreover,
the right to gather information often will involve attempts to acquire information
from "unwilling" speakers like the government in certain cases or situations that
may involve no "speakers" at all (as with journalist access to events or places,
scientific research on non-human or inanimate objects, or even sought-after
interviews of human information sources where no "willing speaker" exists per se
until the investigator initiates a conversation and begins to elicit the desired
"speech"). 62 Because of this, although a right to receive information may overlap
hear-the right to receive information-is no less protected by the First Amendment than
the right to speak.... Indeed, the right to hear and the right to speak are flip sides of the
same coin." (citations omitted)).
58 See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972) (rejecting a
claimed violation of a university community's right to receive speech where the
government refused to grant a foreign speaker a visa to enter the U.S. on the basis of the
government's plenary authority to control the country's borders).
59 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
756 (1976).
60 As Justice Brennan observed with respect to the right to receive information and
ideas, "the right to receive publications is... a fundamental right. The dissemination of
ideas can accomplish nothing if otherwise willing addressees are not free to receive and
consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had only sellers and no
buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).
61 For instance, the right to receive information would certainly not protect
eavesdropping activities, whereas the right to gather information has been invoked (albeit
unsuccessfully) to protect such activities in the newsgathering context. See, e.g.,
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1999) (rejecting a First Amendment newsgathering defense
regarding the violation of eavesdropping statutes in connection with an investigation of
the Church of Scientology).
62 Quite surprisingly, lower courts will often confuse the right to receive information
with the right to gather information, even in situations where there clearly is no "willing
speaker" present. See, e.g., Bonnichsen v. Dep't of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 645-48
(D. Or. 1997) (treating scientists' assertion of a First Amendment right to study and test
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with a right to gather it in some situations, the latter right encompasses a much
larger range of information-seeking activities. 63
This wider sweep of an information-gathering right, and especially its
application to situations involving unwilling speakers, creates the potential for
greater conflict with important rights or interests of others.64 Whether one wants
to gain access to a government proceeding or facility that has been closed to the
public, obtain copies of sensitive government documents, conduct investigations
or research likely to arouse the opposition of others, or gain access to digital
information that has been access or copy-protected, it is clear that such activities
may conflict with the legally recognized interests of others that society values as
much if not greater than the potential expression facilitated by such activities
(e.g., interests in security, confidentiality, privacy, or property). And such
opposing rights and interests create formidable opponents for an information-
gathering right. These are not contests that courts are likely to encourage.
In addition, unlike a right to receive information, the right to gather
information is not considered to be an essential part of the process of speech.65
While the acquisition of particular information on a subject might enhance the
substance or quality of communications about it, one would typically remain free
to communicate about that subject, albeit without the benefit of such information.
Thus, one could pursue alternative avenues for learning about a subject, or simply
make educated guesses, render opinions, or engage in speculation about it. Such
expressions just might not be as factual, objective, or reliable as they otherwise
could have been had certain information been obtained by the speaker. But given
the First Amendment's concern with ensuring a "free and full flow of
information" to facilitate informed self-governance (not to mention the
Amendment's truth-seeking purpose),66 this seems to be a particularly poor
the remains of an ancient human skeleton as a right to "receive information") (emphasis
supplied).
63 Indeed, the right to receive information might be thought of as a subset of a right
to gather information but for another important difference where the former right might
be implicated in situations where the latter right would not. The right to receive would
apply to situations where a hearer or reader had no intent to "retransmit" the information
that was received. By definition, a right to gather information should only apply to
situations where a person gathers information with a First Amendment purpose for doing
so (i.e., to communicate the gathered information as part of another information flow).
See infra notes 330-33 and accompanying text.
64 Cf. Emerson, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing for absolute protection of a right to
receive information and ideas in part because "any danger to the social order [from such a
right] is so inchoate and so unascertainable that it cannot be given substance or taken into
account").
65 See id. (observing that "[tihe right to read, listen, or see is so elemental, so close
to the source of all freedom, that one can hardly conceive of a system of free expression
that does not extend it full protection").
66 See supra note 30.
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rationale for failing to accord information gathering an adequate measure of
constitutional protection.
In sum, it is evident that a right to gather information lies at the periphery of
traditional First Amendment protection for expressive activities, and presents
difficulties that are not implicated to the same degree by according protection to
the opposite end of information flows-i.e., to the receipt of information and
ideas.67 At the same time, information gathering clearly implicates First
Amendment interests given its capacity for supplying and enhancing the quality
of those flows, and according constitutional protection to such activities would be
consistent with the Court's traditionally expansive reading of First Amendment
rights. Before considering the circumstances under which information-gathering
conduct ought to be brought under the First Amendment umbrella, 68 it is
necessary to examine the evolution and current status of this "right" in the Court's
freedom of expression jurisprudence. As this examination will demonstrate, many
of the aforementioned considerations of the role and nature of an information-
gathering right have played a significant part in the thought processes of different
Justices as they struggled with these issues.
HI. EVOLUTION OF SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE DEALING WITH A
RIGHT TO GATHER INFORMATION
A. The Relevant Supreme Court Decisions
The evolution of the Court's cases dealing with an asserted right to gather
information reflects the difficulties presented by such a right, particularly given its
"implied" or "unenumerated" nature. Significant developments in this evolution
occurred in eight important cases, which are examined below in detail.
67 Because of these differences between a right to receive information and a right to
gather it, I disagree with the approach of Professor Emerson, who argued for the
treatment of both of these rights as components of an overall First Amendment "right to
know." See Emerson, supra note 26, at 2-5. For the reasons just discussed, there is good
reason to accord the right to receive information First Amendment protection on par with
the right to communicate, while according such protection to information-gathering
activities on the more limited basis I suggest in Part IV. Obviously, if both of these rights
are treated as subsets of one overarching First Amendment right, conceptually and
juridically it makes it much more difficult to make these kinds of distinctions. Moreover,
as I argue in Part mI, the basic concept of a "right to know" in First Amendment
jurisprudence seems inappropriate for several reasons, not the least of which is that such
a right bears little resemblance to the "right of speech and press" which the First
Amendment literally protects. See infra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
68 Cf. Brennan, supra note 52, at 177 (noting that granting First Amendment
protection for newsgathering "significantly extends the umbrella of the press'
constitutional protections").
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1. Zemel v. Rusk- No "Unrestrained" Right to Gather Information Under
the First Amendment
Most of the Court's "information-gathering" cases to date have involved
claims of a right to gather news asserted by the institutional press. However,
somewhat ironically, the Court's first important decision in this area was the only
one to directly address an asserted right to gather information by non-media
parties.69 In Zemel v. Rusk,70 after the U.S. State Department restricted travel to
Cuba in the early 1960s, Louis Zemel requested permission to travel there as a
tourist to "satisfy [his] curiosity about the state of affairs in Cuba and to make
[him] a better informed citizen." 71 Among a host of other claims, Zemel argued
that the restrictions directly interfered with "the First Amendment rights of
citizens to travel abroad so that they might acquaint themselves at first hand with
the effects abroad of our Government's policies, foreign and domestic, and with
conditions abroad which might affect such policies."72
The Court agreed with Zemel that the travel restrictions "render[ed] less than
wholly free the flow of information concerning [Cuba]," and also that this was a
factor to consider in evaluating Zemel's claim that the government had violated
his Fifth Amendment right to travel.73 However, the Court could not "accept the
contention of [Zemel] that it is a First Amendment right which is involved. For to
69 Although the Court recently decided one other case involving an asserted right to
gather information outside of the newsgathering context, see Los Angeles Police Dep't v.
United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999), the case was decided on other
grounds, and the information-gathering claim was not presented directly for decision. See
infra notes 193-209 and accompanying text. Although a claim for access to government
information was asserted by both press and non-press parties in Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,
438 U.S. 1 (1978), the non-press parties relied on the press' right of access for
newsgathering purposes to "press" their claims. See infra notes 117-19 and
accompanying text.
70 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
7 1 Id. at4.
72 Id. at 16.
73 Id. In an earlier portion of the opinion, the Court had rejected Zemel's Fifth
Amendment claim that the government had improperly restricted his liberty interests in
traveling without due process of law. The Court held:
[T]he Secretary has justifiably concluded that travel to Cuba by American citizens
might involve the Nation in dangerous international incidents, and that the
Constitution does not require him to validate passports for such travel.
... That the restriction. . . in this case is supported by the weightiest
considerations of national security is perhaps best pointed up by recalling that the
Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 preceded the filing of appellant's complaint by
less than two months.
Id. at 15-16.
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the extent that the Secretary's refusal to validate passports for Cuba acts as an
inhibition... it is an inhibition of action." 74 Further, the Court explained:
There are few restrictions on action which could not be clothed by ingenious
argument in the garb of decreased data flow. For example, the prohibition of
unauthorized entry into the White House diminishes the citizen's opportunities to
gather information he might find relevant to his opinion of the way the country is
being run, but that does not make entry into the White House a First Amendment
right. The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right
to gather information.75
Thus the Court declined to find that the freedom to speak and publish includes an
"unrestrained" right to gather information. 76 In the Court's view, to hold
otherwise would open up a virtual floodgate of challenges to government
regulation on the grounds that an argument could almost always be made that an
74 Id. at 16.
75 Id. at 16-17.
76 In a dissent eerily reminiscent of calls heard today regarding the need for Western
and Eastern societies to understand each other better, Justice Douglas, joined by Justice
Goldberg, argued:
The right to know, to converse with others, to consult with them, to observe social,
physical, political and other phenomena abroad as well as at home gives meaning
and substance to freedom of expression and freedom of the press. Without those
contacts First Amendment rights suffer....
The ability to understand this pluralistic world, filled with clashing ideologies,
is a prerequisite of citizenship if we and the other peoples of the world are to avoid
the nuclear holocaust....
... [T]he only so-called danger present here is the Communist regime in
Cuba .... They are part of the world spectrum; and if we are to know them and
understand them, we must mingle with them .... Keeping alive intellectual
intercourse between opposing groups has always been important and perhaps was
never more important than now.
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1965) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Moreover:
[T]he right to travel is at the periphery of the First Amendment, rather than at its
core, largely because travel is, of course, more than speech: it is speech brigaded
with conduct. "Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society.... [But in every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in
attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom." Restrictions
on the right to travel in times of peace should be so particularized that a First
Amendment right is not precluded unless some clear countervailing national interest
stands in the way of its assertion.
Id. at 26 (internal citations omitted).
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inability to engage in conduct has a detrimental impact on the acquisition of
information related to that conduct.
But since few, if any, constitutional rights are "unrestrained" in the sense of
being unqualified or absolute, was the Court suggesting by implication that some
sort of First Amendment right to gather information did exist? Certainly the Court
did not agree with Justice Douglas' suggestion in his dissenting opinion that such
a right was a "fundamental personal libert[y]. ' '77 However, some Justices
dissenting in subsequent cases argued that "[t]he necessary implication [of the
Court's use of the "unrestrained" term was] that some right to gather information
does exist." 78
2. Branzburg v. Hayes: A Newsgathering Right of
Constitutional Dimensions
In Branzburg v. Hayes79 the Court displayed more receptivity to a right to
gather information by the organized press-at least to the extent of
acknowledging the logic of according such activities some constitutional
protection in order to safeguard the "freedom of the press." In that case, various
newspaper and television reporters had been subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury with respect to information they had obtained while covering stories about
allegedly criminal activities (including the identity of confidential informants).
The journalists argued that compelling them to testify would unduly burden their
right to gather news by deterring their sources from providing information--"al
to the detriment of the free flow of information protected by the First
Amendment." 80 Hence, the journalists argued, the Court should recognize a
77 Id. at 26 n.* (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also supra note 76.
78 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 728 n.4 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting); see
also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 28 n.15 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
79 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
80 Id. at 680. While Branzburg appears to be the first case decided by the Court
involving a claim of undue government interference with the press' right to gain access to
news sources, one month after Zemel had been decided the Court did address the right of
the press to gather news to which they otherwise had access in a particular way. See
Estes v. State of Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1965). In Estes, five Justices rejected the
argument that the broadcast news media had a First Amendment right to televise
courtroom proceedings that were otherwise open to the public and press. See id. at 539-
40 (plurality opinion); id. at 589 (Harlan, J., concurring). In dealing with a First
Amendment right to gather information, this Article will focus on a basic right to access
and gather information in any manner, as opposed to a right to use a particular medium
or technology for gathering it once access has been achieved. This is not to say, however,
that government interference with "more effective" mediums for gathering information
does not raise First Amendment concerns. See, e.g., Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16-17
(Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that once the government has permitted
access to certain information, the press has a First Amendment right to "effective" access
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limited privilege grounded in the First Amendment that would excuse journalists
from providing such testimony unless the government could establish a
compelling need for the information.81
In a lengthy 5-4 decision, the Court declined to create a special privilege for
journalists in the context of grand jury investigations, but did clearly assert that
newsgathering activities were entitled to "some" First Amendment protection.82
At the inception of its analysis, the Court pointedly observed it was not
"suggest[ing] that news gathering [did] not qualify for First Amendment
protection; without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the
press could be eviscerated." 83 But after explaining that the press was subject to
general laws like everyone else, the Court concluded that the press was not
entitled to the "privileged position" 84 it appeared to be claiming:
On the records now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public
interest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury proceedings is
insufficient to override the consequential, but uncertain, burden on news
gathering that is said to result from insisting that reporters, like other citizens,
respond to relevant questions put to them in the course of a valid grand jury
investigation or criminal trial.
85
in terms of the use of video and audio recording equipment); see also infra note 129 and
accompanying text. But interference with "more effective access" to information does not
impede the flow of information to the public to the same degree as interference with
access itself, since in the former situation the public is presumably still receiving some of
the desired information, albeit perhaps not in the most preferable form (e.g., reading a
journalist's account of courtroom proceedings versus viewing the actual proceedings for
oneself via a television broadcast). Further consideration of the constitutionality of
restrictions on particular methods of gathering information is beyond the scope of this
Article. For commentary on a First Amendment right to gather information in a particular
manner, see, for example, Diane L. Zimmerman, Overcoming Future Shock: Estes
Revisited, or a Modest Proposal for the Constitutional Protection of the News-Gathering
Process, 1980 DUKE L.J. 641 (1980).
81 See Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 680.
82 Id. at 681.
83 Id.
84 Id. at 682.
85 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 690-91 (1972). Because the press had no right
to violate criminal laws or invade the rights of other citizens in gathering the news, the
Court concluded that compelling reporters to testify about criminal acts witnessed by
them presented "no substantial question." Id. at 692. The more difficult question, in its
view, was requiring reporters to divulge the identity of informants who had not engaged
in any wrongdoing themselves. But after an exhaustive analysis considering a number of
factors-such as the lack of evidence that the flow of news would be significantly
constricted by failing to create a privilege, the need for effective enforcement of criminal
laws, the fact that the press historically had "flourished" without a testimonial privilege,
the government's "compelling" interest in preventing crime, and the absence of judicial
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Yet the Court ended its analysis by once again asserting that "news gathering is
not without its First Amendment protections, and grand jury investigations if
instituted or conducted other than in good faith, would pose wholly different
issues for resolution under the First Amendment. 86
In providing the critical fifth vote to decide the case, Justice Powell filed a
brief concurring opinion in which he appeared to stake out a middle position
between the majority and the four dissenting Justices, even though he had
purportedly joined the majority's opinion.87 Whereas the majority suggested that
any First Amendment protection for journalists in this area would be limited to
instances where the government was using its subpoena powers in bad faith
(apparently focusing on the subjective motivations of government officials),
Justice Powell asserted that such protection would also cover situations where
from an objective standpoint the government could not demonstrate a sufficient
need for the information. 88 Accordingly, if a reporter were requested to provide
information bearing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the
investigation, or if he has some other reason to believe that his testimony
implicates confidential source relationships without a legitimate need of law
enforcement.... [T]he asserted claim to privilege should be judged on its facts
by the striking of a proper balance between freedom of the press and the
obligation of all citizens to give relevant testimony with respect to criminal
conduct. The balance of these vital constitutional and societal interests on a case-
by-case basis accords with the tried and traditional way of adjudicating such
questions. 89
Thus, while rejecting the notion of a pre-defmed journalist privilege that would
force the government to meet certain requirements in order to even call a reporter
to the witness stand, Justice Powell endorsed a case-by-case balancing approach
for reporters seeking to quash a subpoena in a particular case.90
standards for administering a privilege that was more appropriately the province of the
legislative branches, including the difficulties associated with defining the "press"
entitled to invoke the privilege-the Court declined to create a testimonial privilege as to
this type of information. See id. at 693-705.
86 Id. at 707.
87 Id.at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 710.
90 See id. at 710 & n.*. Although Justice Powell's concurrence has frequently been
criticized as being ambiguous, see, for example, id. at 725 (Stewart, J., dissenting)
(labeling that concurrence as "enigmatic"), he later confirmed this reading of his opinion.
See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 570-71 n.3 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Powell asserted that his concurring opinion in Branzburg
noted only that in considering a motion to quash a subpoena directed to a
newsman, the court should balance the competing values of a free press and the
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Justice Stewart, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, argued for the
adoption of the sought-after privilege on the grounds of a journalist's First
Amendment right to gather news:
A corollary of the right to publish must be the right to gather news. The full
flow of information to the public protected by the free-press guarantee would be
severely curtailed if no protection whatever were afforded to the process by
which news is assembled and disseminated.
... News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for without
freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be impermissibly
compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must
exist.9 1
Moreover, "[t]he right to gather news implies, in turn, a right to a confidential
relationship between a reporter and his source," because "[i]t is obvious that
informants are necessary to the news-gathering process as we know it today. '92
Justice Douglas went further and argued that journalists enjoyed an absolute
privilege from appearing before a grand jury unless they themselves were targets
of a criminal investigation.93 Both Justices Stewart and Douglas criticized the
majority's characterization of the press' claim as one for special constitutional
treatment vis-a-vis other citizens, arguing that it was the press' function of
delivering important information to the public that was deserving of special
consideration-and not the press qua press as a privileged, private actor. 94
societal interest in detecting and prosecuting crime.... Rather than advocating
the creation of a special procedural exception for the press, it approved
recognition of First Amendment concerns within the applicable procedure.
Id.
91 Id. at 727-28 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
9 2 Id. at 728-29 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93 See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 711-14, 720-25 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Justice Douglas based much of his views on the work of First Amendment
scholar Alexander Meiklejohn, attributing to him the position that "effective self-
government cannot succeed unless the people are immersed in a steady, robust,
unimpeded, and uncensored flow of opinion and reporting which are continuously
subjected to critique, rebuttal, and re-examination." Id. at 713-15.
94 As Justice Stewart argued:
[A] reporter's right to protect his source is bottomed on the constitutional guarantee
of a full flow of information to the public. A newsman's personal First Amendment
rights ... are subsumed under that broad societal interest protected by the First
Amendment. Obviously, we are not here concerned with the parochial personal
concerns of particular newsmen or informants.
Id. at 726 n.2 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas made a similar point: "The
press has a preferred position in our constitutional scheme, not to enable it to make
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Thus, in Branzburg, it appears that every member of the Court believed that
newsgathering was entitled to some First Amendment protection. Although the
majority declined to create a specific testimonial privilege for the press in the
grand jury context-mainly in resistance to the notion that journalists should be
exempt from laws applicable to everyone else-in reaching this conclusion it
engaged in a thorough assessment of the impact that compelled testimony might
have on the press's ability to gather and report the news. Lacking any solid
empirical support for the notion that the flow of news would be detrimentally
impacted by the lack of such a privilege, the Court declined to adopt one.95 But
the Court's ultimate decision on this score should not obscure the important First
Amendment interests it believed were at stake in the case, and the detailed
balancing analysis it engaged in to reach that decision (weighing those interests
against society's competing interests in effective law enforcement). 96 Had
newsgathering not been entitled to any significant constitutional protection, such a
thorough weighing of the competing concerns would have been unnecessary. 97
Moreover, even as to a specific testimonial privilege for journalists, it appears
that the majority may have won the battle but lost the war. Many lower courts
have interpreted the position of Justice Powell and the four dissenting Justices as
support for at least a case-by-case determination of a First Amendment
testimonial privilege for journalists in criminal cases, and virtually all courts
recognize some form of such a privilege in civil cases. 98 Such a privilege is
money, not to set newsmen apart as a favored class, but to bring fulfillment to the
public's right to know." Id. at 721 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 691 ("Nothing before us indicates that a large number or percentage of all
confidential news sources ... would in any way be deterred by our holding .... ).
96 As Justice Powell observed in a later case, "a fair reading of the majority's
analysis in Branzburg makes plain that the result hinged on an assessment of the
competing societal interests involved in that case rather than on any determination that
First Amendment freedoms were not implicated." Saxbe v. Wa. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843,
859-60 (1974) (Powell, J., dissenting). See also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHt. L. REV. 46, 54 n.32 (1987) (implying that the Court had applied
First Amendment scrutiny in Branzburg, but asserting it was unclear whether the Court
had "applied intermediate or deferential scrutiny").
97 Thus I disagree with the views of at least one commentator who has asserted that
"Branzburg was an explicit rejection of the press claim to an independent right-to-gather
information," and that "the Court reasoned that the process of gathering information from
confidential sources was entitled to no constitutional protection." See Cerruti, supra note
21, at 249. Even if one were to ignore the majority's explicit and implicit recognition of
"some" First Amendment protection for newsgathering, certainly the case-by-case
testimonial privilege advocated by Justice Powell-together with the position of the four
dissenting Justices-shows that these assertions are incorrect.
98 See C. THOMAS DiENEs ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW 757-65, 853-63
(2d ed. 1999). Indeed, such a privilege has been held to shield a journalist not just against
compelled testimony, but against compelled disclosure of many forms of a journalist's
work product. See id. at 872-92.
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squarely based on First Amendment protection for the newsgathering activities of
the press. 99
3. Pell and Saxbe: No "Special" Right of Access to Government-
Controlled Information for Newsgathering Purposes
While both Zemel and Branzburg dealt with claims that the government was
unduly interfering with the ability to gain access to information in the public
domain (the sights and sounds of Cuba) or under the control of private individuals
(information about criminal activities that was being deliberately shielded from
public view), the companion cases of Pell v. ProcunierI°° and Saxbe v.
Washington Post Co. 101 concerned claims by the press that the government was
unduly restricting its right to gain access to information controlled by the
government. At issue were prison regulations that restricted the ability of the press
to interview inmates of their choice, as opposed to inmates selectively made
available by the prisons themselves.10 2 As the Pell Court phrased it, the various
newspaper reporters asserted a "constitutional right to interview any inmate who
[was] willing to speak with them, in the absence of an individualized
determination that the particular interview might create a ... danger to... the
corrections system."'103 Moreover, "they rely on their right to gather news without
governmental interference, which [they] assert includes a right of access to the
sources of what is regarded as newsworthy information." 104
Justice Stewart, writing for the 5-4 majorities in both cases and laying out the
controlling legal analysis in Pell, rejected the notion that the First Amendment
provided the press with a right of access to the sought-after information.105 The
Court initially took pains to point out that there was no attempt by the government
to conceal prison conditions or frustrate the press' investigation of them because
99 Besides a journalist's privilege grounded in the First Amendment, courts have
also derived such a privilege in various cases from common law sources. See id. at 767-
825. Moreover, many state governments have enacted statutory measures essentially
codifying a journalist's privilege-so-called "shield laws." See id. Even the federal
government recognizes various non-constitutional forms of a journalist's privilege. See
id. at 825.
100 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
101 417 U.S. 843 (1974).
102 Id. at 844.
103 Pell, 417 U.S. at 829.
104 Id. at 829-30.
105 It was somewhat surprising that Justice Stewart, the leading advocate of a First
Amendment right to gather information in Branzburg, thought that such a right had no
application in the context of government-controlled information. For a discussion of the
distinction he drew between the rights of the press to gain access to such information
versus other types of information, see infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text.
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"both the press and the general public [were] accorded full opportunities to
observe prison conditions" in both cases. 106 Thus, as the majority saw it, the issue
was whether "press access to specifically designated prison inmates" was "such
an effective and superior method of newsgathering that its curtailment
amount[ed] to unconstitutional state interference with a free press."' 107 While
acknowledging that the Court in Branzburg had recognized newsgathering was
entitled to some First Amendment protection, the Pell Court held that the
Constitution did not "require [the] government to accord the press special access
to information not shared by members of the public generally." 108 While it was
one thing to say that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not
available to members of the general public... [and] is entitled to some
constitutional protection of the confidentiality of such sources ..... [i]t is quite
another thing to suggest that the Constitution imposes upon government the
affirmative duty to make available to journalists sources of information not
available to members of the public generally. That proposition finds no support
in the words of the Constitution or in any decision of this Court. 109
Justice Powell filed a lengthy dissent in Saxbe that was joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall.110 While he agreed that the press did not have any
"constitutional rights superior to those enjoyed by ordinary citizens,"'111 Justice
Powell believed that the press was entitled to special access to government
information in situations where general public access was not feasible and the
press was acting as an information-gathering agent of the public.112 Moreover,
106 Pell, 417 U.S. at 830. Indeed, the Court noted that under the prison regulations at
issue, the press enjoyed greater access to the prison than the general public. Id. at 830-31.
107 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974).
108 Id. at 834.
109 ld. at 834-35 (citations omitted). Although all of these statements were made in
the Pell decision, the Court essentially incorporated the Pell decision by reference into
Saxbe as a basis for the result there as well. See Saxbe v. Wa. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850
(1974).
110 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 850-75. The fact that Justice Powell was leading the
dissenting Justices in advocating a First Amendment right of access to government
information further clarifies his position in Branzburg that newsgathering was entitled to
a healthy dose of constitutional protection.
S11 Id. at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting).
112 See id. at 863 (Powell, J., dissenting). As Justice Powell argued:
[Flreedom of speech and press protects two kinds of interests: "There is an
individual interest, the need of many men to express their opinions .... and a social
interest in the attainment of truth ......
What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in
preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs.... And public debate
must not only be unfettered; it must also be informed....
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while the government certainly had an interest in protecting the confidentiality or
secrecy of some information, or in regulating the time, place or manner of access
to non-sensitive information, in this case it had
no legitimate interest in preventing newsmen from obtaining the information that
they may learn through personal interviews or from reporting their findings to
the public. Quite to the contrary, federal prisons are public institutions. The
administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their rehabilitative
programs, the conditions of confinement that they maintain, and the experiences
of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters of legitimate societal
interest and concern. 113
Justice Douglas filed a separate dissent in Pell that was also joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, in which he made arguments similar to those made by
Justice Powell.114
In my view this reasoning also underlies our recognition in Branzburg that
"news gathering is not without its First Amendment protections .. " An informed
public depends on accurate and effective reporting by the news media. No individual
can obtain for himself the information needed for the intelligent discharge of his
political responsibilities. For most citizens the prospect of personal familiarity with
newsworthy events is hopelessly unrealistic. In seeking out the news the press
therefore acts as an agent of the public at large. It is the means by which the people
receive that free flow of information and ideas essential to intelligent self-
government. By enabling the public to assert meaningful control over the political
process, the press performs a crucial function in effecting the societal purpose of the
First Amendment. That function is recognized by specific reference to the press in
the text of the Amendment and by the precedents of this Court ....
Id. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
113 Id. at 861 (Powell, J., dissenting).
114 See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 836-42 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). As
Justice Douglas observed:
It is indeed ironic for the Court to justify the exclusion of the press by noting
that the government has gone beyond the press and expanded the exclusion to
include the public. Could the government deny the press access to all public
institutions and prohibit interviews with all governmental employees? Could it find
constitutional footing by expanding the ban to deny such access to everyone?
I agree with the courts below.., that the absolute ban on press interviews with
specifically designated federal inmates is far broader than is necessary to protect any
legitimate governmental interests and is an unconstitutional infringement on the
public's right to know protected by the free press guarantee of the First Amendment.
Id. at 841. The reason that Justices Douglas and Powell dissented separately may have
had to do with the fact that Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall also disagreed with a
portion of the Court's opinion not discussed here that the prisoners themselves had no
First Amendment right to engage in selected press interviews, while Justice Powell
agreed with this portion of the Court's opinion. See 417 U.S. at 835-39.
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Given the Court's analysis in Pell and Saxbe, it seemed that the constitutional
balancing which Branzburg had suggested was appropriate when the government
was interfering with the press' access to sources of newsworthy information
would not apply to the press' efforts to gain access to information from
government institutions. But the Court's emphasis on the fact that the press and
public did enjoy "full opportunities" to gain information about prison conditions,
apart from designated-prisoner interviews, suggested that the Court might have
been limiting its holding to situations where the public already enjoyed a
substantial flow of information about the government matters at issue.1 15
However, any such interpretations of Pell and Saxbe were quashed in the next
important case to come before the Court.
4. Houchins v. KQED, Inc.: No "Basic" Right of Access to Government-
Controlled Information for Newsgathering Purposes
Not surprisingly, the Court's holdings in Pell and Saxbe were soon tested in
another prison access case where it could not be maintained that the press was
simply seeking a better method of gathering information that was otherwise
available, because the government had closed off all access to certain
information. 116 In Houchins v. KQED, Inc.,117 a media broadcasting company
115 On this view, the Court's ruling would have been consistent with its earlier
decision in Estes, holding that the press had no First Amendment right to engage in
"more effective" modes of newsgathering as long as some basic access was provided to
the information being sought. See Estes, 381 U.S. at 539-40 (plurality opinion).
116 Between its rulings in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins, the Court decided two other
cases involving claims that the government was improperly interfering with the press'
newsgathering activities in violation of the First Amendment. The first involved a claim
for "more effective access" to government information that had otherwise been made
available to the public, similar to that asserted in Estes, while the second involved a claim
of indirect governmental interference with general newsgathering activities similar to
those asserted in Branzburg.
In Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978), relying principally
on Estes, the Court held that the media had no First Amendment right to obtain physical
copies of tape recordings made by President Nixon where the media had listened to, and
taken notes about, the contents of the tapes when they had been played in open court. 435
U.S. at 609. Thus, there was "no question of a truncated flow of information to the
public"presented by the case. Id.
Additionally, in Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), a 5-3 majority of
the Court again declined to create a special privilege for the press, this time to be
exempted from general laws permitting physical searches of locations for evidence of
crimes committed by third parties. Id. at 541-42.The press had argued that searches of
their offices for such evidence unduly burdened both the gathering and reporting of the
news. Id. at 563. The Court explained that the Fourth Amendment guarantee against
unreasonable searches had been adopted mainly to protect against government
harassment of the press, and that the Court had already held that Fourth Amendment
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and members of the NAACP sued a sheriff who denied the media access to a
portion of the county jail that had been the site of a recent suicide by an inmate, as
well as the subject of allegations regarding abusive conditions.118 Emphasizing
the public interest at stake in the case and the media's role as the public's agent,
the plaintiffs alleged that the sheriff "had violated the First Amendment by
refusing to permit media access and failing to provide any effective means by
which the public could be informed of conditions prevailing in the Greystone
facility or learn of the prisoners' grievances."1 19
In a 4-3 decision which failed to produce a majority opinion, 120 the Houchins
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims. Writing for a plurality of three justices, Chief
Justice Burger asserted that "[t]his Court has never intimated a First Amendment
guarantee of a right of access to all sources of information within government
control.1 121 Characterizing Branzburg's recognition of First Amendment
protection for newsgathering as dictum, the plurality explained that these
assertions "in no sense implied a constitutional right of access to news
sources.... There is an undoubted right to gather news 'from any source by
means within the law' but that affords no basis for the claim that the First
Amendment compels others-private persons or governments-to supply
information." 122 Further, the press' "claimed special privilege of access... [was]
rejected in Pell and Saxbe, [and is] a right... not essential to guarantee the
freedom to communicate or publish." 123 In addition, determining who was
entitled to access to government institutions was "clearly a legislative task which
safeguards "must be applied with 'scrupulous exactitude' " where sought-after materials
were protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 563-65. Accordingly, there was no need
for special press protection in this regard. Id. at 569.
Thus, while the Court once again declined to create a special exemption for the press
to laws of general applicability, it did so only after acknowledging the important First
Amendment interests at stake and the fact that its precedents already required special
protection for search warrants implicating those interests. The Court did note, however,
that in the absence of evidence of government abuse, any incremental impact such
searches might have on the press' ability to gather and report the news did "not make a
constitutional difference in our judgment." Id. at 566. Just as the Court's decision in
Branzburg prompted more states to pass press shield laws, see supra note 99, its decision
in Zurcher prompted the federal government to pass a law providing the press with
special protections against government searches and seizures of press materials. See
DIENES ET AL., supra note 98, at 826-27.
117 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
118 1d. at 4-6.
119 Id. at4.
120 Justices Marshall and Blackmun did not participate in the case.
121 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 9.
122 Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
123 Id. at 12.
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the Constitution has left to the political processes,"' 124 and public officials, subject
to public opinion pressure, might be in a better position to discover and disclose
government malfeasance than the press. 125 Further, there were no workable
standards for courts to administer a right of access, 126 and the press had other, less
convenient, alternatives to learn about prison conditions.127
Declining to join the plurality's opinion, Justice Stewart concurred in the
judgment to supply the fourth vote against the plaintiffs. He agreed with the
plurality that:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not guarantee the public a right of
access to information generated or controlled by government, nor do they
guarantee the press any basic right of access superior to that of the public
generally. The Constitution does no more than assure the public and the press
equal access once government has opened its doors. 128
But he went on to "part company" with the plurality opinion on the grounds that
once the government had opened its doors, the press was entitled to special access
rights vis a vis the general public to accommodate the press' "special needs" in
effectively performing its assigned constitutional role as the information-
gathering agent for the public. 129
124 Id.
125 See id. at 14. Somewhat curiously, Chief Justice Burger appeared to believe that
government officials might have more incentive to disclose government misconduct than
representatives of the press.
126 See id. As the Chief Justice explained:
There is no discernible basis for a constitutional duty to disclose, or for standards
governing disclosure of or access to information. Because the Constitution affords
no guidelines, absent statutory standards, hundreds of judges would.., be at large to
fashion ad hoc standards... according to their own ideas of what seem[ed]
"desirable" or "expedient."
Id.
127 See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 12-16 (1978). To lend additional
support to all of these arguments, the plurality opinion quoted from a speech that had
recently been given by Justice Stewart that appeared to shed additional light on his
different positions in Branzburg and Pell as to the scope of a First Amendment
newsgathering right. See id. at 14-15 (citing P. Stewart, "Or of the Press," 26 HASTINGS
L.J. 631, 636 (1975)). These views are considered in some detail at infra notes 237-43
and accompanying text.
128 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice
Stewart explained in a footnote that "[florces and factors other than the Constitution must
determine what government-held data are to be made available to the public." Id. at 16
n.*. 129 Id. at 16-17. Thus,
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Justice Stevens dissented in an opinion joined by Justices Brennan and
Powell. Objecting to the plurality's reliance on Pell and Saxbe, he argued that
nothing in those cases "intimated that a nondiscriminatory policy of excluding
entirely both the public and the press from access to information... would avoid
constitutional scrutiny."130 Largely echoing Justice Powell's dissent in those
cases, he contended that "[t]he preservation of a full and free flow of information
to the general public has long been recognized as a core objective of the First
Amendment," 131 and "[w]ithout some protection for the acquisition of
information about the operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would be
stripped of its substance." 132 Moreover, while "there are unquestionably
occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried on in complete
secrecy... [i]n such situations the reasons for withholding information from the
public are both apparent and legitimate."'1 33 Here, however, the plaintiffs
simply [sought] an end to petitioner's policy of concealing prison conditions
from the public. Those conditions are wholly without claim to confidentiality.
While prison officials have an interest in the time and manner of public
acquisition of information about the institutions they administer, there is no
legitimate penological justification for concealing from citizens the conditions in
which their fellow citizens are being confined.13 4
Thus, if any uncertainty lingered after Pell and Saxbe, the four Justices who
produced the judgment of the Court in Houchins made it clear that any First
Amendment protection for newsgathering activities did not extend to information
created or controlled by the government. In effect, the Court was saying that
when it came to gaining access to information that the government was unwilling
if a television reporter is to convey the jail's sights and sounds to those who cannot
personally visit the place, he must use cameras and sound equipment.... [T]erms of
access that are reasonably imposed on individual members of the public may, if they
impede effective reporting without sufficient justification, be unreasonable as
applied to journalists who are there to convey to the general public what the visitors
see.
Id. at 17. In other words, the press had a First Amendment right of "effective access"
once the government made information available to the public. Although this view
appeared to be in substantial tension with the Court's earlier decisions in Estes and
Nixon, see supra notes 80 and 116, Justice Stewart made no attempt to reconcile these
positions.
130 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 27-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 30.
132 Id. at 32 (footnotes omitted).
133 Id. at 34-35.
134 id. at 35-36.
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to make available, the flow of such information to the public became a political
matter outside the domain of First Amendment concerns.
5. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale: Hinting at a Reversal of Course as to a
Public Right of Access to Government-Controlled Information Under the
First Amendment
In Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins, the press unsuccessfully argued for a right of
access to government institutions for the purpose of gathering and disseminating
news to the public. Given those defeats the press altered its tactics and, in a case
decided just one year after Houchins, argued for a public right of access to a
preliminary hearing in a criminal trial that was closed to the public. 135 In Gannett
Co. v. DePasquale,136 a newspaper company argued not only that the public had
a right to attend the hearing under the Sixth Amendment, 137 but also that
"members of the press and the public have a right of access to the pretrial hearing
by reason of the First and Fourteenth Amendments." 138 Focusing most of its
attention on the Sixth Amendment claim, the Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Stewart, ultimately concluded "that members of the public have no
constitutional right under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to attend
criminal trials." 1
39
135 Between its decisions in Houchins and Gannett Co., the Court decided another
case where the press alleged undue interference with its newsgathering and reporting
activities along the lines alleged in Branzburg and Zurcher. In Herbert v. Lando, 441
U.S. 153 (1979), the Court held that the press was not entitled to a First Amendment
privilege from civil discovery laws which permitted defamation plaintiffs to inquire into
the editorial decisions made by the press in the course of investigating and publishing a
news story. Generally reasoning that the Court had already provided the press with
sufficient special protections against defamation actions by making plaintiffs prove that
the disputed statements were published with knowing or reckless falsity, the Court would
not make it even more difficult for such plaintiffs to meet this additional requirement by
erecting hurdles to proving it. See id. at 158-78. The Court did note, however, that if a
law subjected "the editorial process to private or official examination merely to satisfy
curiosity or to serve some general end such as the public interest.., it would not survive
constitutional scrutiny as the First Amendment is presently construed." Id. at 174. Thus,
once again the Court refused to exempt the press from generally-applicable rules of
criminal and civil procedure, but as in Zurcher it largely based its decision on the special
First Amendment protections already available to the press to preserve the important
interests embodied by that Amendment.
136 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
137 Id. at 370-71. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ...." U.S.
Const. amend. VI.
138 Gannett, 443 U.S. at 391.
139 Id.
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However, somewhat surprisingly given its decision the previous term in
Houchins, the Court displayed greater receptivity to the First Amendment claim.
Instead of rejecting it outright, as one might have expected, the Court observed
that the plaintiff was arguing that criminal trials, unlike prisons, had been
historically open to the public. 140 It then declared:
[E]ven assuming, arguendo, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments may
guarantee such access in some situations, a question we do not decide .... the
trial court found that the representatives of the press did have a right of access of
constitutional dimension, but held, under the circumstances of this case, that this
right was outweighed by the defendants' right to a fair trial. 14 1
Even more surprisingly, the Court also relied on Justice Powell's Pell-Saxbe
dissent where he argued that Branzburg required a balancing of First Amendment
protection for newsgathering against competing government interests even when
access was sought to government-controlled information: "In short, the closure
decision [by the trial court] was based 'on an assessment of the competing
societal interests involved... rather than on any determination that First
Amendment freedoms were not implicated.' "142 Satisfied with the trial court's
balancing of these interests, the Court held that there was no violation of the First
Amendment even if that Amendment did provide a public right of access to the
trial. 143
140 Id. at 392 and n.24.
141 Id. at 392-93.
142 Id. at 393 (quoting Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 860 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
143 Id. at 393-94. As might have been expected given his dissenting positions in
Pell-Saxbe and Houchins, Justice Powell concurred separately and urged the Court to
hold explicitly that the plaintiffs reporter had a First Amendment right to attend the
criminal trial. See 443 U.S. at 397-401 (Powell, J., concurring). Dismayed at this turn of
events, Justice Rehnquist-who had opposed a right of access in those cases-also
concurred separately to argue that despite the Court's "seeming reservation" of the
question:
[I]t is clear that this Court repeatedly has held that there is no First Amendment right
of access in the public or the press to judicial or other governmental
proceedings.... [T]his Court emphatically has rejected the proposition advanced in
Mr. Justice Powell's concurring opinion ... that the First Amendment is some sort
of constitutional 'sunshine law' that requires notice, an opportunity to be heard, and
substantial reasons before a governmental proceeding may be closed to the public
and press.
Gannett, 443 U.S. at 404-05 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). And four other Justices that
dissented on the Court's resolution of the Sixth Amendment question simply observed
that "this Court heretofore has not found, and does not today find, any First Amendment
right of access to judicial or other governmental proceedings." Id. at 411 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
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Thus, in Gannett, the Court began hinting at an exception to the rule it had
solidified just one year earlier that there was no First Amendment right of access
to information controlled by the government. And by repositioning this new right
of access as a public right, as opposed to one based on the functions of the press
in gathering and disseminating information, the Court appeared to be setting the
stage for the necessity of justifying any such right on the basis of "freedom of
speech" rather than the "freedom of the press" principles debated in the earlier
newsgathering cases.
6. Richmond Newspapers and Progeny: Creating a Public Right of Access
to Information Generated in the Context of Criminal Trial Proceedings
This repositioning of a right of access was consummated the following term
in the case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.144 There, a court trying a
murder case closed the trial to the press and public on an unopposed motion made
by the defendant. 145 A newspaper company intervened in the action and objected
to the closure, but the trial court reaffirmed its ruling. 146 Failing to get satisfaction
in the state appellate courts, the newspaper company appealed to the Supreme
Court. In a 7-1 judgment147 that produced four separate opinions, the Court
decided that the First Amendment provided the public with a constitutional right
of access to criminal trials.
As in Houchins, Chief Justice Burger wrote a plurality opinion joined by only
two other Justices. Apparently to distinguish this case from the question of prison
access in Houchins, the Chief Justice initially described how criminal trials had
historically been open to the public.148 But given that Pell-Saxbe and Houchins
were based on freedom of the press claims, the plurality had to confront, for the
first time, the argument that nothing in the text of the First Amendment speaks to
a public "right of access" to governmental proceedings. 149 Pointing to that
Amendment's protections for speech, press and assembly, the plurality noted that
these "freedoms share a common core purpose of assuring freedom of
communication on matters relating to the functioning of government. Plainly it
would be difficult to single out any aspect of government of higher concern and
importance to the people than the manner in which criminal trials are
144 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (plurality opinion).
145 Id. at 560.
146 Id. at 562.
147 Justice Powell did not participate in the case.
148 Remarkably, however, the Chief Justice made no reference at all to Houchins
throughout his entire opinion, save for a citation in the last footnote to a relatively minor
point that Justice Stewart had made in his separate opinion in that case. See 448 U.S. at
581 n.18.
149 Id. at 575-76.
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conducted .... -150 Moreover, the Court had acknowledged that certain
unarticulated rights are "implicit in enumerated guarantees," and without the right
to attend trials "important aspects of freedom of speech and 'of the press could be
eviscerated.' "151 Accordingly, "[a]bsent an overriding interest articulated in
findings, the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 152
Joining the Chief Justice's opinion but concurring separately, Justice Stevens
proclaimed enthusiastically:
This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually
absolute protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before
has it squarely held that the acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any
constitutional protection whatsoever.... I agree that the First Amendment
protects the public and the press from abridgment of their rights of access to
information about the operation of their government, including the Judicial
Branch .... 153
However, given that the plurality opinion was limited to criminal trials, Justice
Stevens' characterization of the reach of its ruling seemed a bit overstated.
Justices Brennan and Marshall believed that the Chief Justice's approach to
this new right of access was too broad, and needed to be justified on more
principled grounds.' 54 Thus, they concurred in the judgment only, with Justice
Brennan writing the concurring opinion. Acknowledging in an understatement
that "the First Amendment has not been viewed by the Court in all settings as
providing an equally categorical assurance of the correlative freedom of access to
information," he nevertheless argued that
[t]he Court's approach in right-of-access cases simply reflects the special
nature of a claim of [a] First Amendment right to gather information.
Customarily, First Amendment guarantees are interposed to protect
communication between speaker and listener.... But the First Amendment
embodies more than a commitment to free expression and communicative
interchange for their own sakes; it has a structural role to play in securing and
fostering our republican system of self-government. 155
And since that Amendment's structural role assumes a robust and informed
debate on public issues, this model "links the First Amendment to that process of
150 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 575.
151 Id. at 579-80 (citing Branzburg).
152 Id. at 581 (footnote omitted).
153 Id. at 582, 584 (Stevens, J., concurring).
154 This was somewhat ironic given the previous consistent support these Justices
had espoused for a First Amendment right to gather news, and the consistent resistance
that Chief Justice Burger had earlier displayed towards this right.
155 Id. at 585-87 (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
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communication necessary for a democracy to survive, and thus entails solicitude
not only for communication itself, but also for the indispensable conditions of
meaningful communication."'156
However, because the reach of an information-gathering right was
"'theoretically endless,' ... it must be invoked with discrimination and
temperance.... An assertion of the prerogative to gather information must
accordingly be assayed by considering the information sought and the opposing
interests invaded."'157 To perform this "assaying," he counseled that:
[A]t least two helpful principles may be sketched. First, the case for a right of
access has special force when drawn from an enduring and vital tradition of
public entree to particular proceedings or information.... Such a tradition ... of
accessibility implies the favorable judgment of experience. Second, the value of
access must be measured in specifics. Analysis is not advanced by rhetorical
statements that all information bears upon public issues; what is crucial in
individual cases is whether access to a particular government process is
important in terms of that very process.158
With respect to the first principle, Justice Brennan urged the consultation of
"historical and current practice with respect to open trials," including "[tlradition,
contemporaneous state practice, and this Court's own decisions .... ,"
159
Regarding the second principle, "the specific structural value of public access in
the circumstances" must be assessed. 160 He concluded that both of these
principles weighed in favor of a public right of access to criminal trials. 16 1
Justice Stewart also concurred in the judgment. In contrast to his
straightforward rejection in Houchins of "a right of access to information
generated or controlled by government,"'162 here Justice Stewart asserted that the
First Amendment "clearly give[s] the press and the public a right of access to
trials .... civil as well as criminal. As has been abundantly demonstrated... it
156 Id. at 588. Interestingly, Justice Brennan's reasoning here tracked his vision of
First Amendment freedom of the press principles that he had described in a speech less
than one year earlier. See supra note 52. Only here Justice Brennan was applying it
without differentiation to a public right of access under general freedom of speech
principles, a leap that I will argue later may not have been justified or tenable. See infra
Part I, Section A.
157 488 U.S. at 588 (citations and footnotes omitted).
158 Id. at 588-89 (citation omitted).
159 Id. at 589, 593.
160 Id. at 598.
161 According to Justice Brennan, in the case of criminal trials law and custom
manifested an "abiding adherence to the principle of open trials," and public attendance
"substantially further[ed] the particular public purposes of that proceeding" by facilitating
the appearance and reality of the fair administration of justice. See id. at 593-97.
162 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 16.
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has for centuries been a basic presupposition of the Anglo-American legal system
that trials shall be public trials." 16 3 While Justice White concurred in the plurality
opinion and Justice Blackmun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, they
both wrote separately to indicate that they were voting for a First Amendment
right of access only because the Court had incorrectly rejected such a right based
on the Sixth Amendment in Gannett.164 Justice Rehnquist filed the lone dissent,
arguing that nothing in the Constitution could be fairly read to support a right of
access to criminal trials and criticizing the Court majority for improperly
expanding federal power at the expense of State rights. 165
Since Richmond Newspapers was such a fragmented decision, it was not until
two years later in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court166 that a majority of
the Justices agreed upon a single rationale for this new public right of access.
There, a newspaper challenged the closure of a portion of a criminal trial pursuant
to a state law that mandated closure during the testimony of minor victims in sex-
163 Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 599 (Stewart, J., concurring in the
judgment). And in a nod to the textual issues associated with finding a right of "access"
in the First Amendment, in a footnote Justice Stewart asserted that "[t]he First
Amendment provisions relevant to this case are those protecting free speech and a free
press. The right to speak implies a freedom to listen .... The right to publish implies a
freedom to gather information." Id. at 599 n.2 (internal citations omitted). Thus, Justice
Stewart seemed to be implying that the public's right of access was based on the "right to
receive information and ideas" developed by the Court in a separate line of cases, see
supra Part I, while the press' right of access was based on the right to gather information.
However, such a distinction was, and is, untenable. As the Court had held, the right to
receive information is based on the notion of receiving the speech of a willing speaker.
See supra Part I. Clearly the government is not a "willing speaker" when it attempts to
close judicial proceedings to the public. See also Houchins, 438 U.S. at 12 (plurality
opinion) (observing that it was a right to gather information or, synonymously, a right of
access that was at stake in the context of a government closure of a prison to the public,
rather than a "right to receive information and ideas"). Admittedly, however, the Court
itself has been guilty of confusing or blurring the lines between the two rights. See
Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 576 (plurality opinion) (stating that it was not crucial
whether the Court described the right of access to criminal trials as a "right of access" or
"right to gather information," but suggesting that the "right to receive information and
ideas" might support access as well). In any event, to suggest, as Justice Stewart did, that
anyone engaging in "publishing" or "press" activities did not have a right to receive
information as well as a right to gather it (at least in so far as these rights have been
understood by the Court), seems clearly wrong. However, I will argue that Justice
Stewart was largely correct to the extent he was positing that whereas the right to "speak"
does not necessarily imply a right to gather information, the right to "publish" very well
might in certain limited circumstances. See infra Part IV.
164 See 448 U.S. at 581-82 (White, J., concurring); id. at 603-04 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
165 See id. at 604-06 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
166 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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offense trials. 167 The Court held that such automatic closures violated the right of
access established in Richmond Newspapers, reasoning that closure could occur
only after it was shown that it was "necessitated by a compelling governmental
interest, and [was] narrowly tailored to serve that interest." 16 8 Revisiting the
constitutional basis for this right of access, the Court through Justice Brennan
explained:
Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not explicitly mentioned in
terms in the First Amendment. But we have long eschewed any "narrow, literal
conception" of the Amendment's terms .... for the Framers were concerned with
broad principles, and wrote against a background of shared values and practices.
The First Amendment is thus broad enough to encompass those rights that, while
not unambiguously enumerated in the very terms of the Amendment, are
nonetheless necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment
rights.... Underlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is
the common understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,"....By offering such
protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that the individual citizen can
effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self
government. . . . Thus to the extent that the First Amendment embraces a right of
access to criminal trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected
"discussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. 16 9
The Court then adopted the "two helpful principles" that Justice Brennan had
proposed in Richmond Newspapers for assaying claims of a right to gather
information, as the basis for applying a right of access to criminal trials:
Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in the various
opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together serve to explain why a right of
access to criminal trials in particular is properly afforded protection by the First
Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been open to the press and
general public.... Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a
particularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial process and the
government as a whole.... In sum, the institutional value of the open criminal
trial is recognized in both logic and experience. 170
167 Id. at 599--600.
168 Id. at 607.
169 Id. at 604-05 (citations and quotations omitted).
170 Id. at 605-06 (emphasis in original) (internal citations and footnotes omitted).
Justice O'Connor, who had by then replaced Justice Stewart, concurred in the judgment
but declined to join the Court's expansive interpretation of the First Amendment:
I do not interpret [Richmond Newspapers] to shelter every right that is "necessary to
the enjoyment of other First Amendment rights.". . . Instead, Richmond Newspapers
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After Globe Newspaper the Court decided two other significant cases
involving the right of access to criminal trials. In one, this right was extended to
cover juror voir dire proceedings in a criminal trial, 171 and in the other, it was
extended to probable cause hearings.' 72 In the second of these decisions, the
Court expressly adopted Justice Brennan's "logic and experience" principles as
the appropriate standard for assessing a right of access to criminal judicial
proceedings beyond the trial itself.173 Thus, certain proceedings such as grand
rests upon our long history of open criminal trials and the special value, for both
public and accused, of that openness.... Thus, I interpret neither Richmond
Newspapers nor the Court's decision today to carry any implications outside the
context of criminal trials.
Id. at 611 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Chief Justice Burger, and Justices
Rehnquist and Stevens, dissented in the case. Of particular note, Justice Stevens
complained that the case was not ripe for review, and thus was especially unfit for the
application of a right of access that had only recently been recognized by the Court and
was "plainly not coextensive with the right of expression .... 457 U.S. at 621 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
171 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 503 (1984) [hereinafter
Press-Enterprise 1].
172 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 12 (1986) [hereinafter Press-
Enterprise II]. In 1993, in an unremarkable per curiam decision, the Court applied its
holding in Press-Enterprise II to strike down a Puerto Rican law giving a criminal
defendant the right to close a preliminary hearing in a criminal trial proceeding. See El
Vocero De Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 149-51 (1993) (per curiam).
173 As the Court explained:
In cases dealing with the claim of a First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings, our decisions have emphasized two complementary
considerations.... These considerations of experience and logic are, of course,
related, for history and experience shape the functioning of governmental processes.
If the particular proceeding in question passes these.tests of experience and logic, a
qualified First Amendment right of public access attaches.
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9. However, apparently backing away slightly from
the "compelling interest" standard announced in Globe Newspaper, the Court noted that a
right of access "may be overcome only by an overriding interest based on findings that
closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that
interest." Id. at 9 (quoting Press Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 510).
Press-Enterprise I and M were otherwise unremarkable decisions except to mark
Justice Stevens' increasing dissatisfaction with the right of access that he had so
enthusiastically hailed in Richmond Newspapers, as it came into conflict with other
interests that he viewed as equally, if not more, important (such as juror privacy or the
right to a fair trial). In addition to his dissent in Globe Newspaper, in Press-Enterprise I,
he argued that in order to protect juror privacy, the right of access should be applied
selectively based on the content of the juror questioning at issue (in contrast to traditional
First Amendment principles that ordinarily bar protection from being withheld on the
basis of the content of the information or ideas at issue). See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S.
at 519 (Stevens, J., concurring). And in Press Enterprise II, he complained that the
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jury hearings or jury deliberations that had traditionally been closed to public
scrutiny, would presumably not qualify for this new right of access.
In sum, Richmond Newspapers created a public right of access to information
revealed in criminal trial proceedings purportedly to facilitate a "free discussion
of governmental affairs" that is also "an informed one." 174 However, to limit the
"theoretically endless" reach of such a right, the Court seemed to carefully limit
its application to proceedings associated with criminal trials, 175 and also required
that those proceedings have a tradition of public openness and benefit from a
public presence. Accordingly, when fully considered, it appears that the Court
intended the reach of the Richmond Newspapers right to be limited, at least in its
initial conception. Nonetheless, basing such a right on broad "freedom of speech"
principles, rather than the "freedom of the press" principles that underlied the
debate in the newsgathering cases, was a truly substantial development. I will
argue later that a meaningful and workable First Amendment right to gather
information cannot be based on such broad Speech Clause principles, and that in
recognizing a right of access to govemment-controlled information the Court
would have done better to base it on the more narrow Press Clause principles
championed by the dissenting Justices in Branzburg, Pell-Saxbe and Houchins. 176
7. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.: A Return to, and "Evisceration" of, the
Right of Newsgathering
One might have expected that the recognition of a public right to acquire
certain information in the government context-and especially the Court's
application of a heightened standard of scrutiny to impingements on that right-
might have signaled a growing recognition on the part of the Court of the value of
protecting important information flows. However, this attitude was not
discernible in its next case dealing with newsgathering activities. In Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 177 Cohen, a consultant to a political candidate, provided
public court records to the reporters of two different newspapers about minor
crimes an opposing candidate had purportedly committed, in exchange for the
proper standard of review with respect to a right of access should not be one of strict
scrutiny, but rather a general balancing of the "information sought and the opposing
interests invaded" which Justice Brennan had initially proposed in his Richmond
Newspapers concurrence. See 478 U.S. at 28-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Ironically, it was Justice Brennan himself who authored
the opinion in Globe Newspaper elevating the standard of review for a right of access to
one of strict scrutiny. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
174 See Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604-05.
175 See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-10.
176 See infra notes 263-73 and 341-47 and accompanying text.
177 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
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reporters' promise to keep Cohen's identity confidential.' 7 8 After investigating
the records and determining that the charges against the opposing candidate were
of a minor nature and had eventually been dismissed or vacated, the papers
independently decided to publish the entire story, including the identification of
Cohen as the source of the court records. 179 Cohen was fired from his job, and
sought to hold the newspapers liable for his damages. 180 The Minnesota Supreme
Court determined that the only viable theory of recovery was based on
promissory estoppel principles, but held that the newspapers could not, consistent
with the First Amendment, be held liable under those laws for breaching their
promise of confidentiality. 181
The Supreme Court reversed in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice White (the
author of Branzburg).182 Initially, the Court suggested that the "news" in the case
had not been lawfully acquired, and hence fell outside a line of cases holding that
the First Amendment protected the press from punishment for publishing
lawfully-acquired, truthful information. 183 Instead, the decision was controlled by
"the equally well-established line of decisions holding that generally applicable
laws [did] not offend the First Amendment simply because their enforcement
against the press [had] incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the
news." 184 Discussing past decisions where general laws, like the rules of criminal
procedure at issue in Branzburg, had been enforced against the press, the Court
concluded that the "enforcement of such general laws against the press [was] not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against other
persons or organizations."'185 Moreover, even if such enforcement would inhibit
truthful news reporting, "it [was] no more than the incidental, and constitutionally
insignificant, consequence of applying to the press a generally applicable law that
requires those who make certain kinds of promises to keep them."' 186 The Court
then concluded "that the First Amendment [did] not confer on the press a
constitutional right to disregard promises that would otherwise be enforced under
state law .... "187
17 8 Id. at 665-66.
179 Id. at 666.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 668-72.
182 See generally id. Of the five important information-gathering decisions decided
prior to Cohen-Zemel, Branzburg, Pell-Saxbe, Houchins, and Richmond Newspapers-
three of these (Branzburg, Pell-Saxbe, and Houchins) were decided by a one-vote
margin. Cohen would make that four out of six, or two-thirds of the cases.
183 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668-69.
18 4 Id. at 669.
185 Id. at 670.
186 Id. at 672.
187 Id.
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Justice Souter filed a dissent that was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun
and O'Connor,188 and argued that there was " 'nothing talismanic about neutral
laws of general applicability'... for such laws may restrict First Amendment
rights just as effectively as those directed at speech itself."189 Thus, he contended,
as in previous cases the interests promoted by the general laws should have been
balanced against the First Amendment interests at stake. And although the
circumstances under which newspapers acquired their information was relevant to
the balance, given the importance of putting Cohen's information in context "the
State's interest in enforcing [the] newspaper's promise of confidentiality [was]
insufficient to outweigh the interest in unfettered publication of the information
revealed in [the] case." 190
The Court's approach in Cohen appeared to depart dramatically from the
balancing analysis it utilized in Branzburg to resolve the conflict between the
general laws at issue there (i.e., the rules of criminal procedure) and the First
Amendment protection it had accorded to newsgathering activities. In essence,
the Court seemed to say that the First Amendment would no longer be relevant
where newsgathering or publishing activities conflicted with general laws. On the
other hand, the Court's judgment in Cohen was consistent with the protection for
newsgathering it recognized in Branzburg, since the enforcement of promises of
confidentiality made to news sources would only make such sources more likely
to reveal information to reporters. Indeed, the press in Branzburg argued that it
was necessary for it to keep such promises in order to effectively gather the news.
Thus, the only real burden imposed by the promissory estoppel laws in Cohen
was on the press' ability to disclose the plaintiff's identity, which seemed to be a
far cry from burdening its ability to acquire newsworthy information in the first
place.19 1
Accordingly, it is not clear whether the Court really intended to eliminate any
First Amendment protection for newsgathering activities in all future conflicts
involving laws of general application. Nonetheless, its broad, sweeping
pronouncements in this regard appear to require this result. Until the Court
188 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 676. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Marshall and
Souter, also dissented separately on the grounds that the State was effectively punishing
the publication of truthful speech on the basis of its content absent a compelling interest
in doing so. See id. at 672-76 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189 Id. at 677 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting Employment Div., Dep't of Human
Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 901 (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment)).
190 Cohen, 501 U.S. at 679.
191 As the Minnesota Supreme Court observed on remand in upholding a promissory
estoppel judgment against the press, there were other ways the newspapers could have
achieved its objective of informing the public about the questionable source of the story
without breaching its promise to Cohen and specifically identifying him. See Cohen v.
Cowles Media Co., 479 N.W.2d 387, 391 (Minn. 1992).
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indicates otherwise, Cohen would seem to dictate that when newsgathering
activities conflict with generally applicable laws such as tort, contract, or property
laws, or even rules of criminal or civil procedure of the type at issue in
Branzburg, a First Amendment balancing of interests will no longer be
appropriate. As I will argue later, such an approach to facilitating modem flows of
information to the public regarding matters of public concern is inadequate. 192
8. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publishing Co.: A Return
to the Right of Access to Government-Controlled Information: Signaling
the Limited Scope of Richmond Newspapers?
Lastly, the Court's most recent encounter with an information-gathering right
occurred in the context of access to government information.193 But because it
dealt tangentially with the right of access, Los Angeles Police Department v.
United Reporting Publishing Co. 194 is probably less important for its specific
holding than for what it reveals about how the current members of the Court view
that right. In United Reporting, a company that collected names and addresses of
arrested individuals from police reports and sold them for use in commercial
mailing lists challenged a new California law denying access to the arrestee's
addresses for commercial purposes. 195 The lower courts determined that the new
law was an indirect restriction on commercial speech and thus violated the First
Amendment on its face.196
192 See infra Part 1II, Section B. Moreover, I will suggest other ways in which
Cohen might be distinguished from Branzburg and lead one to conclude that First
Amendment scrutiny may still be appropriate with respect to some laws of general
applicability that conflict with newsgathering activities. See infra notes 284-302 and
accompanying text.
193 In Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999), decided between the Court's decisions
in Cohen and United Reporting, the Court gave short shrift to an argument of the news
media that its First Amendment right "to facilitate accurate reporting on law enforcement
activities" overrode an individual's Fourth Amendment right to be free of police searches
of private homes involving "media ride-alongs." Id. at 612-13. As the Court observed,
[T]he Fourth Amendment also protects a very important right, and in the
present case it is in terms of that right that the media ride-alongs must be
judged.... [E]ven the need for accurate reporting on police issues in general bears
no direct relation to the constitutional justification for the police intrusion into a
home in order to execute a felony arrest warrant.
Id. at 613.
194 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
195 Id. at 34.
196 United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Ca. Highway Patrol, 146 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir.
1998); United Reporting Publ'g Corp. v. Lungren, 946 F. Supp. 822 (S.D. Cal. 1996).
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The Court reversed, holding that the lower courts erred in entertaining a facial
challenge to the new law, and remanded for consideration of its constitutionality
on an "as applied" basis. 197 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, who authored
the majority opinion, the facial invalidation of the law was improper under the
Court's overbreadth doctrine because it was "simply a law regulating access to
information in the hands of the police department" rather than a law "regulat[ing]
or proscrib[ing] speech .... ,"198 As the Court explained:
Facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice
and... its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise
unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction moves from "pure
speech" toward conduct and that conduct-even if expressive-falls within the
scope of otherwise valid criminal laws .... 199
And in this case "what [the Court has] before [it] is nothing more than a
governmental denial of access to information in its possession. California could
[have] decide[d] not to give out arrestee information at all without violating the
First Amendment. Cf Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978)."200
Although six other Justices joined the Chief Justice's opinion, all of them
wrote or joined concurring opinions. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, contended the fact that the amendment at issue
was "properly analyzed as a restriction on access to government information, not
as a restriction on speech," was sufficient grounds in and of itself for reversal.20
1
In their view, "California could, as the Court notes, constitutionally decide not to
give out arrestee address information at all."'20 2 Accordingly, the release of the
addresses was in the nature of a subsidy, which California could choose to
provide to some speakers and not others as long as it did not discriminate on the
basis of "an illegitimate criterion such as viewpoint. 20 3
197 Id. at 40-41.
198 Id. at 38, 40.
199 Id. at 39-40 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
200 Id. at 40 (internal footnote and citations omitted).
201 Los Angeles Police Dep 't, 528 U.S. at 42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
202 Id. at 43.
203 Id. Moreover, Justice Ginsburg argued, "if States were required to choose
between keeping proprietary information to themselves and making it available without
limits, States might well choose the former option. In that event, disallowing selective
disclosure would lead not to more speech overall but to more secrecy and less speech."
Id. Hence, "society's interest in the free flow of information might argue for upholding
laws like the one at issue in this case rather than imposing an all-or-nothing regime under
which 'nothing' could be a State's easiest response." Id. at 44. Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, agreed with the Court's disposition of the facial challenge, but in
contrast to Justice Ginsburg suggested that the law was vulnerable to an as-applied
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In dissent, Justices Stevens and Kennedy expressed the view that the law had
been challenged on an as-applied basis in the lower courts, and argued that the
law was an unconstitutional restriction on commercial speech because it
discriminated between commercial and non-commercial users of the
information. 204 They also suggested that the State could have avoided the whole
problem by simply denying everyone access to the arrestee addresses, or even by
discriminating between those requesting access on a basis other than disfavored
speech purposes.205 Thus, because the amendment was
[r]eally a restriction on access to government information rather than a direct
restriction on protected speech,. . . the majority is surely correct in observing that
California could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without
violating the First Amendment.... Moreover, I think it equally clear that
California could release the information on a selective basis to a limited group of
users who have a special, and legitimate, need for the information. 206
Thus, in United Reporting, the majority opinion, the dissenting opinion, and
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion each stated explicitly that California could
have withheld the arrestee address information from the public without violating
the First Amendment. And the only citation of authority for this proposition was
the Chief Justice's "cf." citation to Houchins in the majority opinion, which both
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Stevens incorporated by reference as the sole support
for their agreement on this issue.207 Given the public right of access to certain
types of government information recognized in Richmond Newspapers, and the
fact that the plaintiff in United Reporting argued for an extension of this right, it
was surprising that the Court flatly rejected this claim without as much as a
mention of it.208
challenge as an indirect restriction on commercial speech. See id. at 41-42 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
204 Los Angeles Police Dep't, 528 U.S. at 44, 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205 Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
206 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
207 See id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J., concurring); id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208 See Respondent's Brief at 41-44. The Court's failure to even consider the
applicability of the Richmond Newspapers right of access was particularly surprising in
view of the fact that at least one federal court of appeals judge had argued in an earlier
case that a state's criminal justice records, including arrestee addresses, did meet the
"experience and logic" test of Richmond Newspapers. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State
of Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1516-20 (10th Cir. 1994) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (arguing
that the Richmond Newspapers test did apply to criminal justice records and that there
was a public right of access under that test to use such records for solicitation by
attorneys and substance abuse counselors). United Reporting highlighted Judge Aldisert's
dissent in its brief to the Court. See Respondent's Brief at 37-38.
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Logically, there are at least two potential explanations for the Court's
dismissive treatment of this argument. On the one hand, it may indicate that the
Court views the Richmond Newspapers right of access as having limited
applicability outside the context of criminal judicial proceedings. On the other
hand, given the personal nature of the arrestee information at issue in the case-
which Justice Ginsburg labeled in her concurrence as "proprietary
information"2 9-even if the Court believed that the "experience and logic"
standard of Richmond Newspapers might apply to government information
outside of judicial proceedings (as Justice Brennan seems to have originally
intended in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence), the Justices may have made
a silent assessment in United Reporting that public access to arrestee addresses
(and particularly for commercial purposes) did not meet that standard. Either way,
the Court signaled that any person attempting to expand the Richmond
Newspapers right of access beyond its current moorings may well bear a
significant burden in doing so.
B. Conclusions on a Right to Gather Information Under Existing
Supreme Court Precedent
To sum up the Court's jurisprudence with respect to a First Amendment right
to gather information, in Zemel it ruled that general information-gathering
activities engaged in for speech-related purposes did not implicate First
Amendment concerns. Then in Branzburg, it indicated that newsgathering
activities were entitled to some constitutional protection and that a general
balancing of such interests against competing governmental interests would be
appropriate where conflicts arose. However, in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins, the
Court held that any such protection for newsgathering did not extend to efforts to
gain access to government-controlled information. But then in the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases, the Court created an exception for criminal judicial
proceedings and created a public right of access to such proceedings. More
recently, in Cohen, the Court appeared to substantially eliminate the protection for
general newsgathering activities recognized in Branzburg, at least in cases
presenting conflicts between such activities and laws of general application. And
in United Reporting, the Court signaled that the right of access to government
information recognized in Richmond Newspapers might have limited application
outside the context of judicial proceedings.
What, then, can be said about the existing contours of a right to gather
information? Under the foregoing cases, the Court appears to have created two
important distinctions in terms of First Amendment protection accorded to
information-gathering activities. The first concerns the source of the information
being sought, and specifically whether the information is created or controlled by
209 See supra note 203.
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the government or whether it is to be gathered from other sources. With respect to
governmental information, Houchins (and to some extent United Reporting)
rejects a First Amendment right to gain access to such information, except to the
extent Richmond Newspapers and progeny created a limited right of access.
The second distinction is relevant for all other information-i.e., that
available in the public domain or under the control of private or non-
governmental parties.2 10 The Court in Branzburg recognized that newsgathering
is entitled to some First Amendment protection, but also suggested in Zemel that
information gathering by members of the general public did not merit First
Amendment consideration. And because the Court in Branzburg based what
protection it did accord to newsgathering on "freedom of the press" principles, it
seems to have created a general perception among lower courts that the
acquisition of "news" by the press is the only (or at least the main) type of
information-gathering activity that merits constitutional protection.2 11 And while
Cohen appears to have limited the scope of protection Branzburg bestowed on
newsgathering activities incidentally burdened by laws of general application,
presumably Branzburg retains whatever vitality it originally had when laws aim
to restrict, or disproportionately burden, the newsgathering activities of the
press.212
C. Summary of Lower Court Interpretations and Application of Supreme
Court's Information-Gathering Jurisprudence
Although a detailed survey of the numerous lower court decisions applying
the foregoing decisions of the Court is beyond the scope of this Article, it is
possible to summarize several patterns and trends in these cases.
First, with respect to a First Amendment right of access to governmental
information, most courts reject such a right on the basis of Houchins except in the
area of governmental proceedings or related records where a claimant can
demonstrate that the Richmond Newspapers standards of "experience and logic"
have been satisfied. More specifically, most courts have rejected a constitutional
right of access to government records or facilities under the control of the
executive or legislative branches (including administrative agencies), either
relying outright on Houchins (and more recently on United Reporting), or by
finding that the Richmond Newspapers standards of "experience and logic" do not
210 Of course, information from such non-governmental sources can certainly
include information about government that can be obtained from the public domain or
private sources.
211 See infra notes 216-18 and accompanying text.
212 See infra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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apply to such information.213 By contrast, under those standards many courts
have recognized a right of access to both criminal and civil judicial proceedings
that have been traditionally open to the public, as well as documents and records
normally made public in connection with those proceedings. 214 However, courts
have reached different conclusions as to a right of access to government
proceedings outside of the context of judicial proceedings. 215
213 With respect to government records, see, e.g., Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. Dep't
of Justice, 331 F.3d. 918, 933-36 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that there was no First
Amendment right of access to records re detainments of individuals in connection with
Sept. 11 terrorism investigation), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1041 (2004); United States v.
Miami Univ., 294 F.3d 797, 823-24 (6th Cir. 2002) (same regarding records of state
university student disciplinary records); Pfeiffer v. CIA, 60 F.3d 861, 866 (D.C. Cir.
1995) (same regarding certain CIA records); ACLU v. Mississippi, 911 F.2d 1066, 1071-
72 (5th Cir. 1990), affd, ALCU v. King, 84 F.3d 784, 785 (5th Cir. 1996) (same
regarding records of a disbanded state agency devoted to maintaining racial segregation);
Calder v. I.R.S., 890 F.2d 781, 783-84 (5th Cir. 1989) (same regarding IRS records of its
investigation of Al Capone); Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Chester, 797 F.2d 1164, 1166-
76 (3d Cir. 1986) (same regarding state environmental agency records of water
contamination investigation); Ohio Contractors Assoc. v. City of Columbus, 733 F. Supp.
1156, 1163-65 (S.D. Ohio 1990) (same regarding the city's construction bidding
records). But see Cal-Almond, Inc. v. Dep't of Agric., 960 F.2d 105, 109-110 (9th Cir.
1992) (suggesting there was a First Amendment right of access to USDA voter
referendum records); Bauer v. Kincaid, 759 F. Supp. 575, 593-95 (W.D. Mo. 1991)
(finding First Amendment right of access to incident records of state university campus
police).
As to government facilities, see, e.g., Phillips v. Bureau of Prisons, 591 F.2d 966
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (paralegal had no First Amendment right of access to prison to interview
prisoner); United States v. Maldonado-Norat, 122 F. Supp. 2d 264 (D.P.R. 2000)
(joumalists had no right of access to enter Vieques naval base to cover protests),
SEARCH v. Pena, No. CIV.A.95-1289SSH, 1995 WL 669235, at *1 (D.D.C. July 31,
1995) (scientist had no right to enter restricted waters to sample for nuclear
contamination around submarine decommissioning facility); New Mexico v.
McCormack, 682 P.2d 742 (N.M. Ct. App. 1984) (journalists had no right of access to
protest buffer zone at DOE nuclear waste construction site).
214 See, e.g., Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 695 n.ll (6th Cir. 2002)
(observing that "a number of circuits .... have... agreed that the press and public have
a First Amendment right to attend civil proceedings under [two-part Richmond
Newspapers] test"); In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002)
(observing that First Amendment right of access under Richmond Newspapers "extends
to documents and kindred materials submitted in connection with the prosecution and
defense of criminal proceedings"); see also generally DIENES Er AL., supra note 98, at
71-156, 179-298.
215 Compare North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.
2002) (rejecting First Amendment right of access to attend deportation proceedings
connected with Sept. 11 terrorism investigations), with Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at
683 (finding a First Amendment right to attend such proceedings). Compare also Cal.
First Amendment Coalition v. Woodford, 299 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding right
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Second, as to a right to be free from undue interference in gathering
information from non-governmental sources, relying on Branzburg courts have
generally held that newsgathering activities enjoy some measure of First
Amendment protection. 2 16 Moreover, courts have been fairly liberal in construing
"newsgathering" to include information gathered for special-interest publications
or television productions, in addition to traditional news publications and
broadcast news programs. 2 17 Outside of the newsgathering context however, even
when parties have alleged a definite speech or publishing purpose for engaging in
certain information-gathering activities, courts have been more reluctant to extend
First Amendment protection to them on the basis of Zemel.2 18
of access to prisoner execution), Whiteland Woods, L.P. v. Township of W. Whiteland,
193 F.3d 177, 180-81 (3d Cir. 1999) (same regarding township commission planning
meetings) and Soc'y of Prof'l Journalists v. Sec'y of Labor, 616 F. Supp. 569, 575 (D.
Utah 1985) (same regarding administrative safety hearing), with JB Pictures v. Dep't. of
Defense, 86 F.3d 236, 239 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (rejecting right of access to military
ceremony) and First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d
467, 472 (3d Cir. 1986) (same regarding state board investigating judicial misconduct).
216 See, e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838 F.2d 380, 384 (9th Cir. 1988)
(asserting that "the First Amendment protects the media's right to gather news"); Von
Bulow v. Von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 142 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[T]he process of newsgathering
is a protected right under the First Amendment, albeit a qualified one."); United States v.
Espy, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1998) ("There can be no question but that the press has
a right under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution to gather
information .... "); CBS, Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794, 803 (S.D. Fla. 1988) ("Simply
put, newsgathering is a basic right protected by the First Amendment ... ").
217 See, e.g., Southwell v. Southern Poverty Law Ctr., 949 F. Supp. 1303, 1315
(W.D. Mich. 1996) (holding that a public interest law group that published a newsletter
was entitled to invoke First Amendment journalist privilege to withhold identity of
confidential source); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 745 F. Supp.
1540. 1547 (C.D. Cal. 1990), affid on other grounds, 971 F.2d 303, 309 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that a celebrity magazine had a First Amendment newsgathering right to use the
rock band's name in connection with a poll about the band).
218 See, e.g., Freedom to Travel Campaign v. Newcomb, 82 F.3d 1431, 1441 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that an educational travel group had no First Amendment right to
travel to Cuba to gather information for its use in a debate about Cuban embargo; "where
a person seeks only to gather information, no First Amendment rights are implicated");
Walsh v. Brady, 927 F.2d 1229, 1234-35 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that an importer of
political posters from Cuba had no First Amendment right to personally gather
information in Cuba in order to arrange for importation and the sale of posters); accord
SEARCH v. Pena, No. Civ. A. 95-1289 SSH, 1995 WL 669235 at *3 (D.D.C. July 31,
1995) (The court held that a public interest group seeking to test the waters surrounding a
nuclear submarine facility could not term its exclusion from it "a violation of their First
Amendment rights by insisting that their lack of access to a restricted military zone
effectively prevents them from speaking and publishing"); Bennett v. Fieser, 152 F.R.D.
641, 644 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that where a protective order of the court barred civil
plaintiffs from conducting an independent investigation of certain facts, such an order
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Lastly, regarding the level of protection accorded to newsgathering activities,
prior to Cohen courts seemed to acknowledge at least the appropriateness in some
situations of a Branzburg-type balancing analysis to resolve alleged conflicts
between those activities and the laws intended to regulate conduct generally.2 19
However, since Cohen many courts appear to dismiss, with little or no
consideration, the First Amendment interests involved in such conflicts. 220 But in
only "limit[ed] their right to gather information. Therefore, first amendment concerns
[were] not implicated by the court's requirement.").
However, one area in which courts appear to be more inclined to extend First
Amendment protection for information gathering beyond the sphere of "newsgathering"
is in the application of a so-called "journalists" privilege against the compelled disclosure
of work product. See, e.g., Cusumano v. Microsoft Corp., 162 F.3d 708, 714-15 (1st Cir.
1998) (journalist privilege extended to academic researcher who acquired information in
connection with investigating a book); see also DIENES ET AL., supra note 98, at 847-52
& n.63, 67 (discussing how journalists' privilege has also been extended to freelance
investigative book authors, documentary filmmakers and a political advocacy group
researcher, but also how some courts have reserved the question of whether a history
writer, academic researchers, and a "virtually unpublished freelance writer operating
without an employer or contract for publication" are entitled to invoke it). See generally
supra notes 98-99, for additional discussion of a journalists' privilege under the First
Amendment.
219 See, e.g., United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d 1057, 1082 (4th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting First Amendment protection for violation of espionage law by government
employee that leaked secret government information to the media, but majority of judges
observing that "aggressive balancing" normally undertaken "to balance the value of
unrestricted newsgathering against other public interests" must yield to more deferential
review in context of national security secrets); Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press
v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d 1030, 1073, 1085 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (rejecting a
newsgathering defense to subpoenas for journalist toll-call records in law enforcement
investigations, but concurring and dissenting judge on 3-judge panel appearing to
balance First Amendment interests at issue in case); Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986,
995-96 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting newsgathering defense for harassment and invasion of
privacy of a public figure, but observing that "legitimate countervailing social needs may
wan-ant some intrusion despite an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and
freedom from harassment," but "interference allowed may be no greater than that
necessary to protect the overriding public interest"). But see, e.g., Dietemann v. Time,
Inc., 449 F.2d 245, 249 (9th Cir. 1971) (asserting that the First Amendment had "never
been construed to accord newsmen immunity from torts or crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering").
220 See, e.g., Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 520 (4th Cir.
1999) (relying on Cohen to reject consideration of a First Amendment defense to tort
liability regarding an undercover news investigation of improper food handling practices
by a grocery chain); W.D.I.A. Corp. v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 34 F. Supp. 2d 612, 624 (S.D.
Ohio 1998) (same regarding tort and breach of contract liability for an investigative
magazine article on the ease of access to consumer credit information); Risenhoover v.
England, 936 F. Supp. 392, 403-05 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (same regarding tort liability
relating to the news coverage of an FBI standoff with a religious cult at Waco);
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the case of laws or government actions alleged to target the newsgathering
activities of the press, courts appear much more willing to apply a vigorous level
of First Amendment scrutiny. Thus, for example, laws designed to restrict media
exit polling of voters within certain distances of polling places, orders by a trial
judge restricting media interviews of jurors or other participants in a trial, or
police conduct unreasonably interfering with the media's access to or ability to
record events in the public domain, have all been held to violate the First
Amendment.221  Moreover, any form of discriminatory treatment of
Dickerson v. Raphael, 564 N.W.2d 85, 92 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd on other grounds,
601 N.W.2d 108 (Mich. 1997) (same regarding a violation of eavesdropping statutes in
connection with an investigation of a religious cult). However, in cases where plaintiffs
have alleged damages of a reputational nature stemming from a publication derived from
alleged newsgathering torts or other wrongful conduct by the media, many courts have
held that the First Amendment bars recovery of such damages on the basis of the Court's
decision in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52 (1988) (requiring a
showing of New York Times' actual malice for recovery in tort actions alleging
defamation-type reputational harm caused by media publications); see, e.g., Food Lion,
Inc., 194 F.3d at 522-24 (permitting recovery of nominal damages for newsgathering tort
violations, but barring reputational damages caused by publication itself).
One major exception to the Cohen rule of no First Amendment scrutiny in conflicts
between newsgathering activities and general laws seems to be in the area of an asserted
journalist privilege against compliance with general rules of civil procedure where parties
demand that journalists disclose information or materials obtained in the course of their
investigations. Apparently taking the view that Cohen does not supplant Branzburg in all
newsgathering cases, lower courts almost overwhelmingly disregard Cohen in this
context and grant bona fide journalists a First Amendment privilege regarding
compliance with such rules. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
221 With respect to voter polling laws, see, e.g., Daily Herald Co. v. Munro, 838
F.2d 380, 384 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988) (law prohibiting exit polling within 300 feet of polling
places violated the First Amendment as an unconstitutional restriction on speech in a
public forum; declining to analyze as a "right of access" case, but noting that the law
would likely violate such principles). See also id. at 389-90 (Rienhardt, J. concurring)
(agreeing with a public forum analysis but also arguing that the law violated the right of
"media and, more important, the right of society to gather and disseminate information
important to the democratic political process"); CBS, Inc. v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794,
802 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (holding that a law prohibiting the solicitation of voters within 150
feet of polling places violated the newsgathering and free speech rights of the press).
As to restrictions of media interviews with jurors or other trial participants, see,
e.g., Davis v. E. Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 78 F.3d 920, 929 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding
that a gag order on certain participants issued during a trial violated the media's
newsgathering right and right to receive information). See also Journal Publ'g Co. v.
Mechem, 801 F.2d 1233, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that a broad post-trial juror gag
order was an invalid prior restraint on the media's newsgathering right); United States v.
Brown, 250 F.3d 907, 917-18 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that an order during trial
prohibiting the circumvention of a juror anonymity rule via the media's independent
investigation into juror identities was an impermissible prior restraint on the media's right
to report the news). The application by the court in Journal Publishing Co. and other
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newsgatherers by government officials tends to be scrutinized closely from a First
Amendment perspective. 222
In the next section of this Article, the soundness of the foregoing distinctions
and patterns in the treatment of a right to gather information will be analyzed
from the perspective of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence as a whole, as
well as from the perspective of desirable First Amendment policy. Following that,
I will propose principles on which a consistent and cohesive information-
gathering jurisprudence might be premised. This will have implications not only
for a more uniform treatment of the variety of cases in this area, but also for the
willingness of the Court to extend additional protection to information-gathering
activities where it might be merited without undue concern that it would be letting
an unmanageable "cat" of "theoretically endless" protection out of the bag.
III. CRITIQUE OF COURT'S INFORMATION-GATHERING JURISPRUDENCE
In Part HI, I concluded that the Court has created different standards of First
Amendment protection for information-gathering activities depending on (1)
whether the information is being sought from governmental or non-governmental
sources, and (2) in the context of non-governmental sources, whether it is being
sought by the organized press or other members of society. This Part explores
whether these distinctions are warranted or desirable in light of general First
Amendment principles and desirable constitutional policy.
lower courts of the prior restraint doctrine to newsgathering activities seems questionable
in light of the traditional application of that doctrine to restraints on publication. Even
more questionable was the Brown court's treatment of a restraint on newsgathering as
equivalent to a restraint on publication itself, blurring the "speech-gathering" distinction
altogether. However, an extended analysis and discussion of these issues is beyond the
scope of this Article.
Regarding police interference with newsgathering regarding public events such as
demonstrations or accident scenes, see supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
222 See, e.g., ABC v. Cuomo, 570 F.2d 1080, 1084 (2d Cir. 1977) (ordering the
district court to enjoin the threatened application of criminal trespass laws against a
television network seeking to broadcast post-election activities at candidate headquarters
when other major networks were allowed access to the broadcast events); Sherrill v.
Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 130 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (ruling that the Secret Service's denial of a
White House press pass to a particular journalist had to be based on the government's
articulation of a compelling interest given the important newsgathering interests at stake);
United Teachers of Dade v. Stierheim, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2002)
(enjoining a school board's assignment of the accredited teachers' union newspaper
reporters to a media room different than the "general-circulation media" where plaintiffs
were "deprived of the same news gathering environment and opportunities" afforded to
general media).
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A. Information Gathering From Governmental Sources
As discussed in Part I1, the Court has declined to recognize the existence of a
First Amendment right to gather information from government sources outside of
the discrete area of criminal judicial proceedings, while at the same time it has
recognized that there is some form of a First Amendment right to gather "news"
outside of the government context. And the protection that the Court did accord to
acquiring information about criminal judicial proceedings was justified on very
broad freedom of speech principles, which was a departure from its earlier
newsgathering cases where the debate centered on more narrow First Amendment
principles involving the freedom of the press. These points will be taken up in the
order I have raised them.
1. Constitutional Standards Governing the Gathering of Information from
Governmental Versus Non-Governmental Sources
Initially, it seems fair to ask whether it makes sense to say that the First
Amendment does or does not apply to information-gathering activities depending
on whether one is seeking to acquire information from the government versus
other sources of information. Preliminarily, this state of affairs seems undesirable
for two main reasons.
First, where the Court has created a set of rules that operate to accord some
protection to the gathering of information from non-governmental sources, but
none to acquiring information from the government except in a very discrete
category of government affairs (i.e., criminal trials), such rules appear to turn the
First Amendment on its head. Given the Court's repeated admonitions that the
protection of speech of a political nature lies at the "core" of the First
Amendment, these rules seem highly ironic in that government information that is
by definition "political" receives less overall protection than information that is
not necessarily political (and frequently will not be).
Second, to have the existence of a First Amendment right depend on the type
or content of the information being gathered creates substantial tension with
traditional First Amendment principles that generally require government
regulation of conduct associated with speech to be on a content-neutral basis. As
discussed earlier, government restrictions on the "time, place or manner" of
speech, or the non-expressive components of expressive or symbolic conduct, are
subject to an "intermediate" versus "strict" level of constitutional scrutiny only if
the government is regulating the conduct on a basis that is neutral with respect to
the content of the speech at issue.223 This neutrality is generally required not only
with respect to the specific viewpoint of a speaker, but also with regard to the
223 See supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
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general subject matter of the ideas or information being expressed.224 Certainly
the government has compelling interests in restricting certain information-
gathering activities based on the content or type of some forms of information-
such as information regarding national security matters-but the point is that
under traditional free speech principles, such alleged interests are normally
weighed against the First Amendment value of the speech that the government is
claiming implicates those interests, rather than simply deferring to the
government's view that such speech is so dangerous that no First Amendment
right to engage in it should be recognized. 225
224 See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 3-1 to 3-16.
225 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714-48 (1971).
Thus, even in particularized contexts where the government does have a more substantial
interest in regulating speech to achieve other important objectives-such as the military,
prisons, or schools-the Court has never said that the protections of the First Amendment
are simply inapplicable. Instead, the Court has reviewed restrictions on First Amendment
freedoms in these contexts under a more deferential standard of review that does require
some showing of legitimate need by the government. See, e.g., Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986) (observing that "aspects of military life do not, of course,
render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment");
see also Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 409 (1989) (prisons); Hazelwood Sch. Dist.
v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (schools). Of course, it might make sense to treat
information gathering differently from speech in terms of declining to recognize the
existence of a First Amendment right in the face of substantial competing interests if
there were a sufficiently compelling reason to do so, such as a belief that the judiciary is
less equipped to weigh the competing interests in the information-gathering context than
it is in the speech context. See infra note 252 for a further discussion of this issue.
One could argue that the Court has allowed the government to discriminate on the
basis of subject matter content in an area analogous to the information-gathering context.
Under the Court's public forum precedents concerning a right of access to government-
controlled fora for the purpose of engaging in expressive activities, when access is sought
to a non-public forum the Court frequently allows the government to deny such access
altogether (if such restrictions are reasonable), or to discriminate against putative
speakers on the basis of the subject matter of their speech (but not the speakers' particular
viewpoints). See, e.g., Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality:
R.A. V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion,
1992 SuP. CT. REv. 29, 42-43 (1993). The principal justification for this treatment is that
government simply could not function properly if it could not make reasonable subject
matter distinctions on what types of speech would be allowed in certain government
contexts and what would not. See SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 2-70.
Similarly, one could argue in the information-gathering context that the government
should be able to generally deny access to non-public information, or to discriminate
against putative information gatherers at least on the basis of the subject matter of the
information at issue (like granting access to government courtrooms and documents
while denying it to legislative and executive branch facilities and documents). Although
this argument is not blithely dismissed, there are critical differences between the "access
for speech" cases and the "access to information" cases in terms of promoting the First
Amendment objectives of democratic deliberation and informed self-governance. While
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So how did this divergent constitutional treatment of gathering government-
controlled information versus other types of information come about? This
divergence began with the Court's refusal to adopt a Branzburg-type balancing
analysis in its decisions in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins to address a claimed right of
newsgathering in the governmental context. It refused to do so for two principal
reasons.
First, even though the Pell-Saxbe majority acknowledged that the Court in
Branzburg had recognized that newsgathering activities were entitled to some
measure of First Amendment protection, it proceeded to ignore this principle and
instead relied on a dubious assertion that Justice White had made in his opinion
for the Court in Branzburg.226 In that case, citing primarily to Zemel, Justice
White had asserted that "[i]t has generally been held that the First Amendment
does not guarantee the press a constitutional right of special access to information
not available to the public generally."227 However, Zemel had absolutely nothing
to do with the press or press rights, 228 and ironically, the restrictions on travel to
Cuba at issue in that case expressly contemplated special rights of access to that
country for the press.229 So in a sense, this critical principle of Pell-Saxbe was
built on a house of cards. 230
access to non-public forums-such as an event hosted by a public school or a military
base-to express one's views might conceivably further those objectives in some
situations, speakers denied such access will normally have alternative modes of getting
their message out. The use of government property as a forum for speech purposes is
typically not critical to maintaining a healthy flow of information to the public on
important issues. The same cannot be said with respect to having access to information
about the decisions and conduct of government officials that they have decided to
withhold from the public, and especially where such withholding routinely occurs
whether the nature of the information truly merits confidential treatment or not. See infra
note 256. The First Amendment interests at stake in this context are simply too great to
allow self-interested government officials to be the final arbiters of whether the public is
entitled to important information about how those officials are executing their public
trusts. See infra note 252 and accompanying text. While some may argue that leaks by
government officials, or protections provided by government employee whistleblower
statutes, are sufficient alternative modes of obtaining government information at least
with respect to alleged misconduct, such uncertain and haphazard methods of achieving
access to important government information seem plainly insufficient. Moreover,
freedom of information laws enacted by the government in recent decades have also
proved inadequate to address what one prominent commentator has referred to as the
"problem of 'over-concealment' by mammoth, complex government." See Henkin, infra
note 262 and accompanying text.
226 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
227 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 684.
228 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
229 In Zemel, the State Department had announced that it anticipated "granting
exceptions to 'persons whose travel may be regarded as being in the best interests of the
United States, such as newsmen or businessmen with previously established business
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Second, as Justice Stewart put it for the Court in Pell-Saxbe, it was one thing
to say that the government could not unduly interfere with newsgathering
activities, but quite another to say that the government had an affinnative
obligation to make available to the press sources of information not available to
the public generally.231 Here the Court seemed to be drawing a distinction
between the use of the First Amendment as a sword, to compel the government to
disclose or provide access to information, versus its use as a shield, presumably to
ward off any undue interference with access to, or the collection of, information
that would otherwise be freely available for the taking.
In Houchins, the Court continued to rely on the two foregoing principles as
the main basis for its decision in that case.232 But while these principles may
appear plausible on their face, on closer examination they fail to withstand
scrutiny as a basis for treating the gathering of information from the government
differently than the gathering of information from other sources.
interests.' " Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 3 (1965) (quoting a State Department press
release) (emphasis supplied). As additional support for his "no special access"
proposition, Justice White in Branzburg cited to Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in
New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971), which also had nothing to say
about press newsgathering activities, or any special rights of access to information it
might enjoy in this regard. See New York Times Co., 403 U.S. at 727-30 (Stewart, J.,
concurring). However, two lower court opinions cited by Justice White did provide some
support for this proposition even though those decisions themselves appeared to be
founded on dubious authority. See In re United Press Ass'ns v. Valente, 123 N.E.2d 777,
778 (N.Y. 1954) (holding that the press had no First Amendment right to attend a court
proceeding when the general public was excluded, but relying primarily on a prior New
York Court of Appeals decision that did not directly address this issue); see also Tribune
Review Publ'g Co. v. Thomas, 254 F.2d 883, 884-85 (3d Cir. 1958) (holding that the
press had no First Amendment right to take photographs in and around courthouse in
violation of court rules banning anyone from taking them, relying solely on In re United
Press Associations v. Valente to support ruling). In any event, these two lower court
opinions-which dealt primarily with a court's ability to control its own proceedings-
hardly provided an adequate basis for Justice White's sweeping assertion that "it has
generally been held" the press was not entitled to information that the government had
withheld from the general public. See also Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1507 n.14
(observing that none of the decisions relied on by Justice White "considered whether the
constitutional gathering rights of the press and public are coextensive").
230 Indeed, one commentator has suggested that the "no special access" principle
fails to accurately describe the law on this issue in terms of what the lower courts have
done. See Dyk, supra note 24, at 948 ("One apparent area of traditional press-only access
involves scenes of crime, disasters, illegal demonstrations, and disorders. Despite the
Supreme Court's dictum in Branzburg that '[n]ewsmen have no constitutional right of
access to the scenes of crime or disaster when the general public is excluded,' some lower
court cases have recognized such a right.") (internal citations omitted).
231 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 122-23 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 65:249
2004] FIRSTAMENDMENTAND THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION 313
As to the press not being entitled to some rights of access to information
above any right that might be enjoyed by the general public, this was not only a
dubious statement of precedent, it was unsound as a simple matter of logic. As the
Court recognized in Branzburg, newsgathering was entitled to "some"
constitutional protection; if this did not mean that persons engaged in that
function were entitled to some special protection for gaining access to
information, then it is difficult to envision what this would otherwise mean.
Gaining access to information sources is the essence of effective newsgathering,
since the particular method of gathering information to which one has access is of
less serious concern. For instance, if the government limited a journalist's access
to a trial to being physically present and taking written notes (as the Supreme
Court does in its own courtroom), 233 that journalist would still be able to report on
her observations even if she is barred from using more effective electronic
recording devices.234
Moreover, it would have been strange for the Court in Branzburg to have
been referring to protection for methods of newsgathering versus access to
information for two reasons: first, because that case itself involved alleged
interference with access to news sources; and second, because in its decisions in
Estes and Nixon,235 the Court rejected any notion that a particular method or
format for gathering the news was entitled to any constitutional protection at all.
Indeed, those decisions rested on the rationale that no rights of the press were
being infringed by not allowing it to gather the news via a television camera or
tape recording, because the press otherwise had full access to the information it
sought (albeit not in the preferred manner or format).236
Thus, if newsgathering is to enjoy some measure of constitutional protection,
it would be mainly with respect to granting the press some special rights of access
to information for the purpose of disseminating it to the general public. In this
view, the press would enjoy some special access prerogatives not from an
institutional perspective (i.e., not because the press qua press was entitled to
special treatment), but rather from the functional perspective of operating as an
233 See infra note 234.
234 This is not to suggest, however, that government restrictions on methods of
information gathering are not of serious concern. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar & Steven G.
Calabresi, The Supreme Court's Unfree Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2002, at A19
(suggesting that the Court's policy allowing note-taking by the press in its courtroom but
barring the general public from doing so violates the First Amendment, as well as its
restrictions on the press's ability to at least provide the public with live radio broadcasts
of Supreme Court arguments). My point is that restrictions on basic access to information
are the most serious concern, for without such access debates about restrictions on
particular methods of gathering information become moot.
235 See supra notes 80 and 116
236 See supra notes 80 and 116.
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information-gathering agent of the public. 2 37 And this seems to be the very
distinction that the Court in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins seemed unwilling to
accept. 238 In other words, those opinions seemed to be based on the Court's
reluctance to grant the press any special rights as a private institution, as opposed
to the needs and interests of the public in obtaining access to certain governmental
information through the press. 239 This institutional focus was demonstrated
starkly by Justice Stewart, the author of Pell and Saxbe, in an article written in
that period and cited by the Court in Houchins, where Justice Stewart argued that
[T]he Free Press Clause extends protection to an institution. The publishing
business is, in short, the only organized private business that is given explicit
constitutional protection .... The primary purpose of the constitutional
guarantee of a free press was... to create a fourth institution outside the
Government as an additional check on the three official branches.... The
relevant metaphor, I think, is the metaphor of the Fourth Estate.... It is this
237 This appears to be the view Justice Brennan had in mind when he argued in a
speech that the First Amendment absolutely protected the right of the press to speak, and
qualifiedly protected a "structural" or functional role for the press in gathering and
disseminating information for the public. See Brennan, supra note 52, at 177 (Under the
"structural" model of the First Amendment the press receives constitutional protection
"when it performs all the myriad tasks necessary for it to gather and disseminate the
news.").
238 As Professor Lillian BeVier observed, Justice Stewart's "opaque assertion" in
Pell-Saxbe that the government had no duty to grant the press special access rights
"trivialized the issue in the case by failing to meet the argument that the denial of 'special
access' to the press infringed the public's right to know," and "avoided direct
confrontation with not only the basic premises of the press' claim, but also the
implications of his own rhetorical affirmations [in his Branzburg dissent] of the first
amendment's office in fulfilling the broad societal interest in a full and free flow of
information to the public." Informed Public, supra note 24, at 490 (footnotes and
quotations omitted). However, Professor BeVier ultimately concludes that the Court
reached the right result in Pell, Saxbe, and Houchins because in her view the First
Amendment cannot legitimately be read to support a "judicially enforceable right to
know" government information on behalf of the public. See id. at 517. I will argue that
Professor BeVier's cogent and insightful analysis was half right and half wrong: that
while the First Amendment cannot be read to support a directly enforceable "right to
know" by the public, this does not preclude a more limited and indirectly enforceable
"right to know" through the mechanism ordained for that end by the First Amendment-
i.e., the Press Clause. See infra Part IV. Professor C. Edwin Baker has forcefully argued,
however, that while that clause should be read to provide the press with special defensive
protection against government interference with its functional or "instrumental" role, he
was "tentatively" not convinced that it should provide the press with offensive rights of
access to government-controlled information. See Press Rights, supra note 28, at 840-45;
accord generally O'Brien, supra note 24. These arguments will be taken up in more
detail later. See infra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
239 See also Justice Powell, supra note 24, at 181-82.
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constitutional understanding, I think, that provides the unifying principle
underlying the Supreme Court's recent decisions dealing with the organized
press.... The press is free to do battle against secrecy and deception in
government. But the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee
that it will succeed. There is no constitutional right to have access to particular
government information, or to require openness from the bureaucracy [citing
Pell-Saxbe]. The public's interest in knowing about its government is protected
by the guarantee of a Free Press, but the protection is indirect. The Constitution
itself is neither a Freedom of Information Act nor an Official Secrets Act. The
Constitution, in other words, establishes the contest, not its resolution.... [W]e
must rely.., on the tug and pull of the political forces in American society.
240
Hence Justice Stewart, at least, seemed to believe that the organized press
was entitled to no special access to government information because it was an
autonomous, constitutional co-equal with government, and that giving it any sort
of special entitlement to that information would somehow upset this system of
checks and balances. But not only did Justice Stewart fail to explain how giving
the press some sort of special access to government information would cause
constitutional harm,241 his view seems entirely inconsistent with assertions by the
Court in other contexts that the press was accorded special recognition in the First
Amendment primarily due to its role in keeping the public informed about
governmental affairs.242 In this "functional" view, some constitutional protection
for the press' access to government information would seem entirely appropriate.
Moreover, such access rights would be "special" not because the press was
somehow more constitutionally significant than ordinary members of the public,
but rather because it fulfilled afinction for the public that individuals members of
the public generally did not perform themselves.243
240 Stewart, supra note 28, at 633-36.
241 See also Informed Public, supra note 24, at 491 n.41 (observing that in Justice
Stewart's speech there was "little analytical effort expended to explain what appears to be
an inconsistency between what is described as a consciously chosen constitutional
purpose to establish an institution to give 'organized, expert scrutiny of
government' . . . and what is asserted to be the absence 'from the Constitution [of] any
guarantee that it will succeed' ") (quoting Stewart, supra note 28, at 634, 636).
242 See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 219 (1966) ("The Constitution
specifically selected the press... to play an important role in the discussion of public
affairs .... as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power by governmental officials and
as a constitutionally chosen means for keeping officials elected by the people responsible
to all the people whom they were selected to serve.").
243 Some scholars have argued that such "special agency rights" would not come
without costs to the agent, and thus would be unwise. In other words, if the press were to
receive special constitutional treatment in its agency capacity, like most legal "agents"
the press would also assume special legal obligations "as a fiduciary of the public
interest" to report the information to which it received access accurately, fairly and
completely. See generally, e.g., Van Alstyne, supra note 28. But just because the
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As to the second principle relied on in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins, that
compelled access to, or disclosure of, information is of a different constitutional
magnitude than preventing undue governmental interference with gaining access
to or gathering otherwise available news (such as events in Cuba or criminal
sources that would be willing to talk but for compelled grand jury testimony), the
Court never undertook in either decision to explain why this was so. In other
words, the Court relied on ipse dixit-if you cannot explain it, just assert it. One
statement by the plurality in Houchins does provide a clue, however: "There is an
undoubted right to gather news from any source by means within the law.... but
that affords no basis for the claim that the First Amendment compels others-
private persons or governments-to supply information."'244 Certainly this must
be true as a general rule with respect to using the First Amendment to compel
disclosures of information from unwilling private individuals. For one thing, it is
difficult to see how the government would be "abridging" or interfering with
anything under such a scenario, and thus the requisite state action to invoke any
sort of First Amendment right would appear to be missing. 245 But even absent
this state action problem, the countervailing privacy or property interests-
interests of a constitutional magnitude were the government to interfere with
them-would surely counsel against a First Amendment right of the press or any
other private parties to compel private individuals to supply them with
information.246
Constitution grants certain special protections, it does not seem to necessarily follow that
special obligations would be the inevitable consequence of those rights. But even if they
were, it does not seem out of the question that the press might be held responsible in
some ways for accurately and fairly reporting information to which it gained special
constitutional access (at least to the extent of making it liable for any materially false or
misleading assertions, and subject perhaps to some sort of New York Times actual malice
limitations, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which would leave
it sufficient breathing rooms to exercise its editorial discretion). However, any detailed
consideration of these complex issues is beyond the scope of this Article.
24 4 Houchins, 438 U.S. at 11.
245 See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (asserting that
without the requisite " 'state action' . . . the First Amendment has no bearing"); see also
Harvard Note, supra note 7, at 1513-14. Somewhat ironically, however, were a journalist
to engage in "self-help" in gathering information from an unwilling private party and be
sued by that party for "violating" an applicable law such as a tort, contract or property
law, for example, there would be sufficient state action to raise the First Amendment as a
"shield" to that action. See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668 ("Our cases teach that the application
of state rules of law in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment
freedoms constitutes 'state action'.... ). For a discussion of a right to gather
information in the context of such "self-help" measures used against unwilling private
sources of information, see infra notes 284-302 and accompanying text.
246 Cf Emerson, supra note 26, at 19 ('The Constitution, of course, does not
obligate any private person, that is, non-government person, to disclose information to
any other private person."). One might debate, however, to what extent these rationales
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But to equate the government's right to withhold information from the public
to that of private individuals, as Chief Justice Burger did in Houchins, seems way
off the mark. This turns the principle that government exists to serve the people
on its head.2 47 As the dissenting Justices in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins
should apply to "non-individual private persons" such as a corporation which is driven
primarily by property considerations rather than privacy concerns, particularly when such
"persons" have become major centers of power in our society with the ability to
profoundly affect the public interest (and also "exist" under grant of right from the
government, thus perhaps providing an argument to overcome "state action" problems).
See, e.g., Editorial, An International Right to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, at A18
(arguing that multinational companies should have a duty to disclose chemical emissions
and other environmental risks that they pose abroad in the same manner as disclosure is
required in the U.S.); Editorial, Our Money, Our Votes, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at
A16 (describing the opposition of mutual fund companies to proposed regulations
requiring them to disclose how they vote shares of companies technically owned by their
individual investors); Katie Hafner & John Biggs, In Net Attacks, Defining the Right to
Know, N.Y TIMES, Jan. 30, 2003, at GI (describing calls for a public right to know about
breaches of a company's computer network that may compromise the safety of consumer
financial and other personal data). Of course, one obvious response to a right to gather
information from businesses would be that if government (through its regulatory powers)
will not act to compel disclosure of information affecting the public interest, why should
a private party like the press have that right? In other words, if the public wants
information from private entities, it should go through the democratic process in order to
obtain the information rather than relying on a judicially-enforced constitutional right that
is exercised by its "agents." One possible response to this argument might be that if one
of the primary purposes of the First Amendment is to provide the public with sufficient
information to allow it to exercise its "democratic franchise," then an "institutional
failure" of government to represent the public interest in this regard might provide a
sufficient basis for constitutional action. Cf., e.g., Sunstein, supra note 24, at 891-92, 920
("societal" view of First Amendment seeks to protect against self-interested behavior by
politicians and "control of government by powerful private groups"). Also, if as many
scholars urge, the First Amendment should be read to afford investigative journalists
protection against subsequent legal sanctions for engaging in "self-help" in acquiring
information to report on important public matters, see infra notes 293-301 and
accompanying text, is it not more desirable to force such investigators to go through the
"front door" by openly demanding such information through legal process, rather than
incenting them to engage in surreptitious "back door" newsgathering activities?
Obviously, any detailed consideration of these complex issues is beyond the scope of this
Article.
247 As James Madison, the principal drafter of the Constitution, said long ago: "If
we advert to the nature of Republican Government, we shall find that the censorial power
is in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over the people." 4
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794). This point was critical to the dissenting Justices in
Pell and Saxbe. See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 872 (Powell, J., dissenting) (right to information
from government was the "right of the public to the information needed to assert ultimate
control over the political process"); id. at 839-40 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (right was one
"of the people, the true sovereign under our constitutional scheme, to govern in an
informed manner").
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acknowledged, there is no question that the government has an interest in
blocking public access to some information that needs to be kept secure or
confidential for legitimate reasons.248 But these areas of sensitivity should be the
exception and not the rule.249 In a democratic system the government consists of
the representatives of the people, and beyond these areas of legitimate need the
government has no business in treating its affairs as if they were proprietary
matters.250 The presumption should be one of public availability and access to
government information, and not the other way around.251 Given the difficulties
of asserting the contrary proposition, it is no wonder that the majorities in Pell-
Saxbe and Houchins never sought to justify their statements in this regard. As the
248 Indeed, Professor Louis Henkin has asserted, rightfully in my view, that the
government has a duty to withhold some information from the public that, if generally
disclosed, would be likely to cause harm to the public interest. See Louis Henkin, The
Right to Know and the Duty to Withhold: The Case of the Pentagon Papers, 120 U. PA.
L. REV. 271, 273-76 (1971).
249 See, e.g., Emerson, supra note 26, at 16-17 (arguing that the "starting point" for
a right to know should be the right of the citizen as ultimate sovereign to all government
information, with exceptions "scrupulously limited to those that are absolutely essential
to the effective operation of government institutions").
250 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 24, at 917-18 (arguing that justifying government
restrictions on the speech of its employees by "analogy to private ownership of
information... breaks down because the arguments that support such ownership are
inapplicable to government. The first amendment question should therefore turn not on
notions of information ownership, but on what sort of justification the government is able
to use to support the restriction"); see also id. at 921 ("[T]he notion that some
information is 'owned' by the government is unacceptable.... [Tihe notion of a
governmental 'property interest' in information should, at least for most purposes, be
rejected.").
251 By this statement I do not mean to suggest, however, that this conceptual ideal
should not be limited by practical considerations. For instance, I agree with Justice
Stewart's assertion that the Constitution should not be a Freedom of Information Act, in
the sense that it would simply be unworkable to allow any citizen denied access to
government information to bring a constitutional action to compel access to it. Otherwise,
such a situation would certainly risk trivializing constitutional rights, as well as place an
inordinate burden on the government to administer and comply with such a right. The
challenge is to give meaning to this ideal, while recognizing legitimate interests of
government in withholding certain information and avoiding undue burdens of
administration and compliance. First Amendment scholar Vincent Blasi seemed to
recognize this tension between the ideal and the practicalities when he concluded that a
public right to obtain access to at least some measure of government information is a
"core commitment of the first amendment." See Blasi, supra note 24, at 492, 493 ("It
would be anomalous for a constitutional regime founded on the principle of limited
government not to impose some fundamental restrictions on the power of officials to
keep citizens ignorant of how the authority of the state is being exercised.") (emphasis
supplied). In Part IV of this Article, I will propose a First Amendment right to gather
information that I believe best accommodates these competing interests.
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dissenters in Houchins pointed out, what possible basis did the public servant in
that case (i.e., the local sheriff) have for telling the public it had no business
knowing in what condition he was maintaining the public jail facilities? 25 2
252 As described earlier, see supra notes 120-27 and accompanying text, in addition
to the primary "no special press access" and "no compelled disclosure" rationales for
refusing to recognize a press right of access to government information relied on by the
plurality in Houchins, it also provided some other reasons for refusing to recognizing
such a right. Of these, certainly the most compelling one is the questionable competence
of the judiciary to weigh-under a myriad number of different scenarios-the asserted
public interest in receiving particular information against the public interest asserted by
the government in withholding it. Directly related to this issue is the difficulty of creating
workable standards that the judiciary could use to decide such disputes, and the fact that
such decisions often involve policy judgments more suitable for the political branches of
government. This nettlesome problem has been a substantial factor in leading a number
of scholars, who otherwise see great merit in a First Amendment right of access to
government information, to ultimately conclude that such a right should not be
recognized.
For instance, in a 1986 article Professor Cass Sunstein concluded that an
"equilibrium theory" proposed by certain scholars, under which a lack of a government
obligation to disclose information is supposedly offset by the press' right to publish
almost all lawfully-obtained information to produce an ideal accommodation between the
need for government secrecy and the public's need for information, is unlikely to achieve
either objective. See Sunstein, supra note 24, at 890, 920-21. Accordingly, he appeared
to suggest that a form of contextualized "interest-balancing" should be undertaken by the
courts to accommodate these interests. See id. at 904, 921. However, Professor Sunstein
later seems to have concluded that the difficulties inherent in such judicial balancing
counsel against the recognition of rights of access to government information. See CASS
R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 106-07 (1995); see also
Baker, supra note 28, at 841-45, 857 (while arguments for "offensive" rights of access to
government information have "considerable force," tentative conclusion is that the press
is only entitled to "defensive" rights against governmental interference with
newsgathering and reporting functions due in significant part to problems inherent in the
judicial administration of a right of access); see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY
AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 225-49 (1989); cf generally Informed Public, supra note 24
(rejecting general "right to know" government information not only because of
difficulties with judicial administration, but also based on representative structure of our
democracy). On the other hand, other scholars have proposed various solutions to the
difficulties associated with a judicially-enforced right of access. Probably the most
popular one is some version of the right of access recognized by the Court in Richmond
Newspapers and progeny, essentially prohibiting the government from denying access to
information that has traditionally been open to the public. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 24,
at 493; Dyk, supra note 24, at 930 (arguing for press access rights based on traditional
openness standard, as well as where the government has granted access discriminatorily
or in an arbitrary manner); cf Anderson, supra note 1, at 523 (observing that the special
constitutional rights of press access ought to be recognized only during extreme
constitutional crises involving government secrecy); Cheh, supra note 24, at 698, 730-31
(urging stronger free speech rights for government employees to combat secrecy, as well
as right of access limited to policing "official policies or processes of concealment" of
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government information, and a "due process" based right of access to government
institutions).
Certainly the issue of workable judicial standards to administer a constitutional right
of access to government information (including government proceedings and
institutions)-where a court is being asked to balance competing public interests-is a
difficult and close one. But this difficulty inheres in any attempt to provide some measure
of First Amendment protection to information gathering based on the public's interest in
receiving certain information to intelligently exercise its democratic franchise, such as in
the area of newsgathering. To a large extent the Court has already demonstrated that such
balancing, including the creation of some form of workable standards, can be done-first
in Branzburg, and more particularly in the Richmond Newspapers line of cases. The
option of leaving the public's right to government information completely in the hands of
the government representatives and officials whose performance the public must assess,
seems unwise and perhaps ultimately destructive of the democratic process. See, e.g.,
Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Democracies die
behind closed doors."); Brennan, supra note 52, at 182 ("I believe that the
Framers.. . had in mind the truth precisely captured several generations later by Lord
Acton: 'Everything secret degenerates, even the administration of justice."'). This is not
to say, however, that there is no good reason to treat affirmative rights of access to
government information differently than more defensive rights of preventing undue
government interference with information-gathering activities. At least in cases where
such interference has been alleged, the conflict has been sharpened and particularized as
to the information desired and the competing interests at stake. In the case of demands for
access to government information, the challenge is more to prevent "fishing expeditions"
for information that the government may or may not have in its possession, placing
unmanageable burdens on government to both respond to such requests and manage them
from a judicial perspective (i.e., preventing the Constitution from becoming a Freedom of
Information Act). In Part IV, I will propose special limitations on a right to gather
information from the government that I believe may help to alleviate these concerns
while still preserving a meaningful judicial check on flows of government information to
the public. See infra note 341.
As indicated above, Professor Lillian BeVier has also argued against a right to know
government information based on the representative nature of our democracy. In her
view, "[s]ince the Constitution does not establish a direct democracy, the inference of a
right to know cannot find its constitutional source in the view of popular sovereignty
which contemplates direct citizen participation in the making and administration of
laws." Informed Public, supra note 24, at 506. A short answer to this argument is that
whether or not the Framers of the Constitution contemplated a "direct" democracy or an
"indirect" one through the offices of our representatives, in order to have democratic self-
government at all, citizens must still have access to information vital to choosing, and
assessing the performance of, representatives that undertake the day-to-day operations of
our government. Indeed, Professor BeVier appears to concede as much. See id. at 505-06
("The Constitution envisions.., a system in which the citizens do not directly either
make or implement public decisions, though through their power to elect their
representatives they retain their authority to choose the direction of governmental
policy."). If citizens do not have sufficient information to understand the decisions and
policies their representatives are adopting and implementing, how can they retain their
authority to determine what those policies will be? Moreover, the representative
democracy argument appears to ignore the problems of self-interested representation and
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Hence, the Court's principal justifications for applying different standards of
First Amendment protection to the gathering of news from governmental versus
non-governmental sources-and especially where newsgathering from
governmental sources is generally disfavored-are unsupportable both from the
perspective of general First Amendment law and as a matter of policy. But as
noted above, in the one category of government information for which the Court
subsequently did recognize a First Amendment right of access-i.e., to criminal
judicial proceedings-it did so on grounds that were much broader than those
relied on by the Court in Branzburg for according some protection to the
gathering of news from non-governmental sources. Thus, like the Court's
treatment of information gathering from governmental versus non-governmental
sources generally, it is important to inquire whether this differential treatment can
be justified as a matter of law and policy.
2. Justification for a Public Right to Gather Information About Criminal
Trials Versus the Justification for General Newsgathering Protection
As discussed earlier, in Richmond Newspapers and its progeny the Court
created a public right of access to criminal judicial proceedings under the First
Amendment on the theory that one of the core purposes of that Amendment is to
ensure an informed discussion of governmental affairs. It was thought that such
an informed discussion is necessary in order for citizens to effectively participate
in our scheme of self-governance. Thus the Court held that any restrictions by the
government on this relatively specific right are subject to a form of heightened
scrutiny, as opposed to the milder balancing approach for governmental
impingements on the press' newsgathering functions the Court utilized in
Branzburg.25 3
Assuming that, as argued above, the gathering of news from government
sources should, at the least, receive similar First Amendment protection as the
gathering of news from other sources, one must then inquire whether that
Amendment provides a basis for providing the general public, including the
press, with greater constitutional protection for acquiring information about a
specific segment of government affairs than provided to newsgathering activities
generally. Preliminarily, however, one might question just how much protection
for access to government information is being provided by a right that depends on
a history or tradition of public access in the first place.
Despite Justice Brennan's good intentions of coming up with "helpful
principles" for limiting the "theoretically endless" reach of the right to gather
information about government affairs, a right of access based on a historic
undue influence by private factions that Professor Sunstein has argued were some of the
main problems that the First Amendment was designed to address. See infra note 307.
253 See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
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tradition of government openness is a fairly limited step towards the goal of
keeping the public informed about those affairs.254 Although it might prevent
idiosyncratic or irregular decisions to deny the public access to information that
the government had otherwise made routinely available, 255 for the most part this
is akin to the government taking the position that the public is only entitled to
receive information about public business that the government had decided
sometime in the past to make available to it. Giving government representatives
the sole authority to decide what information the public will receive to assess their
performance would not appear to be a very wise policy.256 Moreover, a standard
based on historic practices appears to freeze the government's obligations of
openness in the past. Considering the government's ever-changing and evolving
functions, such a standard would likely close the public out from access to
information about more modem initiatives that might be every bit as important for
the public to know about as traditional government activities.257
Thus, it is questionable whether such a right of access would operate to
provide citizens with sufficient information to make informed decisions about
254 Cf Sunstein, supra note 24, at 899 (describing Richmond Newspapers' "right of
access to judicial proceedings" as a "quite narrow" exception to general rejection of right
of access to government information).
255 Cf generally Dyk, supra note 24.
256 See supra note 252; see also C. Edwin Baker, The Media that Citizens Need, 147
U. PA. L. REv. 317, 402 (1998) ("[B]ureaucratic bodies instinctually seem to desire
secrecy.... Information could expose their misbehavior, failures or incompetence.");
Cheh, supra note 24, at 693 ("Allowing the executive branch a virtual free hand to
withhold information is not.., cost free. It invites excessive secrecy and abuse of
power."); Henkin, supra note 248, at 275-76 ("Without any doubt... Government
frequently withholds more and for longer than it has to. Officials, of course, tend to
resolve doubts in favor of non-disclosure. Some concealment is improperly motivated-
to cover up mistakes, to promote private or partisan interests, even to deceive another
branch.., of government, or the electorate."); Mark Tapscott, Too Many Secrets, WASH.
POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25 ("Why does the White House sometimes seem so
determined to close the door on the people's right to know what their government is
doing? Even some of us who admire the leadership of President Bush in the war on
terrorism would like to know."). For an extreme example of these problems, see
Elizabeth Mehren, 'Insanity' in Nixon's White House, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2003, at All
(describing alleged proposal of Nixon White House official to firebomb a Washington
think tank that had been critical of the Nixon Administration).
257 See, e.g., Editorial, Total Information Awareness, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 2002, at
A20 (decrying lack of public information about new Pentagon project to amass and
screen data about American citizens for purpose of fighting terrorism). This highlights
another problem with Justice Brennan's "experience and logic" approach: it bears scant
relationship to the First Amendment value of information that impels the recognition of a
right of access in the first place-i.e., for its importance in keeping the public informed
about significant government policies, actions, or decisions. See, e.g., Mackerel in
Moonlight, supra note 24, at 336-38.
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their government. And this problem is obviously exacerbated by the fact that this
right is currently limited to the judicial branch of government (at least as it has
been defined by the Supreme Court), and does not apply to the more political
branches where citizens are called on to make frequent, periodic decisions about
whether their representatives are doing an adequate job of operating the
government. Many people opposed to (or in doubt about) a greater constitutional
right of access, however, point out that the federal and state governments have in
recent times enacted freedom of information and related laws designed to make
government actions more transparent to the public.258 But many of these laws do
not even apply to important operations of government, 259 and to the extent they
do it is frequently and persuasively contended that they are subject to such broad
exemptions2 60 and government resistance in complying with them 261 that their
stated goal of open governance has been substantially diminished.262 In sum, the
258 For a good overview of the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and
related government openness laws, see DIENES ET AL., supra note 98, at 357-518.
259 For instance, the most important of these laws-the federal FOIA-only applies
to the records of executive branch agencies and excludes "[miany governmental
organizations... most notably Congress, the courts.... the President ... and those
whose sole function is to advise and assist the President." See id. at 421-22 (footnotes
omitted).
260 The federal FOIA contains nine broad exemptions, see id. at 426-53, the most
important of which relate to matters of national security and law enforcement. These
exemptions are notorious for permitting the government to withhold much important
information at its discretion. See, e.g., Cheh, supra note 24, at 690-91 ("Because the
executive branch both establishes the criteria for classification and performs the actual
classification of such information, the FOIA national security exception is not so much an
exemption as it is a license to withhold.") (footnotes omitted); Dyk, supra note 24, at 937
("FOIA ... contains exemptions enabling the government to withhold evidence of abuse.
Even if the information is not withheld altogether, the Act allows the government to
substantially delay its release.").
261 See, e.g., HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO
KNOw 71 (1999) ("It has been virtually a matter of principle for American presidents to
oppose the Freedom of Information Act .... "); id. at 76 ("Though the FOLA staff in
federal agencies have generally embraced the letter and spirit of the FOIA, full
compliance with the act is frustrated by underfunding and, in some agencies, by clear
hostility at the policy level."); id. at 180 ("In recent years, the courts have suggested ways
for Congress to repair glaring FOIA loopholes, but, despite several
opportunities... Congress has turned its back on the FOIA."); see also Adam Clymer,
Government Openness at Issue as Bush Holds Onto Records, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2003, at
Al (describing new directive from U.S. Attorney General encouraging "federal agencies
to reject requests for documents if there was any legal basis to do so, promising that the
Justice Department would defend them in court").
262 Indeed, the situation today appears to be little different than it was in 1971 when
Professor Henkin observed that statutes such as FOIA "do not begin to reach the problem
of 'over-concealment' by mammoth, complex government." Henkin, supra note 248, at
276; see also generally ACCESS DENIED: FREEDOM OF INFORMATION IN THE INFORMATION
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Richmond Newspapers right of access seems woefully inadequate for achieving
its stated goals.
Be that as it may, however, from a policy perspective it does appear to be a
movement by the Court in the right direction in terms of recognizing the public's
entitlement to information about its government that there is no legitimate reason
to withhold. The real question is whether such a right of access can be justified
from a legal perspective, and particularly based on the First Amendment's
protection of "speech" or "press." 263 The right of the press recognized in
Branzburg to some protection for newsgathering activities would seem to be
reasonably included within the proscription that the govemment shall not abridge
the "freedom of the press." If one believes that the "press" intended by the
Framers is the institutional or organized press, as did Justice Stewart, then it
seems reasonable to think that the entire "press" process or function of gathering,
editing, and publishing the news should be entitled to some protection under this
clause. But even if one believes, as most members of the Court seem to think, that
the principal purpose of the Press Clause is to protect the right of anyone to
publish information or ideas, it would still not be unreasonable to take the position
that "anyone" at least includes the institutional press, and that when it comes to
publishing news some protection is warranted for the process by which news is
acquired.
However, by the time the Court was faced with the press' claim in Gannett
Co. that it was entitled to attend and report on a pre-trial hearing in a criminal
case, the Court had recently expounded the principle in Pell-Saxbe and Houchins
that the press had no First Amendment right of access to government information
AGE (Charles N. Davis & Sigman L. Splichal eds., 2000). It should be noted that courts
of this country have recognized a general common law right "to inspect and copy public
records and documents." Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597
(1978). However, this right is fairly limited in that it mainly applies to judicial records
(where courts find a Richmond Newspapers right of access based on the First
Amendment anyway), and has largely been supplanted with respect to other records of
government by state FOIA-type laws. See DIENES ET AL., supra note 98, at 179-86, 483-
84.
263 Without purporting to enter the extensive debate on the legitimacy of different
methods of constitutional interpretation, for purposes of this Article I will assume that
implied constitutional rights-like a right to gather information-should at least be
"fairly inferable" from the textual provisions of the Constitution. See, e.g., Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REv. 1189, 1193-94 (1987) (contending that arguments from text are the most
important mode of constitutional interpretation when various modes are in conflict);
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1,
8 (1971) (arguing that constitutional rights should be derived from the history and text of
the First Amendment, and their "fair implications"); see also Informed Public, supra note
24, at 499-500; cf., e.g., Cheh, supra note 24, at 722 (noting that the argument that the
"first amendment cannot legitimately be read to provide... a right [of
access].... proceeds from a narrow, interpretivist reading of the constitution").
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for newsgathering purposes. And since in Gannett the Court rejected the press'
claim that the public had a right to attend the hearing under the Sixth Amendment,
the only reasonable alternative left for those Justices who thought the public did
have a right to be informed about what took place in criminal trials was the First
Amendment. In other words, the Court's sweeping rejection in Pell-Saxbe and
Houchins of a right of the press to gather government information for the public,
fairly boxed it in when considering the claims of the press in Gannett and
Richmond Newspapers as to a right to report on criminal judicial proceedings.
Thus, the Court essentially had no choice in the latter cases but to make it a public
right of access versus one based on a newsgathering right under the Press Clause
of the First Amendment.
But a public right of access, as opposed to one based on the newsgathering
functions of the press, is much more difficult to support as conduct protected by
the First Amendment. Both are forms of non-expressive conduct that would
normally fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection, but as discussed
above, the gathering of news about government proceedings is a necessary
antecedent of publishing news about them. In other words, the press seeks access
to government proceedings for the purpose of engaging in an activity expressly
protected by the First Amendment.
The connection between a general public right of access, however, and acts
of speaking or publishing, is much more tenuous. Although the Court in Globe
Newspapers justified the protection of such conduct as being necessary for an
informed discussion of governmental affairs, it seems almost "fairy taleish" to
presume that all, or even most, individual members of the public seeking access
to a criminal trial are doing so for the purpose of thereafter engaging in a debate
about how best to reform the criminal justice system (or some such thing having
to do with governmental decision-making). A more realistic presumption about
why individuals attend criminal trials would be that they have personal ties to the
victim or accused, or they are drawn to attend by the notoriety of the alleged
crimes or persons involved. Thus it is probably fair to say that most members of
the public are likely to seek access to a criminal trial for reasons having nothing to
do with engaging in speech about issues of governance.
Accordingly, while basing a First Amendment right of access on the Press
Clause can be reasonably grounded in the language of that Amendment, basing it
on the Speech Clause seems much more problematic. What the Court really
appeared to be doing in these cases, while purporting to rely on an "informed
speech" rationale, was accepting the thesis expressed by Justice Powell in his
Pell-Saxbe dissent that people simply have a basic right "to a free flow of
information and ideas on the conduct of their Government. '264 In other words,
under the "societal function" of the First Amendment, the people have a basic
right to know about what goes on in certain government proceedings without
264 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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having to demonstrate a "speech" purpose for invoking a right of access to
them.265 But discerning the Court's exact justification in this regard is not
essential, since predicating a constitutional right of access on a generalized
presumption that informed speech will result is in substance no different than
predicating it on a general right to know. In either case, individual citizens are
entitled to invoke this right of access regardless of whether or not they have a true
"speech" motivation for doing so.
Despite the ubiquity of rhetoric in much legal commentary extolling a public
"right to know" under the First Amendment that even some Justices have used
from time to time,266 basing a right of access on such grounds (or on a
generalized speech presumption if you will) seems troubling for several reasons.
Preliminarily, such a justification seems in conflict with the Court's rejection of a
public right to access or gather information in Zemel-thus creating additional
doctrinal inconsistencies. More importantly, such a reading transforms the First
Amendment into an entirely different form of constitutional right than was
originally intended. And finally such a right is simply unmanageable from a
constitutional perspective, and for that reason ends up becoming regarded as
something of an anomaly in derogation of the broader First Amendment interests
which sparked its recognition in the first place. These problems will be addressed
in turn.
In Zemel, the Court held that a governmental restriction on an individual's
freedom of action that constrains his ability to become informed about the impact
of government policies does not implicate First Amendment concerns. But from
the perspective of such a "speech-action" distinction, it is difficult to see how a
ban on travel to Cuba is any different than a ban on "travel" into a courtroom.
Both are restrictions on movement (or "inhibitions of action," as the Court said in
Zemel) allegedly engaged in for the purpose of acquiring information concerning
governmental activities, or the impact of them. In addition, it would be hard to
contend that the way in which a government operates its criminal justice system is
of any greater concern from a democratic-decisionmaking point of view than the
impact of its foreign policy. Thus, as to a right of the general public to gain access
to important information for First Amendment purposes, Zemel is in substantial
tension with the right of access recognized in Richmond Newspapers.267
265 See id. at 872 (asserting that "[g]overnmental regulations should not be policed
in the name of a 'right to know' unless they significantly affect the societal function of
the First Amendment"). Again it is interesting to note that Justice Brennan's original
application of the "structural" or "societal" model of the First Amendment seemed to be
limited to the Press Clause, even though he did join Justice Powell's dissent in Pell-
Saxbe. See Brennan, supra note 52.
266 See supra notes 76 and 265.
267 One might argue, however, that a right of access is more appropriate where
judges in particular cases have taken targeted action to restrict flows of information from
the courtroom (where such restrictions are in some sense content-based, at least as to the
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More significantly, reading the freedom of "speech" and "press" protected by
the First Amendment to essentially protect a "freedom to know" radically alters
the activities protected by that Amendment. Such a reading appears to confuse
means with ends. While the acquisition of information and progress of knowledge
are certainly important goals of freedom of expression, they are just that-goals.
The means chosen by the Framers for achieving those objectives consist of
expressive activities and, by reasonable implication, other non-expressive conduct
necessary to engage in meaningful expression. In protecting the right of the public
to "know" certain information both as a means and an end, it becomes well nigh
impossible to place any meaningful boundaries on that right. This problem forces
judges to resort to "helpful principles" like "experience and logic" in an attempt to
establish such boundaries or limitations, which often render the right relatively
insignificant in promoting the general goal of an informed and knowledgeable
citizenry.
Even if a "right to know" could be fairly implied from the freedoms of
speech and press, the wide array of conduct or activities one might justify under
such a right, and its potential for conflict with other societal interests, might
counsel against its recognition. Trying to define manageable boundaries of a right
to engage in information-gathering activities for the purpose of engaging in
meaningful expression presents enormous challenges of its own.26 8 However,
with an activity like newsgathering and our society's experience with what that
activity involves, we at least have some sense of the relative costs and benefits
associated with assigning a certain level of constitutional protection to it. The
same cannot be said of a general right to know that could be used to justify
constitutional protection for a virtually limitless universe of conduct pursued in
the name of information or knowledge.269 Thus the potential societal costs and
general subject matter of the information), as opposed to the government incidentally
burdening the flow of information with general travel bans (that are plainly content
neutral). But under traditional First Amendment speech principles, such a distinction in
the character of the government restriction would typically be more relevant to the
consequent level of constitutional scrutiny (including a decision not to apply any scrutiny
in a given case, such as in Cohen) than the existence of the First Amendment right in the
first place. See infra note 293.
268 See infra Part IV.
269 Of course there are those that would argue that a "right to know" should be
confined to the meaning traditionally ascribed to it-that is, the public's right to know
information about its own government (hence giving members of the public a special
"right" to that particular information). See, e.g., Informed Public, supra note 24, at 484
n.10 ("[T]he term 'right to know' denotes a personal right held by every member of the
public to have access to information controlled by the government."). There are many
problems with this position, however, of which I will highlight only a few. First, there is
no basis for limiting a First Amendment right to "know" only this type of information.
Logically a "right to know" would encompass any information or expression within the
scope of First Amendment protection. But even if one derived a narrower "right to know
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"injury to other social goals" 270 that would likely attend the recognition of such a
right seem prohibitive.
These last points are related to my final criticism of a right to know. Once
such a broad, unmanageable right is created, the Court will likely be reluctant to
extend its application to other contexts where the public does have a legitimate
interest in obtaining certain information. This seems to be the case with the right
of access to criminal proceedings recognized in Richmond Newspapers and its
progeny, where the Court spoke only of its application to criminal proceedings
even though from an "experience and logic" perspective it would seem to apply
equally to civil trials.271 Moreover, even though a delineation of the boundaries
between the Houchins rule of no access to government information, and the
Richmond Newspapers exception to that rule, has been a matter of active
litigation in the lower courts since the early 1980s through the present time,272 the
Court has not taken a case outside of the criminal trial context to clarify these
issues. In other words, the public right of access created in Richmond Newspapers
has been relatively dormant at the Supreme Court level. Although it is impossible
to determine precisely why this has been, one reason may be the daunting task of
determining the scope of such a right. And this may be particularly true of
claimed rights of access to government information that are not so easily resolved
by reference to principles like "experience and logic," which proved to be
especially suitable for assessing such a right in the context of historically open
criminal trials.273
In sum, while I have argued that the Houchins rule of no access to
government information is unsupportable at least as part of a body of law that
recognizes some protection for the gathering of information from non-
government sources, I have contended that the broad public right to know
recognized in Richmond Newspapers is similarly unsupportable. What is needed
is a workable standard somewhere in the middle that bridges these extreme ends
of the spectrum, which accords some right of access and protection for
government information" from a "structural" reading of the First Amendment, such a
right would presumably give any citizen a directly enforceable right to obtain government
information and would effectively convert the Constitution to a Freedom of Information
Act. Such a right would be both unmanageable and unworkable. See supra note 252.
270 See supra note 49.
271 Indeed, many lower courts have so applied that right. See supra note 214 and
accompanying text.
272 See supra notes 213-15.
273 See also Cheh, supra note 24, at 728. Indeed, as I mentioned at the beginning of
this Article, despite the fact that a split of opinion among the U.S. Courts of Appeal is
one of the most important and frequent reasons that the Court will decide to hear a
particular appeal, it recently declined to resolve a split that has emerged among those
courts as to whether the Richmond Newspapers right of access applies to deportation
hearings conducted by the government. See supra note 19.
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information-gathering activities to a manageable subset of our society that the
general public relies on to gather and disseminate important information to it. In
other words, by focusing on the recognizedfunctions that certain groups perform
for society, instead of on the perceived inequities in allowing some groups to
invoke constitutional rights not available to individual citizens, a workable right
to gather information that is not "theoretically endless" can be fashioned. But
before I elaborate on this further, having explored the Court's information-
gathering jurisprudence in the context of governmental information, it remains to
evaluate it with respect to information gathered from other sources.
B. Information Gathering with Respect to Non-Governmental Sources
This section will explore the implications of the Court's jurisprudence for the
gathering of information that is in the public domain or under the control of non-
governmental parties. I will first examine the different messages that the Court
sent in Zemel and Branzburg, and then undertake a similar analysis with respect
to Branzburg and Cohen.
1. Scope of Protection for Information Gathering From Non-
Governmental Sources
Read together, Zemel and Branzburg could be viewed as establishing a
general principle that information gathering is not protected by the First
Amendment except in the limited area of gathering and reporting the "news."
Indeed, some lower courts appear to have interpreted these decisions in this
way.274 However, such a principle appears to be more a product of the "common
law manner" of deciding constitutional issues on a case-by-case basis than any
conscious intent by the Court. This is because any such principle would be largely
unsupportable under general First Amendment principles that have traditionally
guided the Court.
First of all, granting some protection to gathering information about "news"
or recent events, but not with respect to conditions that have historically prevailed
in Cuba, for example, would again appear to be in substantial tension with a
cardinal rule of First Amendment law that the government generally is restricted
from regulating conduct associated with speech on the basis of the content or
subject matter of the speech at issue.275 Moreover, as the Court itself recognized
in Branzburg, "freedom of the press" has not been traditionally viewed as being
limited to the right of the institutional press to report on the news. As the Court
explained in the context of declining to create a specific testimonial privilege for
journalists:
274 See supra note 216-18 and accompanying text.
275 See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
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Freedom of the press is a fundamental personal right which is not confined to
newspapers and periodicals. It necessarily embraces pamphlets and
leaflets.... The press in its historic connotation comprehends every sort of
publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion .... The
informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press... is also
performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic researchers, and
dramatists.2 76
Thus, from a First Amendment perspective, the "press" encompasses
publishers of all sorts, that publish all kinds of "information and opinions." While
it might be possible to confine First Amendment protection for information
gathering to those who published "news" (provided an acceptable definition of
that term could be agreed upon), such a result would seem to be at odds with the
"public informing" purpose of that Amendment recognized by the Court in Globe
Newspapers and other cases. Surely, the published findings of a private research
group that has conducted a study of government environmental policy, or the
published results of a social scientist's study on an issue like crime or drugs, can
provide the public with information that is just as important to decisions about
self-governance as that obtained from newspapers or the nightly news.277
Accordingly, if a First Amendment principle that protected the gathering of
news but not other sorts of important information would be largely indefensible,
one must account for the seeming inconsistency between Zemel and Branzburg in
other ways. In other words, what caused the Court to view Mr. Zemel's desire to
travel to Cuba for the purpose of acquiring information about affairs there, as
being less worthy from a First Amendment perspective than the desire of the
reporters in Branzburg to acquire information from their informants in an
unimpeded manner? It could not be a difference in the character of the
government regulation in either case, for the burdens imposed on the asserted
First Amendment interests of both Zemel and the reporters appeared to be
incidental ones, caused by the application of generally applicable laws to them
(i.e., the travel restrictions in Zemel, and the requirement of providing relevant
grand jury testimony in Branzburg). Nor would it likely be the characterization of
the travel restrictions in Zemel as a regulation of conduct that did not implicate
protected expression, because it could be said that the government was doing the
276 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 704 (citing Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 440, 450, 452
(1938)); see also Redish, supra note 47, at 261-64 (arguing persuasively that private
corporations also perform an important informative function in our society).
277 Indeed, it would be somewhat perverse to provide some constitutional protection
for the gathering of "news" about such a study or report that had recently been published,
and no protection for the gathering of the facts or information that served as a basis for
the study or report on which the news media was reporting. This is especially true
considering that a news report would almost always be a more superficial account of the
information contained in such a study or report than the actual study or report itself.
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same thing in Branzburg. The reporters there were not complaining that the
government was violating any First Amendment right they may have had "not to
speak" by making them testify as to their confidential sources, but were rather
claiming interference with their right to gather news in an unhindered fashion.278
In this sense, the government was not inhibiting rights of expression in Branzburg
any more than it had been in Zemel. But there are two other important distinctions
between the two cases.
First, unlike the press in Branzburg that had a defined First Amendment
purpose for desiring unimpeded access to news sources (i.e., to publish the news),
Zemel himself never alleged that he desired to go to Cuba in order to gather
information for the purpose of engaging in public debate, publishing his findings,
or otherwise communicating his findings.279 In other words, Zemel never
identified a First Amendment purpose for going to Cuba other than to become a
"better informed citizen." 280 Using the words of Justice Douglas in his dissent in
that case, what Zemel had really alleged was a "right to know."'28 ' And even
though the Court, in its declaration about the rights of speaking and publishing not
including an unrestrained right to gather information, appeared to presume Zemel
would eventually communicate his findings to others, such a generalized speech
presumption (or right to know) was apparently not a sufficient basis for the Court
to recognize a First Amendment claim.282 Such a basis for recognizing a First
Amendment right would not be accepted by the Court until years later, and only
then in the narrow context of the Richmond Newspapers right of access to
criminal trials.
In a related vein, even if Zemel had alleged a general desire to engage in
discussion about the things he would learn in Cuba, from the perspective of the
"public informing" purpose of the First Amendment such speech would be much
less efficacious than the "speech" intended by the reporters in Branzburg.
Ordinarily, the "speech" of newspapers or television news programs would be
expected to disseminate information to a much greater degree than the discussions
or writings of an average person. Justice Powell suggested such a distinction in
his Saxbe dissent where he argued that while the rights of speech and publication
protect the "individual interests" in self-expression and personal fulfillment, the
press is important with respect to fulfilling the "societal function" of that
Amendment because "[n]o individual can obtain for himself the information
needed for the intelligent discharge of his political responsibilities." 283 Thus, the
Court may well have believed that any recognition of a right to gather information
278 See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
279 See Zemel, 381 U.S. at 4, 16.
280 Id.
281 See id. at 23-24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
282 Id. at 16-17.
283 See Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 862-63 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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under the First Amendment should be limited to contexts where the public
dissemination of that information can be assured.
In sum, there seem to be compelling reasons for rejecting the notion that the
protection for information gathering recognized in Branzburg is limited to
newsgathering activities, as well as the notion that Zemel was intended to lay
down a general prohibition against the recognition of such a right for all but the
organized press. However, what the Zemel-Branzburg decisions may suggest is
that the recognition of a right to gather information may only be appropriate in
situations where the societal, versus the individualistic, purposes of the First
Amendment are being served in an identifiable way. This would suggest that such
protection might be reserved to those channels of communication, like the
organized press, that society relies upon for the dissemination of important
information to the public. This Article will explore these ideas further in the next
section. But before turning to this topic, it remains to discuss the apparent impact
of Cohen on the constitutional protection Branzburg did recognize for
newsgathering activities.
2. Depth of Protection for Information Gathering from Non-Governmental
Sources
Although the Court in Branzburg declined to create a special testimonial
privilege for news reporters, in reaching this conclusion it engaged in an extensive
balancing of the First Amendment interests in newsgathering and society's
competing interests in the effective enforcement of its laws.284 And in two
subsequent decisions, which pitted First Amendment interests in both gathering
and reporting the news against the enforcement of general rules of criminal and
civil procedure, the Court again declined to create special exemptions for the
press but mainly on the basis of protections the Court had already created to
protect the First Amendment interests at stake in those cases. 285 Thus, the Court's
almost "flip" dismissal of the First Amendment interests at stake in Cohen
appeared to be an aberration from its precedents in this area, at least in cases
where the First Amendment interests in the gathering and dissemination of news
had come into conflict with society's interest in the enforcement of its criminal
laws (in Branzburg and Zurcher) and its civil defamation laws (in Herbert). And
while it is true that there were different interests at stake in Cohen-i.e., both
societal and individual interests in the enforcement of promises that induced
reliance by others-it does not appear that these interests were any more
important than those at issue in the earlier cases (and certainly not so much more
important as to dispense with the need for any consideration of First Amendment
interests).
284 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
285 See supra the discussions of Zurcher and Herbert at notes 116 and 135.
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Moreover, as one commentator has put it, while the result reached in Cohen
was not unreasonable and might actually strengthen First Amendment interests in
newsgathering (by assuring sources of news that promises of confidentiality are
enforceable), the decision itself appeared to be "sloppily reasoned. '2 86 To support
its apparent thesis that incidental burdens imposed on the press by laws of general
applicability are subject to little or no First Amendment scrutiny, the Court relied
on cases that simply did not support the application of that principle in Cohen
itself. The Court first cited Branzburg, which definitely did not say that because
the rules of criminal procedure at issue there were ones of general application, no
consideration of First Amendment interests was warranted. 2 87 On the contrary, as
described earlier, the Court engaged in an evaluation of the asserted First
Amendment interests that was, if anything, probably more exhaustive than
warranted. 288
The Cohen Court also cited a number of cases dealing with the application of
antitrust, labor, and tax laws to the business of operating a newspaper.289 But to
"burden" the business operations of the press by making it adhere to the same
general economic regulations as other businesses would appear to be one thing; to
permit the application of general contract laws in a way that burdens its
newsgathering and reporting activities without any consideration of society's
competing First Amendment interests is quite another. In the former case,
potential threats to First Amendment interests seem extremely remote and
attenuated, while in the latter case the more specific application of general laws to
distinctly speech-related activities pose a much greater threat.290 Finally, the
Court relied on a case where it held that the press could be held liable under a
State's general "right of publicity" law for broadcasting a "human cannonball's"
act in its entirety as part of a news broadcast, and allegedly diminishing the
286 See Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA. L.
REv. 1087, 1087 (2001); see also generally, Jerome A. Barron, Cohen v. Cowles Media
and its Significance for First Amendment Law and Journalism, 3 WM. & MARY BILL
RTS. J. 419 (1994).
287 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
288 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. It is worthy of note that Justice
White's opinion for the Court in Branzburg ran 42 pages in the U.S. Reporter, with 42
footnotes.
289 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
290 See Easton, supra note 25, at 1157 (observing that the general economic
regulations at issue in Cohen "appear[ed] to pose only the most attenuated threat to
established First Amendment rights," and therefore showed the doctrine of no First
Amendment scrutiny for laws of general application "in its most innocuous and
apparently acceptable form"); id. at 1162 (The economic regulation cases concede only
that such "regulations of general applicability may be imposed on businesses engaged in
First Amendment activities... provided the integrity of those activities is never
threatened. These cases have nothing to say about laws.., which still may be applied to
obstruct newsgathering or stifle publication of truthful information....").
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commercial value of that performance. 291 However, even in that case, the Court
gave due consideration to the competing First Amendment interests, implying
that the Amendment might have prevented recovery had the newscast used less
than the entire act at issue.292
Considering then, the dearth of support for the Court's analysis in Cohen,
what might have lead it to abjure any sort of Branzburg balancing or weighing of
the First Amendment interests in that case? 293 The answer appears to be the
291 See id. at 1164 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S.
562, 576-79 (1977)).
292 See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 574-75 ("It is evident... that petitioner's state-law
right of publicity would not serve to prevent respondent from reporting the newsworthy
facts about petitioner's act. Wherever the line in particular situations is to be drawn
between media reports that are protected and those that are not, we are quite sure that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments do not immunize the media when they broadcast a
performer's entire act without his consent.") (footnotes omitted)).
293 Not only was the Court's approach in Cohen inconsistent with that utilized in
Branzburg, but it was also in substantial tension with its traditional "symbolic conduct"
and "time, place or manner" doctrines which subject even content-neutral regulations of
conduct related to speech to an "intermediate" level of First Amendment scrutiny. See
supra notes 32-34 and accompanying text. The Court explicitly acknowledged this
tension in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994), where it
compared the approach it took in Cohen to that of another decision where intermediate
scrutiny had been applied to a general ban on public nudity, and stated simply that "the
enforcement of a generally applicable law may or may not be subject to heightened
scrutiny under the First Amendment." Id. at 640. And although the Turner Court did not
discuss this fact, in an earlier decision the Court had attempted to explain when laws of
general application would be subject to heightened scrutiny under the First Amendment.
See Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704-08 (1986) (explaining that such laws
would be subject to heightened scrutiny when they (1) were applied to activity with a
significant expressive element, (2) had the inevitable effect of singling out those engaged
in expressive activity, or (3) were enforced as a pretext for suppressing protected speech).
But certainly the application of the promissory estoppel laws in Cohen restricted the
press' publication of news, an activity that could not be more expressive. Thus, Cohen
should have been analyzed in the same manner as the decision where the Court applied
intermediate scrutiny to a general ban on public nudity which allegedly burdened
"expressive" nude dancing.
Be that as it may, however, one might attempt to explain the Court's dicta about
newsgathering not meriting First Amendment scrutiny in this context by the fact that it is
generally non-expressive conduct with a more attenuated connection to expression than
the non-expressive components of symbolic conduct or the non-expressive aspects of
general communicative activities. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. In other
words, it is more difficult to say in the former context that the conduct being restricted
has a "significant expressive element" than it is in the latter two contexts where the
conduct and speech are closely bound up with each other. However, as Dean Elena
Kagan has explained, the Arcara rule does not fully exhaust the situations where the
Court has applied heightened scrutiny to generally-applicable laws. See Elena Kagan,
Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment
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different nature of the conduct engaged in by the press in the two cases, which
may have led the Court to view the propriety and justification for enforcing the
generally applicable laws differently. 294 In Branzburg and other cases, the Court
has suggested strongly that First Amendment protection does not extend to the
wrongful or unlawful acquisition of news, nor to the publication of such news by
the wrongdoing party. 295 And Branzburg itself involved no allegations that the
newsgathering at issue in that case involved wrongful or unlawful activity.296 The
burdens on newsgathering imposed by the rules of criminal procedure in that case
were truly "incidental" in the sense of being unintended: those laws were not
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REv. 413, 497-99 (1996). As she discusses, in United States v.
Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985), the Court applied intermediate First Amendment scrutiny
to a law barring the reentry into a military base of a person who had previously been
expelled and who desired to reenter for the purpose of distributing leaflets. See. id. at 497
n.228. And "contrary to the Court's analysis, the conduct that drew the sanction-the
reentry-was not itself expressive, although the policy regulating reentry interfered with
the leafletter's ability to engage in expressive activity." Id. Obviously in this case, the
Court must have believed that the non-expressive conduct being regulated was
sufficiently bound up with the expressive acts itself to apply heightened scrutiny to that
general law. Given that newsgathering is similarly bound up with expressive activities-
just as Albertini's access was necessary for him to engage in his expressive activities, so
newsgathering is necessary to publishing-Albertini undermines the dicta in Cohen,
which barred scrutiny of general laws that interfere with newsgathering activities. In my
view, such laws should at least be subject to some form of Branzburg balancing of the
public interests involved. See infra notes 299-301 and accompanying text; accord
Smolla, supra note 25, at 1248-51 (arguing for a newsgathering privilege against privacy
torts based on general balancing of interests involving specific privacy interests at stake,
value of news story, and necessity of engaging in surreptitious newsgathering methods).
But see Chemerinsky, supra note 21, at 1160-61 (urging a straightforward application of
the Court's "intermediate scrutiny" analysis to the application of general tort and criminal
laws to newsgatherers). One issue I see with Professor Chemerinsky's thoughtful
proposal is that is treats all content-neutral regulation of speech and speech-related
conduct as presenting similar conflicts between First Amendment and other societal
interests, where the presumption in all of these cases would be made to favor speech
interests. As I discussed in Part I, however, the more attenuated the relationship becomes
between the non-expressive conduct being regulated and the expression it facilitates, the
greater society's interest will likely be in regulating such conduct. See supra notes 48-52
and accompanying text.
294 See also Easton, supra note 25, at 1173 ('The operative reason for denying some
degree of constitutional scrutiny in Cohen is revealed in Justice White's argument that
the Minnesota newspapers may not have 'obtained Cohen's name "lawfully"' in this
case ....") (citation omitted).
295 As Professor Easton has pointed out, however, in decisions preceding Cohen the
Court had expressly reserved the question of whether the publication of unlawfully
acquired news could be punished. See id. at 1174-76; see also Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532
U.S. 514, 528, 532 n.19 (2001) (continuing to reserve this question, but suggesting that
the unlawful acquisition of the information itself could be punished).
296 See generally Branzburg, 408 U.S. 665.
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designed to force members of the press into breaching their promises of
confidentiality, but rather to compel any member of society possessing relevant
information about a crime to provide that information to a grand jury on request.
In Cohen, by contrast, the promissory estoppel laws at issue were designed to
redress the very type of conduct engaged in by the press in connection with its
newsgathering activities-i.e., the breaking of a promise that one has induced
another to rely on. In several different portions of its opinion, the Court made it
clear that the perceived impropriety of the press' conduct was a significant factor
in its ruling. 297 In a sense, then, the burden imposed on the newspaper's
publication of information in Cohen was not incidental or unintended, but rather
the very aim of the law (i.e., to encourage members of society, including the
press, to either keep their promises or compensate a promisee for any harm
caused by failing to keep them). Thus, a better way of interpreting Cohen is not
that it intended to eliminate any Branzburg-type scrutiny of general laws that
unintentionally burden First Amendment activities, but rather that when such laws
aim to regulate the type of conduct engaged in by the press as part of its
newsgathering activities, there will be a heavy presumption in favor of their
constitutionality. Read in this way, Branzburg balancing would not be eliminated
in the context of all generally applicable laws, but would continue to be applied in
those situations where such laws burden the activities of the press in a genuinely
incidental way.298
297 See Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669 ("[The truthful information sought to be published
must have been lawfully acquired. The press may not with impunity break and enter an
office or dwelling to gather news."); id. at 671 ("Minnesota law simply requires those
making promises to keep them."); id. at 671 ("[I]t is not at all clear that respondents
obtained Cohen's name 'lawfully'.... ); id. at 672 (enforcing the promissory estoppel
laws "is no more than the incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of
applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain
kinds of promises to keep them").
298 Indeed, this explanation of Cohen could explain why lower courts have virtually
ignored it in continuing to apply a First Amendment journalists' privilege against the
application to journalists of generally applicable rules of civil procedure. See supra notes
98-99. Of course, another reason for this could be the procedural nature of such rules, as
opposed to the substantive nature of contract law, for example. One could also
distinguish Cohen from Branzburg based on the severity of the burden imposed on First
Amendment interests by the law at issue in each case. As mentioned earlier, in Branzburg
the press' claim was that compelling reporters to testify before the grand jury would deter
informants from providing newsworthy information to it. In Cohen, by contrast, the
alleged burden was a more narrow one of deterring the press from reporting the identity
of a source when it believed that information itself was newsworthy. While on the surface
the latter burden might seem to strike more closely at the heart of First Amendment
protection (i.e., burdening "speaking" rather than "gathering"), on closer reflection it
would seem that the First Amendment objective of facilitating a full flow of relevant
information to the public would be stifled in a much greater way if the press were
prevented from acquiring newsworthy information in the first place, than if the press
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But even though this rationale might reasonably identify the basis for the
Court's different approaches in Branzburg and Cohen, it is not to suggest that the
Court was correct in essentially repudiating any First Amendment protection for
newsgathering conduct that is alleged to run afoul of general contract, tort,
property, intellectual property, or even less serious criminal laws. To
automatically resolve all such conflicts between First Amendment interests and
the contending interests reflected in such laws in favor of the latter seems unwise
and unwarranted. Both of the constitutional and contending interests are of an
important societal nature, and there is no good reason to believe that society
would wish a preordained and unexamined decision in favor of general laws in all
cases. 299 To assert that legislatures in passing such laws foresaw and considered
were occasionally deterred from revealing its specific sources of certain information.
Thus, it could be argued that the burden imposed on First Amendment objectives from
enforcing generally applicable laws was much less in Cohen than it was in Branzburg,
thus dispensing of the need for any sort of First Amendment balancing. See also Cohen,
501 U.S. at 677-78 (Souter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the majority's decision in
Cohen might also be explained by the theory that the press had waived its First
Amendment rights in the case by promising not to reveal Cohen's identity, but rejecting
this explanation as inadequate).
An insightful and provocative article by Dean Elena Kagan suggests yet another
basis upon which Cohen might be distinguished from Branzburg (and even Zemel for that
matter). See generally Kagan, supra note 293. At the risk of oversimplying, Dean Kagan
suggests that the level of First Amendment scrutiny the Court will apply to a law
(whether general or not) is really determined by its view of whether the government's
purpose is to suppress particular speech in a given case. This generally means that the
more discretion the government has in applying a law to conduct related to speech, the
greater the potential for impermissible motivations to be affecting the government's
actions. See id. at 456-61. On this view, the promissory estoppel laws enforced in Cohen
(which were not even initiated by the government, but rather by a private party) and the
general travel ban enforced in Zemel, presented much less risk that the government's
actions were impermissibly motivated than the criminal discovery rules at issue in
Branzburg where the government seemingly had more discretion to apply those rules in
the sense of urging grand juries to compel information disclosures from reporters. This
analysis suggests that the application of general laws to newsgathering activities should
be subject to increasing scrutiny as the government's discretion in enforcing such laws
increases. However, I do not believe the lack of such discretion in a given case, as in
Cohen, is sufficient reason to obviate any sort of First Amendment scrutiny. See infra
notes 299-301 and accompanying text.
299 Of course, such general laws also seek to protect important individual interests as
well. But this still does not mean there ought to be automatic resolutions of such conflicts
in favor of general laws in every case. For instance, taking a perhaps extreme example,
let us suppose a reporter learned that a company was dumping drums of toxic waste into a
river that ran through its property, that the company had bought off law enforcement
officials to look the other way (or such officials simply refused to investigate without
certain proof), and that the reporter committed a minor trespass to take photographs of
these activities for publication in the local newspaper. Can it be seriously doubted that the
public interest in such newsgathering activities would not greatly outweigh the individual
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all conceivable conflicts with other important interests reflected in the
Constitution, or that judges in developing common law doctrines did the same,
seems to border on the fanciful.3°° Accordingly, instead of rejecting the
applicability of the First Amendment in such contexts, the constitutional interests
in newsgathering ought to be explicitly recognized. But just as in other areas of
First Amendment law, the general nature of the government restrictions in these
cases might well counsel in favor of a lower level of scrutiny being applied to
them.301
and societal interests in applying criminal and tort trespass laws in such a case? See also
Stone, supra note 96, at 107 (asserting, without specifically addressing the problem of
"speech-related information gathering," that general laws incidentally burdening speech
should not always "be beyond the scope of first [sic] amendment [sic] review. The
potential restrictive effect of such laws is simply too great to disregard them entirely.").
300 Indeed, many different scholars have persuasively decried the rote application of
the Cohen "shibboleth" by lower courts, especially in the context of alleged
newsgathering torts. See Smolla, supra note 25, at 1247. Thus, scholars have proposed
various newsgathering privileges and other legal standards for giving the public's First
Amendment interests in such conflicts its due. See supra note 293 for a discussion of
Professor Smolla's and Chemerinsky's proposals. Professor Easton has proposed that a
newsgathering tort plaintiff be required to prove "deliberate wrongdoing in bad faith or
outrageous conduct" by a journalist akin to the New York Times actual malice standard in
the libel setting. See Easton, supra note 25, at 1212-15; see also Chemerinsky, supra
note 21, at 1161 (describing various proposals of different scholars). But see generally
Bezanson, supra note 25, at 916-25 (arguing against special First Amendment protection
for newsgathering).
301 The Court has scrutinized general laws less closely primarily because they are
less likely to be designed to suppress speech at all (in the case of general regulations of
conduct), or to suppress any particular kind of speech (in the case of generally applicable
regulations of speech itself). Thus, I might agree that in the newsgathering context, a
Branzburg-like balancing of interests should be applied, but favor the application of such
laws--creating a rebuttable presumption of enforceability if you will-which could be
overcome upon a showing of a sufficiently strong First Amendment news value in a
particular story. Compare Professor Smolla's approach at supra note 293. Since I will
argue later, however, that those seeking to invoke a right to gather information
(regardless of whether it is "news" or otherwise) must first demonstrate that the
information sought is or was of sufficient "public concern" to satisfy the societal or
structural purpose of the First Amendment, see infra notes 319-29 and accompanying
text, a newsgatherer defending against the application of general laws would first need to
meet a "threshold" showing of "news value" before even being eligible for such a
balancing analysis. Thus, for instance, to the extent the claimed "news" involved a
tabloid report on the exploits of an entertainment figure, the Cohen approach of no First
Amendment scrutiny for allegedly tortious conduct in gathering such information might
well be appropriate given the questionable social value of such information. See infra
note 328 for a more extensive discussion of this issue.
Dean Kagan argues that the Court once expressly took the position that general laws
should be subjected to First Amendment scrutiny when they burden expressive activity
precisely because the legislatures in passing such laws would not have weighed the First
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As explained earlier, however, even if Cohen were interpreted to preclude
First Amendment scrutiny of any general laws in the newsgathering context,
Branzburg presumably would not be relegated entirely to the dustbin of history.
This is because the Court in Cohen certainly did not retract its assertion in
Branzburg that newsgathering was entitled to some First Amendment protection.
Hence, even were Cohen viewed as narrowing Branzburg in cases involving the
enforcement of generally applicable laws, presumably laws or government
actions targeting newsgathering or other speech-related information-gathering
activities would still remain subject to meaningful First Amendment scrutiny.302
C. Summary of Critiques Regarding the Supreme Court's Information-
Gathering Jurisprudence
In summary, the Court has without sufficient justification refused to
recognize a general right to gather information from the government, while at the
same time acknowledging that such a right is a logical necessity in the context of
information gathering from other sources (at least with respect to newsgathering
activities). On the other hand, it is similarly unsupportable to base a First
Amendment right of access to a narrow category of governmental information on
the broad, amorphous ground of a public right to know. Additionally, in the
context of gathering information from non-governmental sources, limiting the
general protection that has been recognized solely to the collection of "news"
would not accord with general First Amendment principles or sound policy. And
finally, interpreting the Court's decisions in this area to eliminate any protection
for information gathering when they happen to conflict with laws of general
application seems unwarranted and unwise.
IV. TOWARDS A COHESIVE AND WORKABLE RIGHT TO GATHER
INFORMATION UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Amendment interests involved against the competing societal interests. See Kagan, supra
note 293, at 493-97. However, she asserts that in more modem times the Court has
abandoned this position in favor of applying a more deferential standard of review to
such laws because, as noted above, the risk of improper government "speech-
suppression" motives will normally be lower with respect to the enforcement of laws of
general application. See id. Even assuming this description is accurate, as Dean Kagan
herself points out, the Court still applies heightened scrutiny to general laws regulating
non-expressive conduct when that conduct is sufficiently bound up with expressive
activity. See id. at 497-98; see also supra note 293. In such cases, it seems impossible to
identify the Court's precise reasons for doing so, which are likely some mix of a greater
suspicion about government motivations as well as a concern that lawmakers have not
sufficiently weighed the competing societal interests at stake.
302 It is not surprising then that lower courts continue to subject laws or government
actions designed to specifically restrict newsgathering activities to meaningful First
Amendment review. See supra notes 221-22 and accompanying text.
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On the basis of what principles, then, can a more consistent, logical, and
desirable First Amendment information-gathering rights jurisprudence be
premised? A couple of principles appear to be fairly well settled, at least in the
context of general free speech jurisprudence. First, if such a right is to be
recognized at all, it ought to apply both to the gathering of information created or
controlled by the government-information that is generally of an inherently
political or "core" nature for First Amendment purposes-as well as to the
gathering of information from non-governmental sources. 30 3 Second, in a related
vein, the very existence of such a right should not be based on the general content
or subject matter of the information sought to be gathered for First Amendment
purposes.304 Thus, the availability of such a right should not be based on whether
the acquisition of information is being sought from governmental versus non-
governmental sources, nor should any distinctions be drawn solely on the basis of
whether the information being gathered can be classified as "news" or another
sort of information.
Stated somewhat differently, the recognition or non-recognition of an implied
right to gather information under the First Amendment should not depend-as it
appeared to be in most of the Court's decisions in this area--on the nature of the
specific opposing interests being asserted by the government in a particular case,
or on the particular philosophy or temperament of the judges that may happen to
be assessing this question at a given point in time. Rather, the very existence of
such a right should be based on a more foundational and enduring assessment of
the First Amendment values promoted by information-gathering activities,305 and
the potential costs to society of recognizing a constitutional right to engage in
them (for example, difficulties in administering it or the potential for creating
increased conflict with other social interests). Only when such a basis for a right
to gather information has been clearly articulated, established, and agreed upon-
such as to promote informed decision-making on matters important to self-
governance--can the competing interests asserted by the government in a
303 See supra notes 244-52 and accompanying text. This is not to say that some
special considerations cannot apply to such a right by virtue of the "affirmative" or
"offensive" nature of a right to gain access to information that the government is
declining to disclose. See infra note 341.
304 See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text. As stated earlier, however, I
will argue that there is one legitimate content distinction upon which the existence of a
right to gather information can and ought to be predicated: that the information sought be
of sufficient public concern to satisfy the societal purposes of the First Amendment. See
infra notes 312-13, 319-29 and accompanying text for a general discussion of this issue
and why this would be a legitimate content-based treatment of speech in the information-
gathering context.
305 Of course, in evaluating the existence of a constitutional right, adequate due
should also be given to the history and text of the constitutional provision at issue. See
supra note 263.
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particular case be properly evaluated against stable and settled First Amendment
principles. Moreover, only then will interested parties, lower courts, and society in
general have sufficient notice as to which sort of information-gathering activities
implicate constitutional protections and which do not.
Based on the various analyses that have been invoked by the Court in the
different contexts in which a right to gather information has been asserted, it
appears that at least three basic approaches to such a right might be considered.
First, as exemplified by the majority's views in Zemel, Pell-Saxbe and Houchins,
it would be possible to strictly tie the scope of any First Amendment protection to
its plain text-i.e., to protect the activities of speaking, publishing or other
expressive acts. On this view, there would be no constitutional protection
accorded to information-gathering activities per se, and any right to obtain
particular information would be left primarily to the political or legislative
process. But as Justice Powell argued in his Pell-Saxbe dissent, while such an
approach might have the "virtue of simplicity" and delineate "the outer
boundaries of First Amendment concerns with unambiguous clarity," it would
appear inadequate "to preserve First Amendment values amid the complexities of
a changing society. ' ' 306
With respect to governmental information, as discussed earlier, laws
mandating a public right of access to certain government records and proceedings
have come a long way in the last fifty years to promote open governance.
However, it is widely contended such laws still leave a substantial gap with
respect to information that may be the most critical in making important decisions
about the performance and activities of our government representatives. 30 7 I have
also discussed other reasons why leaving the question of access to government
information completely in the hands of government officials is not a sound
constitutional policy. 308 As to the gathering of information that may be available
outside the walls of government institutions, including the public conduct of
government officials or the effects of government policies, the Court in
306 Saxbe, 417 U.S. at 875 (Powell, J., dissenting).
307 See supra notes 258-62 and accompanying text. Moreover, as Professor Sunstein
has argued, under a structural view of the First Amendment the primary purposes of a
right of access to government information are to protect against self-interested behavior
by political representatives and the "control of government by powerful private groups."
Sunstein, supra note 24, at 891-92, 920. But as he persuasively argues, an "equilibrium
theory" of the First Amendment under which access to government information is given
no protection while the publication of information about government is given full
protection, is inadequate to achieve these First Amendment objectives. See id. at 898-
904, 920-21; see also The Checking Value, supra note 25, at 527, 610 (arguing that the
First Amendment value of "checking" the malfeasance and misconduct of government
officials was uppermost in the minds of the Framers, and that a right of access to
government information should be viewed as embodying First Amendment values of the
"highest order" in order to achieve this objective).
308 See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
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Branzburg properly recognized that important flows of information to the public
can just as effectively be curtailed by interfering with access to information
sources as by restricting the communication of information itself.309 One only
needs to look at a country like China for a poignant illustration of how effective
abridging information flows at their source can be in controlling public
discourse. 310
As a second approach, and on the opposite end of the First Amendment
spectrum in terms of respecting its literal text, it would be possible to expand on
the Court's approach in the Richmond Newspapers line of cases and essentially
create a public "right to know" certain information. I have already explained why
it would be difficult to fairly imply such a right from the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of "speech" or "press." 311 But even if this could be done,
presumably it would be necessary to attempt a description or definition of the
information that the public was entitled to obtain or receive, perhaps along the
lines of a "public interest" or "public concern" definition that has been utilized by
the Court in other areas of First Amendment law.31 2 Such an approach would at
least avoid the pitfall of improperly regulating speech or information flows on the
basis of its subject matter or content, since the Court has recognized that speech
about matters of public concern is at the "core" of First Amendment protection
and entitled to special consideration in certain settings.313
309 See, for example, supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the need for some constitutional protection for newsgathering that is inhibited by laws
of general application.
310 See, e.g., Peter S. Goodman & Mike Musgrove, China Blocks Web Search
Engines, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2002, at El (observing that "[t]he Communist Party
remains committed to maintaining its monopolistic grip on political power by controlling
what Chinese people see and read"). Additionally, by failing to give sufficient protection
to the efforts of investigators and researchers that our society counts on for important
information-such as the organized press, academic and scientific researchers, or
researchers employed by private public policy groups--our "information society" risks
the facilitation of vacuous or superficial flows of information and ideas that are
insufficiently supported by empirical research and verifiable data. Indeed, some scholars
have made a persuasive case that the Court's jurisprudence governing the organized
press-including its tepid support for newsgathering activities-has incented the press to
engage in news reporting that is frequently superficial and irrelevant while discouraging
reporting on well-researched, serious matters. See generally William P. Marshall & Susan
Gilles, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Bad Journalism, 1994 SuP. CT.
REv. 169 (1995). But cf. Anderson, supra note 1, at 518-19 (supporting nonconstitutional
privileges for press to gain access to information, but opposing First Amendment rights
on grounds that press has sufficient political power to gain needed access and a
constitutional right would be too difficult to administer).
311 See supra notes 264-73 and accompanying text.
312 See infra note 313.
313 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528, 533-34 (2001) (asserting that a
law implicated "the core purposes of the First Amendment because it impose[d] sanctions
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However, the obvious downside to such a justification for a right to gather
information would be that any individual alleging a public interest in certain
information would presumably be entitled to challenge any law or government
action inhibiting access to it.314 In other words, such a right would be truly
"endless," creating an undesirable increase in social conflict and burdening the
judiciary with the difficult task of resolving such conflicts. But perhaps even more
importantly, permitting individual challenges to alleged interferences with
information flows would not necessarily serve the purposes for which a right to
know was recognized in the first place-to disseminate valuable information to
the public. Take the Richmond Newspapers right of access to criminal trials as an
example. Under the Court's theory, an individual seeking access to a murder trial
purely for the purpose of being titillated by the grisly information expected to be
revealed there, with no desire whatsoever to speak with anyone outside the
courtroom about the trial, would nevertheless be entitled to challenge a legitimate
request by the defense or prosecution to close the trial or any portion of it to the
public. Hence, the Court appears to have seriously undermined the societal
purpose of a right of access by permitting any member of society to invoke it
without demonstrating a "public" justification for doing so.
A third, and possibly the most balanced and principled approach, would be to
respect the textual limitations of the First Amendment while relying on the fair
implications of those provisions to protect information-gathering conduct
necessary for preserving valuable information flows to the public. This would
mean implying such a right from the freedoms of "speech" or "press." But to do
so, some initial premises would need to be established. As both the Court and
prominent First Amendment scholars have recognized, the freedoms of speech
on the publication of truthful information of public concern"); Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (declaring that "[alt the heart of the First Amendment is
the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and opinions on
matters of public interest and concern"). In the areas of defamation law, privacy law, and
speech of government employees, the Court has used a "public concern" test to provide
special First Amendment protection for speech even though this could be characterized as
a content-based regulation. See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of
Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1 (1990); see also id. at 2 (describing public concern test as "an explicitly
content-based category of privileged 'public issue' speech that alone is entitled to certain
important protections"). See infra notes 319-29 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of the relationship of speech of public concern to an information-gathering
right.
314 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 525 (The Press Clause should not be read to
"guarantee each person, or even each journalist, the right to gather information as he or
she sees fit. Such a guarantee would be unworkable because there are too many
information gatherers, even too many journalists, to all be accommodated"); Informed
Public, supra note 24, at 509 (arguing against a right to know government information in
part because "no government could function under the constraints of having to honor
every request of every citizen for information").
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and press have at least two major purposes: first, to protect individual interests in
expressing oneself and fostering personal self-fulfillment, and second, to protect
various societal interests, not the least of which is the promotion of intelligent
self-government. 315
And to the extent the Court has been willing to recognize First Amendment
protection for non-expressive conduct associated with the gathering of
information, it has been solely on the basis of protecting those societal interests.
Thus, the Court in Branzburg recognized that newsgathering for the purpose of
reporting news to the public was entitled to some constitutional protection, and in
the Richmond Newspapers line of cases protection was premised, at least
theoretically, on the promotion of public discussion about governmental affairs.
In contrast, the attainment of information for more individualized purposes, such
as in Zemel (or even the more individualized commercial interests at issue in
United Reporting) has not been recognized as a sufficient basis for extending the
outer boundaries of the First Amendment. And this is as it should be.
As I have explained earlier, the Court has made it clear that First Amendment
protection tends to diminish as conduct moves from "pure speech," to conduct
that is expressive in nature, and finally to conduct of a predominantly non-
expressive nature.316 Extending constitutional protection to information-gathering
activities creates a potential for a much greater range of conflict with other
interests valued by society than protecting expressive activities alone. 317 Thus, it
would only seem appropriate then to sustain these additional social costs when
society is receiving a commensurate benefit. In other words, although no one
could gainsay the importance of freedom of expression to promoting individual
well-being, such interests alone would appear inadequate to justify the social costs
that would result from extending constitutional protection to non-expressive
conduct engaged in mainly for "individualized" purposes (such as Mr. Zemel's
desire to get better acquainted with Cuba). In short, it would seem only proper
that a social quid pro quo be attached to extending the scope of First Amendment
protection to cover conduct that is antecedent to speech and that bears a more
attenuated connection to expressive acts than other forms of conduct protected as
speech.318
Accordingly, such a quid pro quo would demand that certain requirements be
met before a party is entitled to invoke a First Amendment right to gather
315 See supra notes 30 and 112.
316 See generally supra Part I; see also, e.g., LAPD v. United Reporting Publ'g
Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39-40 (1999) (asserting that First Amendment overbreadth protection
"attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct---even if expressive-falls
within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws") (internal citations omitted).
317 See generally supra Part I.
318 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
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information. These requirements would be designed to provide assurance that
one's information-gathering activities indeed promote the societal interests of that
Amendment before constitutional protection could be claimed with respect to
them. First, then, it should be required that the type or content of information
sought be of a character that could reasonably be said to foster or promote those
societal interests. Although both the Court and commentators have given various
accounts of the different societal interests promoted by that Amendment, 3 19 it is
clear that, at least in its decisions dealing with a right of access to governmental
information, the Court has focused on the interest in fostering informed
democratic self-governance. 320 And while scholarly commentators have long
debated whether the type of speech or information regarded as being necessary to
such democratic processes should be confined to predominantly "political"
speech, or whether it should include a much broader conception of topics relating
to issues of public interest or concern, 32 1 it would plainly at a minimum consist of
information of a governmental or political nature.
Thus, efforts to gather and disseminate information about the operations and
affairs of our government, including the impact of laws and policies adopted by it,
would presumptively fit within this first requirement for claiming First
Amendment protection for information-gathering activities. This requirement
would help that Amendment to get off its head and back onto its feet after being
bowled over by Pell-Saxbe and Houchins as to a general right of access to
information created or controlled by the government. However, displaying more
certainty about this issue than many commentators, the Court has also declared
that speech on matters of general public concern is "the essence of self-
government" and thus entitled to "special protection."322 Under current First
319 At a high level of generality, the two main societal interests thought to be
promoted by the First Amendment are the fostering of democratic self governance, and
the discovery of truth through the facilitation of a marketplace of ideas. See supra note
30; see also SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 2-1 ito 2-45.
320 See supra notes 169-70 and accompanying text; see also Landmark
Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 838 (1978) (" 'Whatever differences
may exist about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal
agreement that a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of
governmental affairs.' ") (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)). And
even the dissenters in Branzburg emphasized this aspect of the First Amendment in
arguing for a right of the press to gather information from non-governmental sources. See
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 726-27 (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Enlightened choice by an
informed citizenry is the basic ideal upon which an open society is premised, and a free
press is thus indispensable to a free society."); id. ("Not only does the press enhance
personal self-fulfillment by providing the people with the widest possible range of fact
and opinion, but it also is an incontestable precondition of self-government.").
321 See SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 2-41 to 2-45.
322 See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759
(1985) (plurality opinion) (" '[S]peech concerning public affairs is more than self-
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Amendment doctrine, therefore, it seems that information meeting such a "public
concern" standard would also be considered to promote the societal purposes of
that Amendment for purposes of an information-gathering right. The main
problem under this standard, however, is determining what types of information
would meet it.32 3
In answering this question for the purpose of giving certain speech special
constitutional protection in different settings, the Court has suggested fairly
amorphous standards for identifying speech on matters of public concern. In cases
involving defamation and government employee speech, the Court has instructed
that " 'whether ... speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by [the expression's] content, form and context... as revealed by the
whole record.' ",324 Factors relevant to this determination have been held to
include whether or not the speech was " 'of political, social or other concern to
the community,' "325 whether it was engaged in purely for personal or individual
reasons, and the extent to which the information was publicly disseminated.326 In
other cases involving conflicts between privacy interests and the First
Amendment, the Court has indicated that speech on matters of public concern
embraces" 'all issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period.' "327 This
standard suggests that some showing of societal need for information might be
appropriate in determining whether information pertains to a matter of public
concern.
As in these other areas of First Amendment law, there is no doubt that
premising a right to gather information on meeting a "public concern" threshold
would present definitional challenges (at least apart from information of a clearly
political nature). But courts appear to be applying these general standards to reach
expression; it is the essence of self-government.' " (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)). "Accordingly, the Court has frequently reaffirmed that speech on
public issues occupies the 'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values' and
is entitled to special protection." (quoting NAACP v. Claibore Hardware Co., 458 U.S.
886, 913 (1982))).
323 Another problem might be that such a "public concern" standard is too broad for
determining those who are eligible to claim First Amendment protection for engaging in
information-gathering activities, considering the potential social costs associated with
such a right. However, two other minimum requirements that I am proposing must be
satisfied before such a right could be invoked should sufficiently ameliorate this concern.
See infra notes 330-40 and accompanying text.
324 Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 761 (plurality opinion) (quoting Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)).
325 SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 18-22 (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 146).
326 See id. at 18-21 n.7, 18-22.
327 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001) (quoting Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385
U.S. 374, 388 (1967)).
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reasonable results in these other areas of the law,328 and there seems to be no
reason to believe that sound judgment and common sense would not also prevail
328 According to one commentator:
The cases suggest that generally the following will be considered matters of public
concern in terms of the Dun & Bradstreet definition: politics and campaigns;
operations of financial institutions; conduct of government and public officials;
illegal or questionable business practices with ramifications for the general public;
public health and safety; criminality and criminal justice; recruitment methods of a
religious cult; pornography; and athletics.
Robert E. Drechsel, Defining "Public Concern" in Defamation Cases Since Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 12-13 (1990). Although the
"pornography" and "athletics" may sound questionable as matters of public concern
without additional context, they involved criticisms of an anti-pornography activist and
the conduct of a high school coach during a game. See id. at 13 nn.83 & 84. Of course,
this raises the interesting question of to what extent journalists engaged in investigating
and delivering "newstainment" might be considered to be engaged in information
gathering with respect to matters of public concern. At least one court has recently
appeared to answer this question in the negative. See In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130-
31 (3d Cir. 1998) (declining to extend First Amendment journalists' privilege to 900-
number "hotline commentator" for a "professional wrestling" outfit). And in addition to
the issue of mixed news-entertainment reporting, another nettlesome issue in terms of
identifying matters of public concern in this context is the question of to what extent a
person gathering information for commercial speech purposes would be entitled to First
Amendment protection, especially given the lower level of "speech" protection the Court
accords to commercial speech. Moreover, to have courts making determinations about
which types of speech warrant special information-gathering protection and which do not
presents difficult problems of its own. See Anderson, supra note 1, 528-30 (arguing that
because the "press" is increasingly being defined by content rather than format, its
valuable societal role is in danger of disappearing because of modem reluctance to allow
government to accord special legal protections based on its judgments about the "public
importance" of speech). But see Press Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. at 519 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the government should have more latitude to administer a First
Amendment right of access based on the content of the information being sought, than it
would have in regard to regulating speech itself on the basis of its content). There is no
doubt that these are challenging issues that will require much more consideration and
care to work out. However, a more detailed consideration of them here is beyond the
scope of the present Article. It should be noted, however, that in tort actions against the
press for the publication of private facts, courts have routinely made determinations about
what type of news is sufficiently "newsworthy" or "of public concern" to provide the
press with First Amendment protection against liability for such publications. See, e.g.,
Shulman v. Group W Prods, Inc., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 843, 852-60 (Cal. 1998). If workable
determinations about such issues can be made in this setting, there is no reason to believe
that they could not similarly be made in the information-gathering context. See also
generally Andrew B. Sims, Food for the Lions: Excessive Damages for Newsgathering
Torts and the Limitations of Current First Amendment Doctrines, 78 B. U. L. REV. 507
(1998) (proposing limitations on damages awards for newsgathering torts based in part on
whether the information sought met various levels of public concern in different
contexts).
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in determining whether information sought to be gathered was of a sufficient
"public" character to be eligible for constitutional consideration.329 Any First
Amendment distinctions premised upon the public character of speech or
information will necessarily be somewhat untidy because there is simply no way
to define these characteristics with any precision for every conceivable type of
expression. But this does not mean the objective of drawing such distinctions-to
define speech or information that may be worthy of greater constitutional
protection because of its value in fostering enlightened social decisions-should
be abandoned because of these challenges.
However, focusing solely on the political or public character of information
sought to be gathered would not be sufficient to ensure that the societal interests
of the First Amendment were being served by an information-gathering right.
Such a lone requirement would effectively convert a right to gather information
for First Amendment purposes back into a general right to know. Consider the
hypothetical offered earlier of an individual seeking access to a murder trial for no
other reason than the satisfaction of personal proclivities. Such an individual
would presumably satisfy the first requirement of the information-gathering right
I have proposed given the issues of justice administration and similar matters that
would be bound up in such a proceeding. 330 However, the societal interests of the
First Amendment would not be served-even if such an individual did happen to
make some observations on matters of political or public import-if he never
communicated them to the public. Hence, to ensure the fulfillment of those
interests, we should also require that "qualifying" information be sought for the
purpose of disseminating it to the public, and not just for individual consumption
or dissemination to a limited audience selected for personal reasons. 331
329 See, e.g., SMOLLA, supra note 29, at 18-22.1 (observing that "[c]ourts are
increasingly sophisticated in dealing" with certain issues regarding determinations of
public concern in the employee speech area). Moreover, Professor Drechsel concluded
that in determining the question of whether speech is of "public concern" in the
defamation context, courts have given heavy consideration to factors similar to two other
minimum requirements I am proposing for an information-gathering right: the extent to
which the pertinent information was publicly disseminated, and the professional status of
those disseminating it. See Drechsel, supra note 328, at 20-22; see infra notes 329-39
and accompanying text. In a similar way, these additional factors would likely serve to
ameliorate definitional difficulties in the information-gathering context.
330 Even if our hypothetical person had no actual interest in such "public" matters
but rather was solely seeking the "salacious details," as a practical matter it would be
impossible to screen an individual's request for access to governmental information to
make sure it was solely for the "political" or "public" issues raised by that information.
331 Cf Anderson, supra note 1, at 469 (With respect to the institutional press,
"[c]ommunication to a single individual, or even a small group of individuals, usually is
not thought of as journalism. 'Press' assumes communication to a mass audience, or at
least a general audience, about matters of common interest."). While one could object
that the Court has never made an "intent to disseminate" an explicit condition of showing
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Moreover, such an "intent to disseminate" requirement for receiving First
Amendment protection for information gathering is already well established in
the law, albeit not by the Court itself and for a much narrower purpose than is
being proposed here. As explained earlier, despite the Court's decision in
Branzburg, declining to create a specific testimonial privilege for journalists in
criminal investigations, lower courts have continued to recognize a First
Amendment journalists' privilege against compelled production of confidential
sources and work product.332 But in order to be treated as a "journalist" entitled to
invoke such protection, courts generally require that the information at issue must
have been acquired as part of a process that was intended to culminate in the
dissemination of news to the public.333 Thus, journalists do not receive such
special protection because they are part of an institution that is favored by the
Constitution, but rather because they are engaged in a process or function
designed to facilitate the societal purposes of the First Amendment. For similar
reasons, such an "intent to disseminate" would also appear to be an appropriate
prerequisite for invoking a general right to gather information.
Lastly, merely requiring that a person claiming such a right have an intent to
disseminate their information would not appear to be sufficient, for the simple
reason that it would be too difficult and undesirable to police a person's "intent"
in this regard.334 Moreover, allowing any individual wishing to obtain "public"
a special solicitude for speech on matters of public concern, as described earlier the
extent to which speech was communicated publicly has been one factor courts might look
at in determining the public character of speech. See supra note 326 and accompanying
text. But more importantly, when one is considering a social quid pro quo for extending
First Amendment protection to conduct antecedent to that speech, a public dissemination
requirement would appear to be entirely appropriate in the information-gathering context.
332 See supra notes 98-99.
333 As one court put it:
"[T]he critical question in determining if a person falls within the class of persons
protected by the journalist's privilege is whether the person, at the inception of the
investigatory process, had the intent to disseminate to the public the information
obtained through the investigation."... In contrast, a person who "gathers
information for personal reasons, unrelated to dissemination of information to the
public, will not be deterred from undertaking his search simply by rules which
permit discovery of that information in a later civil proceeding."
In re Madden, 151 F.3d at 129 (quoting von Bulow v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 143 (2d
Cir. 1987)). See generally Linda L. Berger, Shielding the Unmedia: Using the Process of
Journalism to Protect the Journalist's Privilege in an Infinite Universe of Publication, 39
Hous. L. REv. 1371 (2003) (discussing various approaches to identifying the "press"
eligible to claim a journalists' privilege, and proposing "functional definition" of whether
the claimant is engaged in a defined "process of journalism").
334 Cf. BAKER, supra note 252, at 237 (questioning "offensive" rights of access to
information under the First Amendment in part because "[w]hen an individual claims an
offensive privilege, such as access to a prison, it is difficult for the state and sometimes
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information to invoke a constitutional right to do so by simply alleging an intent
to publish that information would pose dangers of creating an unmanageably
broad right similar to a right to know. Hence, to create a workable right while at
the same time making it meaningful, it would also seem appropriate to require
certain bona fides of persons asserting it.335 These should be designed to provide
assurance both that the information sought would indeed be widely disseminated,
and also that it would be collected in a reasonably proficient and responsible
manner (to ensure the quality of the information and that it was collected in a
manner likely to create the least amount of conflict with other recognized
interests). In this regard, courts that have allowed persons to invoke the journalist
privilege described above have also taken care to ensure that such people are bona
fide news reporters. 336
Probably the most reliable indicator that a person seeking information was
doing so for the purpose of disseminating it to the public would be their
membership in a group or organization whose recognized function was to obtain
information for the purpose of public dissemination. Thus, journalists employed
by traditional print and broadcast news organizations would certainly qualify, as
presumably would free-lance journalists who could demonstrate a connection to
news publishing organizations or other credentials similar to their employed
counterparts. Moreover, academic or scientific researchers employed by
institutions of higher learning or the government would also presumably qualify
assuming adherence to their traditional norms of publishing their research to
interested communities in their fields.3 37 And researchers employed by modem
non-governmental organizations, such as public policy groups or think tanks
difficult even for the person seeking access.., to know whether the visit will move that
person to write or lecture about it in the future").
335 See, e.g., Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 873-74 (1974) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (addressing government's concern in a prison access case that "[a]ny
individual who asserts an intention to convey information to others might plausibly claim
to perform the function of the news media and insist that he receive the same access to
prison inmates made available to accredited reporters" by arguing that establishing a
reasonable definition of the press "should not present any constitutional difficulty").
336 See, e.g., In re Madden, 151 F.3d 125, 130 (3d Cir. 1998) (asserting that "[a]s a
creative fiction author, [a professional wrestling commentator's] primary goal [was] to
provide advertisement and entertainment-not to gather news or disseminate
information"). Moreover, to the extent courts have begun extending the journalists'
privilege to other information gatherers such as academic researchers or individual book
authors, they also appear to take care to ensure that such persons have some bona fides of
performing a legitimate information- gathering function. See supra note 218.
337 See discussion supra note 46. As discussed in note 46, whether a privately-
funded scientist, for instance, who performed research with no intent to publish her
findings would qualify for information-gathering protection is an interesting question that
is beyond the scope of this Article.
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whose mission included the research and publication of special studies or reports,
would likely also qualify.338
This is not to say that only individuals affiliated with professional institutions
or organizations could qualify for this constitutional right. Presumably, as with the
journalist privilege, virtually any person (such as an individual book author) who
could demonstrate a legitimate purpose to acquire and disseminate information of
public concern by establishing some bona fides of formal training, experience, or
other credentials to engage in such work (such as membership in a recognized
association having established standards of conduct to guide their work),339
would be entitled to invoke a First Amendment right to gather information
without undue governmental interference. But once again it is important to note
that such a right would not guarantee any of the foregoing persons access to the
information sought. It would simply give them a right to have a court assess
whether society's interest in enforcing certain laws or government actions
outweighed in a given case society's competing interest in obtaining the
information at issue.34°
338 See supra note 47; see also Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions and the
First Amendment, 112 HARv. L. REv. 84 (1999) (arguing for a more institution-specific
approach to free speech doctrine in part to recognize various important functions fulfilled
by different institutions in our society).
339 Cf, e.g., Berger, supra note 333, at 1404 n.192 (compiling codes of ethics for
various journalism associations).
340 Of course, establishing under what conditions a First Amendment right can be
invoked is only part of the battle. The other important questions then become what
standard of review or scrutiny a court would use to assess the claimed right against
competing interests asserted by the government, and what competing interests would be
sufficiently important to overcome the asserted right. See generally Stone, supra note 96
(arguing that the Court has properly applied different levels of scrutiny to content-neutral
regulations of speech (albeit without sufficient openness and explanation), including
general regulations of conduct that incidentally burden speech, depending primarily on
the extent to which such regulations limit the opportunities for free expression and the
preservation of a robust public debate). However, since the primary purpose of this
Article has been to make sense of the disparate circumstances under which the Court has
or has not recognized a right to gather information under the First Amendment, and to
suggest a more cohesive and principled scheme for making these determinations, a
detailed consideration of these additional issues is beyond the scope of this present effort.
Professor Stone and others might properly ask, however, why all this discussion of an
information-gathering "right" when the Court in practice might apply First Amendment
scrutiny under its current jurisprudence to regulations of conduct thought to substantially
restrict speech in an incidental manner? While this would be an excellent question that
would deserve much more of a response than I can provide here, I will offer briefly what
I consider to be some of the more important answers. In practice the Court both
recognizes as implied rights conduct thought to be essential to make the free speech
guarantee meaningful, see supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, and, as I have
argued in this Article, has also incorrectly used the rhetoric of rights (or "no rights" to be
more precise) to avoid difficult constitutional questions about information gathering
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Having proposed, then, the foregoing minimum requisites for invoking a First
Amendment right to gather information, 341 it remains to examine on what basis
rights as illustrated by Pell-Saxbe and Houchins. Given the importance of information-
gathering conduct to enhancing the quality or substance of speech (in addition to merely
enhancing the opportunities for, or quantity of, speech), I believe such conduct is
important enough to First Amendment values to take its place as one of the explicitly
recognized, implied First Amendment rights (albeit one of more limited scope).
Conversely, I believe the Court should be forced to deal explicitly with the important
societal interests that may be in conflict in cases like Pell-Saxbe and Houchins, and not
merely avoid those questions by asserting that information gathering may be a "right" in
some contexts but not in others. In a related vein, the various "incidental burden"
analyses employed by the Court that depend on its unstated perceptions about the severity
of the effects of conduct regulations on speech, all too often create an invisible screen
behind which it can silently balance the competing societal interests at stake in deciding
whether or not to employ First Amendment scrutiny at all (and at what level), instead of
being forced to explicitly recognize the First Amendment values inherent in certain
speech-related information gathering activities and then balance those interests against
the competing societal concerns. Moreover, to the extent certain information-gathering
conduct is or is not recognized as a First Amendment right, to that extent will members of
society receive better notice as to what conduct in this area is constitutionally protected
and what is not (instead of trying to predict these outcomes under the Court's current
obscure approaches to content-neutral regulations of speech that Professor Stone
describes so well).
341 This is not to suggest that additional limitations on invoking such constitutional
protection would not be appropriate or desirable. For instance, I have already discussed
how an affirmative right of access to government information might cause special
problems of administration. See supra notes 251-52. In order to prevent the First
Amendment from becoming a Freedom of Information Act, and to assist judges in
making delicate decisions about the competing public interests in receiving certain
information versus potential harms from disclosure, certain prudential limitations on
invoking a right of access in this context might be appropriate. First, in order to avoid
disruptive and burdensome "fishing expeditions" from bona fide investigative journalists,
for example, it might be in order to require those asserting an information-gathering right
to first exhaust any statutory or common law rights that may be available to obtain the
desired information. See supra notes 258-62. Second, it might be appropriate to require
that the desired information be described with a higher level of specificity or particularity
than may ordinarily be required to reduce the burden of overly broad requests for
information and to assist judges in evaluating the competing interests in disclosure.
Finally, such actions might be dismissible on the basis of a prima facie showing by the
government of a legitimate interest in non-disclosure that could be done in camera (such
as national security or individual privacy concerns), provided that some plausible
assertion of potential harm was made. Additionally, outside of the context of government
information and with respect to alleged burdens on information-gathering activities from
laws of general application, see supra notes 284-302 and accompanying text, it might be
appropriate to refuse to recognize an information-gathering defense based on serious
violations or breaches of criminal or civil laws, or even serious ethical lapses or
misconduct by the party asserting such a defense.
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such a right can be "fairly implied" from the text of that Amendment. 342 Clearly,
basing the right described above on the Speech Clause would not be a good fit.
While it might be reasonable to argue that a right to "speak" fairly implies a right
to gather information necessary to engage in meaningful speech, to distinguish the
societal from the individual purposes for recognizing such a right it would be
necessary to require that speech concern matters of public interest and be the
subject of broad dissemination. But once public dissemination of such expression
is required, it more realistically becomes the province of the Press Clause. The
basic idea underlying the "press" and the main reason it is distinguished from
"speech" in the First Amendment, is that "freedom of press" implies a vehicle for
the wide dissemination or publication of information. 343
Moreover, while information that is "published" in our society by the
multitude of technological means now available is certainly not always limited to
On the flip side of the coin, I do not mean to suggest that individuals or groups
failing to meet the criteria suggested in this Article for invoking a right to gather
information would have no First Amendment protection were the government to
purposefully target their information-gathering activities in order to suppress certain
speech. In such cases, the government action could be viewed as an indirect restraint on
the speech itself and subject to the First Amendment scrutiny applicable to restrictions on
such speech. See supra notes 196 and 203-04, and accompanying text.
342 See supra note 263. As noted elsewhere in this Article, see supra notes 28, 293,
and 300, other commentators have argued for special First Amendment protections for
the press with respect to their newsgathering or other press activities. See generally
Berger, supra note 333. Naturally, such commentators have proposed different tests for
identifying the "press" that is eligible to receive such protections. As might be expected,
several of these tests also contain requirements similar to those I am proposing here with
respect to a more general right to gather information under the First Amendment. See,
e.g., Berger, supra note 333, at 1396-416 (discussing various tests and proposing that an
individual is " 'engaged in journalism' when he or she is involved in a process that is
intended to generate and disseminate truthful information to the public on a regular
basis"); John K. Edwards, Should There Be A Journalists' Privilege Against
Newsgathering Liability?, 18 COMM. LAw. 8, 13 (2000) (proposing a general
newsgathering privilege from civil liability if, in addition to other requirements, "the
conduct made the basis of the action (1) constituted an activity routinely associated with
traditional ... newsgathering efforts, (2) was engaged in for the sole purpose of
furthering publication of news. . . , and (3) related to a matter of legitimate public
concern and interest").
343 See supra note 331; see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
799-800 (1978) (Burger, C. J., concurring) ("To conclude that the Framers did not intend
to limit the freedom of the press to one select group is not necessarily to suggest that the
Press Clause is redundant. The Speech Clause standing alone may be viewed as a
protection of the liberty to express ideas and beliefs, while the Press Clause focuses
specifically on the liberty to disseminate expression broadly and 'comprehends every sort
of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion.' ") (emphasis
supplied) (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
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information of public concern or importance,344 it also seems reasonable to
conclude that when the Framers adopted the Press Clause the dissemination of
such information was at the heart of their intent.345 This was definitely the view
of the various dissenting Justices in the newsgathering cases of Branzburg, Pell-
Saxbe and Houchins who argued for a societal or structural reading of press
freedom, a view that was not disputed by the majority in any of those cases.
Where the Court went awry in my opinion was in attributing a similar reading to
the Speech Clause in Richmond Newspapers, at least as to a public right to obtain
information about criminal trials.346
Finally, it simply seems more reasonable to imply a right to gather
information from the concept of "freedom of the press" than "freedom of speech."
This is especially true if press freedom, as Justice Stewart seemed to believe, was
intended to provide protection to traditional news institutions. Obviously such
enterprises must gather information in order to earn their daily bread and butter.
But even if, as most members of the Court have seemed to believe, freedom of the
press is basically equivalent to the freedom to publish, the act of publication itself
seems to imply a more structured process that frequently involves the acquisition
of information. In other words, when people take the additional time and effort
necessary to publish information, it is often because such activities were part of a
process that involved a more deliberate effort in the beginning to obtain that
information and prepare it for dissemination. Thus, it would not appear
unreasonable to read the Press Clause as encompassing antecedent information-
gathering conduct while taking a different view with respect to the Speech
Clause.
In sum, the Court has been understandably reluctant to draw any distinctions
between the Speech and Press Clauses in its First Amendment jurisprudence,
since all parties (regardless of whether or not they disseminate valuable
information to the public) are entitled to an equal right to express themselves. 347
However, when it comes to extending constitutional protection to antecedent
conduct for the purpose of promoting important societal interests, there is good
reason to avoid an "all or nothing" approach and accord certain rights to a discrete
subset of the population which society relies upon to gather and disseminate
valuable information in a responsible way. And such a proposal is not just
344 Indeed, it might be fair to assert just the opposite with respect to much
expression that is "published" on the Internet.
345 See generally Origins of the Press Clause, supra note 28 (arguing that in
adopting the Press Clause the Framers envisioned a structural role for the freedom of the
press by encouraging the dissemination of information of a political character).
346 See supra notes 263-73 and accompanying text.
347 See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 252, at 240 ("Claims that the press has greater
rights than private individuals to communicate information or opinion are unjustifiable.").
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supported by policy considerations, but by a reasonable interpretation of the Press
Clause of the First Amendment.
However, this interpretation is not based on the Court's traditional approach
of treating that clause as a superficial adjunct of the Speech Clause, but rather on a
reinvigorated and expanded interpretation of it in light of modem needs to
facilitate a robust flow of valuable information to the public. Accordingly,
"freedom of the press" should not be interpreted as being limited to one enterprise
that historically was the principal user of a particular publication technology (i.e.,
news organizations). Rather, it should be read as according First Amendment
protection to the gathering of all types of important public information, and to
their dissemination to the public via the wide array of publication technologies
available today.
V. CONCLUSION
Due to the case-by-case nature of constitutional adjudication, it is inevitable
that broad and cohesive principles in an area of constitutional law will emerge
slowly. However, the fragmented and inconsistent principles that have emerged
governing a right to gather information denigrate core First Amendment values
(in particular the interest of the public in receiving important information about
the operation of their government), and more recently threaten to eliminate any
sort of meaningful protection for the gathering of important information about
other public affairs. I have sought to demonstrate why and how the Court has
been ambivalent about extending First Amendment protection to conduct
antecedent to speech, and also how that ambivalence has contributed to an
inadequate and internally inconsistent legal regime in this area.
To create a First Amendment right to gather information that is both
meaningful and workable, as well as consistent in application across all types of
information regardless of source (whether governmental or not), this Article has
outlined some preliminary proposals that might be considered. To strike an
appropriate balance between society's need for information on which to base
important decisions of governance and public policy, and its interest in preserving
other important interests from undue conflict that a more "conduct-laden" First
Amendment right would be likely to engender, three minimum threshold
showings for invoking such a right have been proposed. Thus, the information
sought must be of legitimate public concern, it must be gathered with a view to
subsequent dissemination to the public (after editing, analysis, etc.), and it should
be limited to those persons or groups whom society recognizes as having a
legitimate information-gathering function as part of their purpose or mission.
Moreover, the most reasonable doctrinal basis for such a right would be the
Press Clause of the First Amendment. This clause evidences the Founders' desire
to ensure a robust flow of information and ideas to the public, by protecting more
of a process of expression than just the expressive acts themselves. Thus, the
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information-gathering right I have proposed would rely on a reinvigorated
interpretation of the First Amendment, one that acknowledges the Press Clause
does have a different role to play in some areas of expression than the Speech
Clause (and is not merely redundant as the current wisdom seems to assume).
And the Press Clause would not only continue to play a role in protecting the
gathering and reporting of "news" (as has traditionally been the case), but serve
society's need for facilitating flows of other types of important information as
well.
